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Theories in the international political economy literature, economic liberalism and
dependency, are explored in order to test the effect of U.S. aid, trade, and investment on
human rights conditions in recipient states. Two measures of human rights conditions
serve as dependent variables: security rights and subsistence rights.  The data cover
approximately 140 countries from 1976-1996.  Pooled cross-sectional time series
analysis, utilizing ordinary least squares (OLS) with panel corrected standard errors, is
employed due to the temporal and spatial characteristics of the data.
The results indicate that foreign assistance and economic policy may not be the
best approaches to altering poor human rights practices in the area of security rights.
Economic and military aid is negatively associated with levels of security rights,
supporting the traditional dependency perspective. While the results from trade and
investment are generally in the positive direction, the lack of consistent statistical
evidence suggests that increased trade and investment relationships do not dramatically
improve security rights.  We can conclude, however, that trade and investment fail to
have the negative effect on security rights in less developed countries which critics of
globalization suggest.
Economic aid has a statistically significant negative effect on subsistence rights,
while military aid seems to benefit the human condition in recipient states.  However,
extreme negative effects on security rights accompany any benefit realized in the area of
subsistence rights from military aid.  Trade and investment have a positive and
statistically significant effect on basic human needs providing support for the liberal
perspective.  It appears that American businesses and politicians can forge ahead with
seemingly self-interested motivations and economic policies as American economic gain
ironically serves to benefit the well being of citizens in other states.  However, in spite of
political rhetoric and even sincere intentions regarding foreign assistance policy, it
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The link between human rights and U.S. foreign policy has seldom been as
evident as in the recent debate on Capitol Hill regarding the granting of Permanent
Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) to China.  The traditional attempt to tie economic and
military assistance to human rights has given way to legislative debates regarding the
relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and investment.  Proponents of
granting China PNTR cite economic benefits to the United States, arguing that the action
would advance America’s high-tech industry and demonstrate that the United States was
not reverting to protectionist policies that failed in the past (Armey 2000).  In regards to
human rights, the positive impact on China and the Chinese people is also cited: “As
information technology spreads in China, it will help the Chinese learn about their
government and, more importantly, the world beyond.  It will encourage democratic
reforms in China and help make China a more free and open society” (Armey 2000).
Thus, conservatives in Congress advocate both a national interest, continued economic
growth, and a foreign policy interest, that of improving human rights and the
development of democratic norms.
Opponents of granting PNTR to China argue that although the U.S. government
rhetorically supports the concept of worldwide democracy, the actions of the American
business community, as well as of Congress, often contradict the sentiment.  As evidence,
opponents point to American companies favoring totalitarian countries such as China
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over democratizing states for investment (Brown 2000).  Additionally, opponents favor
connecting trading privileges to human rights conditions.  “Shame on us, shame on this
Congress, if we give Permanent Most Favored Nation Status trading privileges to the
People’s Republic of China, a communist government that flies in the face of all human
rights, that cares nothing about its workers, that exploits child labor, that uses slave labor,
that persecutes Christians, and allows and encourages forced abortions” (Brown 2000).
Thus, good foreign policy intentions on the part of critics include preventing trade until
human rights conditions improve.
This political exchange echoes the legislative debates heard several decades
earlier concerning the allocation and appropriation of foreign assistance.  In the 1970s
and 1980s, legislators argued whether the United States should consider a state’s human
rights practices when allocating economic and military aid.  The debate resurfaced during
the recent discussions regarding granting Colombia a $1.6 billion aid package.
Supporters in Congress of the plan cite the domestic drug problem as the primary reason
for the need of foreign assistance, however they often resort to human rights and
democracy rhetoric for support.
We have the obligation to at least assist them with some additional fire
power with which to fight the druggies who have been using our dollars
to buy weapons to fight the people there who are trying to preserve their
democracy…Narco-guerrillas, funded by the illicit drug trade, now threaten
the oldest democracy in Latin America.  The Colombian government has the
political will, but not the resources, to combat this threat.  Failing to provide
U.S. “Supplemental” aid will further weaken Colombia’s democratic institutions,
jeopardize its fragile economy and undermine its ability to negotiate peace
(Souder 2000).
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Congressman Souder’s urging was accompanied by that of Congressman Ballenger who
described a recent FARC attack on a village and argued that this “recent attack should
present us with more clear evidence that any further delay…will result in more violence,
more attacks, and could threaten the very existence of the Colombian government”
(Ballenger 2000a).1
Opponents of Plan Colombia in Congress argue that supply side attacks in the war
on drugs are and have been fruitless, and funding should be provided for domestic drug
treatment programs (Ramstad 2000).  In addition, opponents point to the impact of
foreign assistance, and in this case military assistance in particular, on human rights.
“We have just voted, with essentially no strings attached, to be involved in a military
operation in Colombia with the money going for a military operation, to a military that
does not lift a finger while these paramilitary death squads go in and massacre innocent
people. I say to Senators, Democrats and Republicans, this is no longer Colombia’s
business.  This is our business because we now have provided the money for just such a
military, which is complicit, not only in human rights violations…but in the murder of
innocent people, including small children” (Wellstone 2000).
With cuts to the foreign assistance program since the end of the Cold War and the
ever increasing trends in globalization, this same argument has shifted from the allocation
of public, or government, funds to the regulation of private funds, mainly trade and
                                                          
1 Congressman Ballenger offered an even more dramatic plea for passage of the Colombian aid package.
“Mr. Speaker, in Shakespeare’s play Julius Caesar, the soothsayer warned Caesar to ‘beware of the Ides of
March.’ Caesar did not listen and Caesar perished.  Today, on this Ides of March, I bring my colleagues fair
warning. If we do not pass the Colombia aid package, our friends in Colombia could suffer the same fate as
Caesar and our own children could be next” (2000b).
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investment.  This scenario begs the question, is there any merit to the arguments
presented by proponents of granting China PNTR or to the arguments from those
advocating the Colombian aid package?   In other words, is there any empirical evidence
to suggest that human rights conditions are improved by the infusion of international
capital and goods, or even foreign assistance for that matter? Or, is the road to hell paved
with good intentions?
While these questions appeal to those interested in human rights policy and U.S.
foreign policy, these inquiries also address competing theories found in the field of
international relations.  First, the neo-liberal perspective suggests that all forms of
international capital, whether it be aid, trade, or investment, are beneficial to all parties.
The international economy is a positive sum game whereby all participants can
experience improvements in wealth and development, both of which contribute to
improvements in human rights conditions.  Dependency theorists and critics of
globalization, on the other hand, contend that the flow of international capital and goods,
including foreign assistance, is self-serving to the donor regime at the expense of the
recipient regime, particularly the underdeveloped Global South.  Thus, aid, trade, and
investment dollars from the United States are merely economic and political tools aimed
at perpetuating the development and wealth gaps between developed and less developed
states.  Reliance on aid, trade, and investment inhibits both economic and political growth
necessary for the improvements in human rights conditions.
While most academic research examines human rights as a determinant or factor
in foreign and economic policy decisions, this research focuses on the consequences of
foreign policy decisions.  Specifically, this research investigates whether U.S. aid, trade,
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or direct foreign investment affects human rights conditions.  Additionally, this research
addresses the results of the empirical findings in the context of the implications for U.S.
foreign policy.  For example, findings that foreign aid has a negative effect on human
rights conditions would suggest that policy makers should consider this when making
decisions such as the recent Colombian aid package, assuming human rights is a concern.
Likewise, if the results indicate that trade and investment are related to improvements in
human rights, then policies aimed at reducing these relationships due to poor human
rights records may be misguided. These and other scenarios are explored in connection
with the empirical results.
Significance of Study
The majority of the published research on human rights and foreign policy
examines human rights conditions as a determinant in foreign policy decisions,
particularly the allocation of foreign aid. 2   Very little research examines the impact of
U.S. foreign policies, particularly those relating to the allocation of foreign assistance or
economic factors of globalization, on human rights conditions (Regan 1995; Meyer 1996,
1998; Smith et al. 1998, 1999).  This research will address this deficiency in the
understanding of the consequences of U.S. policy making.
In addition, the present research will contribute to the existing research on the
relationship between U.S. foreign policy and human rights in several ways. Focusing on
the influence of the United States is significant because that country was the leader in the
post-World War II era and advocated the liberal capitalist ideology necessary for the
                                                          
2 See Schoultz 1980; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984; Cingranelli and Pasquerello 1985; Carleton and
Stohl 1987; McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 1989; Hofrenning 1990; Poe 1990, 1991, 1992; Poe and
Sirirangsi 1993, 1994; Poe et al. 1994; Blanton 1994; Poe and Meernik 1995; Apodaca and Stohl 1999.
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emerging globalization that took place.  In addition, the United States was the major
western country in the Cold War era that impacted the nature and degree of foreign
assistance, particularly in the allocation of foreign aid to nations of the South.
Also, this research is the first to combine U.S. aid, trade and investment in one
analysis.  The relationship between aid and human rights is examined first, followed by
an analysis of the relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and investment.  The
last chapter offers an integrated model that includes economic aid, military aid, trade
openness, direct foreign investment, and a variety of economic, political, and
cultural/social control variables.   In contrast with the aid and investment literature, a
larger sample of countries is examined.3
Two different measures will be employed to capture the concept of human rights.
The most prevalent research in human rights concentrates on the personal integrity of the
person, or security rights (McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Carleton and Stohl 1985; Poe
and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999).  However, the liberal perspective also
suggests that increases in economic conditions will improve not only the personal
integrity of the individual, but overall living conditions as well.4  Thus, this research will
examine the relationship between aid, trade, and investment from the United States and
human rights conditions using two separate concepts of human rights: security rights and
subsistence rights.
                                                          
3 This study includes approximately 140 countries from 1976 through 1996 compared to that of Regan’s
(1995) use of 32 developing countries in Latin America and Asia, Meyer’s (1996, 1998) sample of
approximately 50 Third World nations, and Smith et al.’s (1998, 1999) similar sample.
4 Research addressing subsistence rights or basic human needs include Dixon (1984); Rosh (1986);
Spalding (1986); Dixon and Moon (1987); London and Williams (1988); Moon and Dixon (1985, 1992);
Moon (1991); Milner (1998); Milner, Poe, and Leblang (1999).
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This study employs an improved research design, specifically the use of pooled
cross-sectional time series.  Regan (1995) does employ pooled cross-sectional analysis in
his study of the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights, but the study is
limited in the number of nations included.  In addition, the models in the present study
include key control variables identified by earlier studies (Poe and Tate 1994) that are
omitted in the studies of Meyer (1996, 1998), Smith et al. (1998, 1999), and Regan
(1995).  This study also takes into account the end of the Cold War which has not been
addressed in the human rights literature by previous research, with the exception of
Milner (1998).  Smith et al. (1998) acknowledge the changes in direct foreign investment
due to the end of the Cold War and even call for expanding the time frame used by Meyer
(1996).
In addition to the main-effects models of security and subsistence rights, this
research investigates the nature of the relationship between each variable of interest and
human rights.  In other words, the assumption that aid, trade, and investment has a simple
linear relationship with human rights is not made; rather, the analysis includes a
discussion and an empirical test to determine whether there are, in fact, curvilinear
relationships.  This is a substantial improvement over the vast majority of the literature
on the determinants of human rights, which assumes and tests for only linear
relationships (Dixon 1984; Rosh 1986; Spalding 1986; Dixon and Moon 1987; Mitchell
and McCormick 1988; London and Williams 1988; Moon and Dixon 1985, 1992; Moon
1991;  Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1999; McCormick and
Mitchell 1997; Milner 1998; Milner, Poe, and Leblang 1999; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999;
Blanton 1999).  A second analysis addresses, in a theoretical and empirical fashion, a
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possible interaction effect that aid, trade, and investment each has with democracy and
wealth, another possibility that is largely left unaddressed by previous research.  Thus,
several interaction terms are introduced into each model.
Lastly, this research addresses the foreign policy implications associated with
each type of economic influence from the United States, that is, aid, trade, and
investment.  Accounting for the variables that explain human rights abuses or poor living
conditions is just the start.  Being able to explain how government actions affect human
rights allows for better policy prescriptions on the part of academicians.
Organization of the Study
This research on the relationship between U.S. aid, trade, investment and human
rights is divided into seven chapters.  The next chapter reviews the literature on the
determinants of human rights, the relationship between foreign assistance and human
rights, and the relationship between factors of globalization and human rights.  The
additional economic, political, and social factors contributing to the realization of both
security and subsistence rights are also explored.  Lastly, this section offers a critique of
the literature, pointing out potential gaps in the literature.
Chapter Three delves into the theories explored in this study.  First, the nature of
human rights is explored, specifically, the development of security and subsistence rights.
This section seeks to address whether there are trade-offs between these rights when it
comes to foreign policy.  Does the realization of certain types of rights necessarily negate
or prevent the realization of other types of rights?  Or are rights realized in a
simultaneous fashion?  In the context of this study, it is logical to assume that aid, trade,
and investment are going to influence more than just one type, or subset, of rights.  It is
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naïve to believe that any country can direct aid or trade or investment to influence only
security rights and not subsistence rights.  The same money is flowing into the domestic
state; it will undoubtedly influence more than one factor in that country.
Second, the nature of foreign assistance is examined within the context of neo-
realism.  The importance of donor interests in the allocation process of foreign assistance
suggests that governments utilize aid programs in a classic realpolitik fashion.  Are
governments, in this case the United States, truly interested in improving conditions in
recipient states, or is national security the priority?  Are these competing or
complementary interests?   Ultimately, does the interest or purpose of the donor make a
difference in terms of the effect on human rights?  The inconsistency of the U.S.’ human
rights policy suggests that the promotion of human rights, the concerns for economic and
social development in poorer nations, and ultimately peace within these regions, are often
sacrificed for other concerns, mainly national security.  Ruttan (1989), in addressing
foreign assistance specifically, suggests that there is an inconsistency between policies
based on self-interest and policies based on human needs which may lead to disturbing
consequences. One such consequence is the danger that self-interest may be pursued in
the name of foreign aid, regardless of the impact on the recipient nations.  The question
becomes, does this donor interest even matter?  Regardless of intent of aid, the United
States, or any other donor, has a moral responsibility to ensure that their gain is not at the
expense of the recipient’s pain, particularly in the area of human rights.
Third, the neo-liberal perspective on the positive effects of globalization, as well
as the arguments posed by critics of globalization, are explored in Chapter Three.  In
practice, it is suggested that private industry, particularly multinational and transnational
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corporations, is concerned with such factors as domestic and regional stability, the
presence of labor unions, and the domestic infrastructure.  It is often argued that MNCs
and TNCs will not invest in a state unless certain conditions are met, conditions relating
to the respect for political rights (Forsythe 1997; McCorquodale and Fairbrother 1999).
However, critics suggest that this fact entices host governments to engage in human
rights violations in order to attract foreign investment.
The theoretical effects of trade and investment are found in two competing views
on the effects of globalization.  The opposing views are often interpreted in relation to the
extent of the distribution of power, wealth, and development as well as the degree of
political and economic struggles over resources (Klak 1998).  It is argued, in a neo-liberal
vein, that globalization provides for economic development and that all players benefit, in
a positive sum game, even the underdeveloped nations of the South.  The liberal capitalist
ideology and policy from which globalization is derived “represents a country’s ticket or
passport to the globalizing economy” (Klak 1998, 3)  Critics of globalization point to the
increasing divide between rich and poor countries, economic inequality within nations,
and the decreasing ability of states to develop and control domestic economic institutions
(Klak 1988; Thomas and Wilkin 1997; 1999; Coker 1999; Galbraith 1999).
The implications of the effects of globalization on human rights can easily be
drawn.  Should globalization benefit nations domestically in terms of economic
development and democratization, human rights conditions should improve as each of
these variables or factors has been found to be important in the realization of human
rights.  However, if critics are correct, then globalization may have a deleterious effect on
human rights in that countries associated with economic inequality, lower levels of
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overall economic development, and those with autocratic governments tend to be less
respectful of human rights.  Critics argue that aspects of globalization, such as trade and
investment, simply contribute to all these inequalities in developing states and lead to
trade dependent and investment dependent relationships.
In Chapter Four, the two models of the realization of human rights are
established.  This process includes the development of a security rights and a subsistence
rights model. Previous models concentrate primarily on domestic factors, with the
exception of international war in the security rights model (Poe and Tate 1994) and the
inclusion of trade by Moon (1991). However, research has begun to examine the
interaction between international and domestic factors, particularly as they relate to the
development of domestic institutions and norms of behavior (Rothgeb 1989, 1990, 1991,
1996; Regan 1995; Meyer 1996, 1998; Smith et al. 1999; Ziegenhagen 1986; Carleton
1989; Pion-Berlin 1989; Timberlake and Williams 1984; and Kowaleski 1989).
In addition, the derivation of the dependent variables is explained in this chapter.
The variable for security rights is designed to capture the level of government abuse of
the integrity of the person.  Thus, this variable measures a government’s propensity to
torture, arbitrarily imprison, summarily execute its citizens for political reasons, as well
as captures the level of extrajudicial killings and disappearances within a society.  The
second dependent variable, subsistence rights, is derived from an index measuring infant
mortality, life expectancy, and basic literacy levels.  It is commonly referred to as the
Physical Quality of Life Index (Morris 1979, 1996).  This measure is designed to capture
the ability of a regime to meet the basic needs of its people.
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The variables of interest, U.S. aid, trade, and investment, are defined and the
mode of measurement is discussed in Chapter Four.  Each variable is reported, in the
original data source, in millions of dollars.  Simply utilizing the variable in this form
distorts the actual influence or relationship between the United States and the recipient
state.5  For example, if state A and state B both receive ten million dollars in aid for a
particular year, it would be incorrect to assume an equal influence on each if state A is
one of the more developed countries, such as Argentina, whose mean value of GDP is
$128,896 million and state B is a smaller, poverty stricken country such as Haiti whose
GDP is $1,678 million.6  Thus, each variable of interest is converted into a percentage of
GDP.  Since this research is testing competing theories regarding the effect of these
variables, the hypotheses regarding the relationship between each of these variables and
human rights is presented as competing hypotheses.  Summary statistics also are provided
showing the differences between a sample of all countries, an OECD sample, and a
sample of non-OECD states.
The remaining control variables are categorized as representing either economic,
political, or social and cultural factors.  The additional economic variables include
measures for wealth and economic growth.  The political variables in the security model
include the level of democracy, the presence of a leftist or a military government, the
presence of either a civil or international war, and a variable for the end of the Cold War.
                                                          
5 The term recipient is used in this study to refer to those states that receive aid, trade, or investment from
the United States.  This term is usually used in the context of foreign assistance, however, to avoid any
confusion it will encompass trade and investment as well.
6 A similar comparison can be made using per capita GDP where Argentineans have an average annual
income of $4,040, while Haitians survive on approximately $275 per year.
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In addition to these political variables, the subsistence model includes two additional
variables: the level of military burden and the number of military personnel.  The social
and cultural variables in the security model include two measures for population, the
level of population and population growth, as well as a variable indicating whether the
state was colonialized by the British.  The subsistence model adds two additional religion
variables measuring the presence of Muslim or Buddhism as a state religion.
 Lastly, Chapter Four explains the methodology utilized in the study.  This study
examines (1) the influence of aid, trade, and investment on the level of human rights, (2)
whether there is a linear or curvilinear relationship between these variables and human
rights conditions and (3) whether the effect of aid, trade, and investment are moderated
by levels of democracy and wealth.  There are approximately 140 countries in the sample
covering a twenty year time period, 1976-1996.   In all three instances, I am interested in
the relationship over time and across many nations.   As such, pooled cross-sectional time
series analysis is the most appropriate design (Stimson 1985; Sayrs 1989; Hicks 1994)
and appropriate, sophisticated statistical methodologies will be used.
Chapter Five presents the results of the effects of U.S. foreign assistance on
human rights conditions.  First, the bivariate relationship between aid and human rights is
addressed.  Then, the results from the multivariate analyses are presented and discussed.
Generally, foreign aid serves as a detriment to human rights.  This finding lends support
to the arguments presented by dependency theorists and critics of globalization who
suggest that elites within the recipient state merely use U.S. dollars to perpetuate their
power and terrorize the political opposition.  Additional analyses are offered to first
assess the nature of the relationship between foreign assistance and human rights.
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Second, the possibility of interaction effects between aid and democracy and between aid
and wealth is pursued.   Interaction terms are created and added to the main-effects model
in order to empirically test whether the effect of foreign aid is conditioned upon the level
of democracy and the level of wealth in recipient states.
Chapter Six presents the effects of economic globalization (i.e., trade and
investment) on human rights conditions.   As in the case with the foreign assistance
chapter, bivariate relationships between these variables are examined, followed by a
multivariate analysis.  The bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that trade and
investment positively and consistently affect subsistence rights, indicating that increases
in the level of U.S. trade and investment relationships translate into increases in the level
of basic human needs.  The effects on security rights are not as consistent and an
additional analysis is offered in order to investigate this result.  Similar to the analysis in
Chapter Five, curvilinear and interaction effects also are explored.
Chapter Seven offers an integrated model combining aid, trade, and investment,
as well as the control variables, into one analysis.  In addition, this chapter summarizes
all of the results of the study and offers suggestions for further research.  Implications for
U.S. foreign policy are explored, given the empirical results.  The combined results
suggest that foreign assistance and economic policies are not the optimal means to
attempt to alter (i.e., improve) a regime’s behavior regarding security rights.  Suggestions
that foreign aid has the potential to do otherwise are not supported by any empirical
results in this study.   While the results from trade and investment generally suggest a
positive relationship, the substantive results suggest that economic policies do not
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drastically alter human rights conditions where the integrity of the individual is
concerned.
The results from the subsistence rights model offer more hope for the relationship
between economic policy and human rights conditions.  While foreign assistance is still,
in general, a negative influence, the prospect for trade and investment improving the level
of basic human needs is promising.  Thus, this research comes to the general conclusion
that the U.S. foreign aid program has perpetuated and contributed to poor human rights
conditions in recipient states and should not be used, rhetorically or in practice, as a tool
to improve human rights.  In addressing national security concerns, the United States
needs to pursue alternative means of influence.  While the allocation of foreign assistance
may serve as a valuable national security tool, it does so at the expense of citizens
elsewhere.  Withholding foreign assistance on the grounds of poor human rights records,
however, would be a positive step in the implementation of an U.S. foreign assistance
program.
  The results from the trade and investment variables are consistent in the analysis
using both the entire sample and non-OECD states only.  The consequence in this case, at
least for subsistence rights, is a positive one.  The human condition is improved by U.S.
trade and investment.  Additionally, trade and investment does not appear to contribute to
a state’s propensity to violate security rights.  The intention of those engaged in trade and
investment is that of economic gain and not necessarily improving human rights.
American businesses, as well as politicians interested in continuing the pattern of
American prosperity, can forge ahead with these seemingly self-interested motivations
and economic policies as their economic gain, as Adam Smith and David Ricardo
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predicted, serves to benefit living conditions for citizens in other states.  On the other
hand, in spite of political rhetoric and even sincere intentions on the part of policy makers
regarding foreign assistance policy, it appears that the road to hell is paved not only with
good intentions, but self-serving intentions as well.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Introduction
The following chapter provides an overview and critique of the previous research
conducted on security and subsistence rights.  The first section examines the development
of the dependent variable – human rights.  Questions such as how researchers define
human rights, how the data is gathered and measured, and whether the measurement of
human rights reflects the definition are considered.  The second section examines the
empirical research on the determinants of security and subsistence rights, specifically the
economic, political and cultural factors that the literature has identified to be significant
in the realization of both security and subsistence rights.   The literature examining the
effect of foreign assistance, direct investment, and trade is discussed within this section.
The last section focuses on the literature addressing the effects of U.S. aid, trade, and
investment on human rights conditions.
Determinants of Security and Subsistence Rights
The research on human rights falls primarily into two categories: first, human
rights as an independent variable explaining U.S. foreign policy decisions such as the
allocation of aid, and, second, human rights as a dependent variable investigating the
causes of human rights violations.1   In the 1980s, researchers began to examine the
                                                          
1 For studies utilizing human rights as an independent variable to explain aid allocation see Schoultz 1980;
Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1987;
McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 1989; Hofrenning 1990; Poe 1990, 1991, 1992; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994;
Poe et al. 1994; Blanton 1994; Poe and Meernik 1995, Apodaca and Stohl 1999.
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conditions within nation-states that explained the latter category, that is, the variation in
human rights conditions.  Specifically, these early studies focused on what would become
known as security rights, or those rights that guarantee the right to be free from
government torture, imprisonment due to political views, and murder (see Stohl and
Carleton 1985; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Poe and
Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Blanton 1999).  At the same time, a second set of
researchers began examining the factors that contribute to a citizen’s standard of living,
or basic human needs (Dixon 1984; Moon and Dixon 1985, 1992; Dixon and Moon 1987;
Moon 1991; Milner 1998).   The following sections of Chapter Two examine the process
of determining and defining human rights as a dependent variable and discuss the
literature that employs such measures.
Human Rights as a Dependent Variable
The first issue facing researchers in the field of human rights has been the
definition of the variable itself.   Once the definition has been established, several
additional issues are relevant, specifically the availability of data and reconciling the data
available with a definition and measurement of human rights.  Like all studies in political
science, the question a researcher wishes to address will determine all other decisions in
the research design, including the definition of the dependent variable.  For example, if
one wishes to ascertain whether wealth influences the level of voting and participation
within a state, the researcher might define the dependent variable as political rights.
Thus, in the case of human rights, researchers must decide if the question they are asking
refers to civil and political rights, personal integrity rights, economic rights, social rights
and so on.
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These typologies have arisen, in part, from the Universal Declaration of Rights
(1948),  and other international human rights covenants such as the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Its Eight Protocols
(1950), The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (1951),  the United Nations International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights (1966), the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (1966), and The Helsinki Agreement (1975).  These agreements outline a
wide range of human rights that the international community strives to protect.   The
selection of which rights to focus on, again, depends on the question being posed in the
research.2
“[E]ven when one has clearly delineated what is meant by human rights
violations, reliable information is often hard to come by” (Carleton and Stohl 1985, 211).
The researcher faces the following questions: Where does the data come from? Who
gathers it?  How reliable and valid are the data?   Nations are usually not forthcoming
with detailed information regarding any abuses that might occur.   Additionally, the
quantity and quality of available human rights data lacks consistency across nations and
over time (Lopez and Stohl 1992).
The last issue involves reconciling the data and actual measurement with the
concept or definition of human rights.  In the case of security rights, there seems to be a
                                                          
2 There is a debate within the human rights literature regarding the “dichotomy” of civil and political rights
on one hand and social and economic rights on the other (Donnelly 1989).  Some researchers question
whether the latter actually constitute human rights at all (Cranston 1964).  This research follows the logic
presented by Donnelly, specifically that these rights are related and social and economic rights (in this case
a standard of life) are indeed human rights.  In addition, this research assumes that there is at least a
minimum level of human rights that is considered universal as evidenced by nation-state's signatures on the
various international human rights documents and covenants.
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consensus that this at least includes torture, false imprisonment, and extrajudicial
disappearances and killings.  The data available with this type of information come from
Amnesty International, State Department Country Reports, as well as professional media
sources.  This has led to the development of two basic types of measurement: an events-
based approach and a standards-based approach.   An events-based human rights measure
consists of a tabulation of the various categories of abuses over a given period of time.
The information regarding the types of abuses is usually gleaned from newspaper
sources. For example, the Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) data set provides the
number of conflictual and cooperative events for a given country each year.  Other
examples are the data set gathered by Taylor and Jodice (1983) and the PANDA data set
(Bond and Bond 1995).
A standards-based data set, on the other hand, establishes a set of criteria for
different levels or rankings for a country.  Researchers examine annual reports on human
rights conditions, such as Amnesty International and State Department country profiles,
and assign a rating for each country given the set of criteria (see Gastil 1980; Carleton
and Stohl 1985).  As will be seen, a consensus on which method is best is not
forthcoming.  Adding to the confusion, security rights has appeared in studies as
“integrity of the person,” “political repression,” and “negative sanctions.”
Studies focusing on the realization of basic human needs rely primarily on
demographic data.   Initially, the measure employed by researchers interested in basic
human rights needs has been one of wealth, specifically gross national or gross domestic
product.  The main reason for its use has been availability.  Researchers hypothesized that
the poorest in a society would eventually realize the benefits from increases in societal
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wealth (Milner 1998).   Moon (1991) presents several arguments regarding the
inadequacies of wealth as a measure of basic human needs.  He argues that wealth, in the
form of GNP, fails to indicate individual income or consumption.  This would be required
in order to evaluate a citizen’s basic human needs.  Second, a measure of GNP fails to
account for price fluctuations within and between countries.  “In sum, the same income
buys very different levels of basic needs fulfillment, even within a single country” (Moon
1991, 21).   Third, a measure of GNP does not account for how the income is distributed
within a society, particularly among women and children.  Lastly, Moon argues that
measures of wealth fail to account for the fact that crucial items necessary for basic
human needs may simply not be available.
Additional demographic measures have been considered, including indicators of
minimum health and nutrition standards, levels of education, adequate water and housing,
and necessary sanitation.   International organizations and agencies such as the United
Nations Development Program, UNESCO, and AID routinely gather such indicators of
basic human needs.   Many researchers have created composite indices of these basic
needs components (Drewnoski and Scott 1966; McGranahan et al. 1972; U.S. National
Economic and Social Council).  The most prominent and widely used index was
developed by Morris (1979).  This Physical Quality of Life Index is a composite of infant
mortality, life expectancy, and literacy.
Literature with Human Rights as a Dependent Variable
Security Rights
Research on the realization of either security or subsistence rights has utilized a
variety of measures as the dependent variable.  As stated above, the measure utilized is
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based on the research question posed.  For example, is the researcher interested primarily
in why governments abuse citizens or why the government is unable to adequately
provide for the basic welfare of the citizenry?  The literature on human rights, thus far,
has focused primarily on two categories of rights: personal integrity or security rights and
basic human needs or subsistence rights.
Early studies focused on political and civil rights.  One of the initial efforts to
codify these types of human rights abuses was the Comparative Survey of Freedom by
Gastil (1973).  Beginning in 1978, Freedom House published an annual report, Freedom
in the World, based upon Gastil’s criteria.  In these surveys, freedom is defined in terms
of political rights “that allow people to participate freely and effectively in choosing their
leaders or in voting directly on legislation and those civil liberties that guarantee
freedoms such as speech, privacy and a fair trial” (Gastil 1980, 4).  Each nation receives a
rating based on a set of factors contributing to a citizen's civil and political rights.  The
result is a ranking from 1 to 7.  The nations are then divided into three categories:
countries with a rating of 1 or 2 are considered “free,” a rating from 3 to 5 refers to a
“partly free” country, and a 6 or 7 indicates a country that is “not free.”
In addition, Gastil (1980) created a scale of political terror which captures
“murder, torture, exile, passport restrictions, denial of vocation, ubiquitous presence of
police controls, and threats against relatives” (Gastil 1980, 37).  This scale provided a set
of criteria that captures personal integrity or security rights.  This political terror scale has
five levels:
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Level A Countries on Level A live under a secure rule of law, people are not
imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional (though
police and prison brutality may occur). Political murders are extremely
rare. There is no detention without trial, and laws protect individual and
group rights.
Level B On Level B there is a limited amount of imprisonment for non violent
political activity.  However, few persons are affected, torture and beating
are exceptional, and psychiatric institutions are not used to silence
political opponents. Political murder is rare, or, if present, characteristic
of small terrorist organizations.
Level C On Level C there is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history
of such imprisonment.  Executions or other political murders and brutality
may be common.  Unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political
views is accepted.  Incarceration in mental hospitals and the involuntary
use of strong drugs may supplement imprisonment.
Level D On Level D the practices of Level C are expanded to larger numbers.
Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life in some
societies at this level. In others there is large-scale incarceration of
ideological opponents in labor camps or reeducation centers. In still
others the terror may stem primarily from the arbitrary and capricious
manner in which opponents are punished.  In spite of its generality, on
this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in
politics or ideas.
Level E On Level E the terrors of Level D have been extended to the whole
population, and may result from religious, ethnic, or ideological
fanaticism.  The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means
or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals. The
worst periods of Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia characterize countries
on Level E (Gastil 1980, 37).
It is with this political terror scale that Carleton and Stohl (1985) developed a one-
dimensional ranking of countries.  In their study, they employ three separate measures to
capture the concept of human rights.  One dependent variable is simply the Freedom
House civil rights scale mentioned previously.  The other two dependent variables are
created using the Gastil five-level scale.  The country information utilized came from two
different sources: the State Department Country Reports and Amnesty International.  This
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study is significant in that it established the idea that human rights are a one-dimensional
phenomenon.  Second, it created a data set that was both cross-national and cross-
temporal in that it included 59 countries for the years 1977 to 1983.  This allowed for
inferences to be made about dynamic changes across time.  Lastly, this research
demonstrated that utilizing different sources of data within the same study provides more
robust and reliable findings.  The five-level scale developed by Gastil (1980) would be
the basis for several additional studies.
Wolpin (1986) creates his own categories for countries using Amnesty
International and State Department Country Reports.  Three categories are based on the
level of violence within a nation: violent, institutional, and minimal.  He compares his list
with that of Sivard (1983) and any differences in the country list are then resolved by
referring to the classification provided by Gastil (1980).  This study is restricted to the
105 low-income countries for the years 1973 through 1980.
Park (1987) ) uses three separate measures for the concept of human rights in a
study of one hundred countries spanning the late 1970s and early 1980s. The exact years
and the exact countries are unclear as the author states that not all of the variables of
interest are available for each country for every year.  The rationale for the broad concept
and scope of human rights is to “encompass all three aspects: the political rights of the
First World, the social rights of the Second World, and the basic economic rights of the
Third World” (Park 1987, 406).  Thus, he uses a composite of Gastil’s Freedom House
Civil and Political Indices, the GINI index, and the Physical Quality of Life Index
(Morris 1979).  This study is mainly a preliminary examination of the variables with very
little theoretical discussions regarding the relationships between them and human rights.
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These two studies demonstrate, once again, the use of multiple measures for the
dependent variable, a pattern that would continue within the literature.
The literature up to this point utilized a one-dimensional measure for the concept
of security rights.  Mitchell and McCormick’s (1988) dependent variable is actually two
dependent variables designed to capture the level of “arbitrary imprisonment” on one
hand and “the systematic use of killings and torture of prisoners” on the other.  “The
conceptual justification for this dichotomy was based upon the view that, although
arbitrary imprisonment was certainly reprehensible, resort to torture and killing was a
distinct, and qualitatively worse, activity” (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 484).   In
order to construct their two-dimensional dependent variable, the authors rely solely on
Amnesty International reports from 1985.  They cite bias in both the Freedom House and
State Department reports as justification for their exclusion.  Through correlation tests,
they find that their measure of political imprisonment/torture is comparable to other
measures of human rights violations.  This study sparked a debate within the literature
regarding the proper way to measure the various governmental actions that are
collectively referred to as security rights.
Referring to disappearances, detention, torture, and political killings as political
repression, Henderson (1991, 1993) utilized the Gastil (1980) method of measuring the
dependent variable.  Similar to Mitchell and McCormick (1988), Henderson relied on
only one source of data – the State Department Country Reports.  However, to ensure
coding validity, the data were compared to Humana’s (1986) survey and Amnesty
International reports.
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Poe and Tate (1994) prefer the one-dimensional approach arguing that “the two
dimensions postulated by Mitchell and McCormick stem, in reality, from the one
dimension that Stohl and his colleagues tap – that both torture/killing and imprisonment
are rooted in a regime’s willingness to repress its citizens when they are considered a
threat” (Poe and Tate 1994, 855).   The authors employ the now familiar five-level
coding system using both Amnesty International and State Department Records for the
years 1980 to 1987 for 153 countries.  These data were expanded to 1994 in a subsequent
article (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).
Thus far, all of the studies under consideration employed a standard-based
measure.  Davenport (1995a, 1995b, 1996, 1999) opted for an events-based measure in
studies on negative sanctions.  This research employs the Taylor and Jodice (1983)
measure that tabulates on an annual basis government censorship and restrictions.
Davenport argues that this measure is preferable for three reasons.  He suggests that these
data are more reliable than data on violations of physical integrity rights such as torture,
political executions, and false imprisonment.  This holds across countries and over time.
Second, Davenport argues that the events-based measure provides for more variance in
the dependent variable.  Lastly, “as the rate of government responsiveness is of interest
and not the general amount of restrictiveness/permissiveness allowed by the political
system, this measure is much more appropriate than some ‘standard-based’ measure such
as Freedom House or Amnesty International Country reports” (Davenport 1996a, 389).
Considering the question Davenport seeks to address is different than the determinants of
human rights abuse, this choice of dependent variable may indeed be appropriate.
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The latest innovation in measuring security rights is offered by Cingranelli and
Richards (1999).  Concentrating on physical integrity rights, the authors employ a version
of Mokken Scaling Analysis to argue that security rights are a one-dimensional
phenomenon.  In addition, their analysis suggests that this one scale “provides
information not only about the level of government respect for physical integrity rights,
but also about the pattern and sequence of government respect for particular physical
integrity rights” (Cingranelli and Richards 1999, 408).   Unfortunately, the data are only
available for the years 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, and 1996 and for only seventy-nine
countries.
Subsistence Rights
Thus far, the studies have focused on what the literature refers to generally as first
generation rights.  These rights are characterized as those protecting the political, civil,
and physical integrity rights of the citizenry.  Researchers also have focused on
explaining the factors contributing to the basic needs of individuals.  Shue (1980) argues
that human rights consist of more than just security rights or personal integrity rights. He
contends that there are also subsistence rights and the right to liberty.  The primary
variable employed here has been the Physical Quality of Life Index (hereafter PQLI)
(Morris 1979, 1996).  Researchers utilizing this variable include Dixon (1984), Moon and
Dixon (1985, 1992), Spalding (1986), Rosh (1986), Moon (1991), and Milner (1999).
The use of different dependent variables to capture the concept of human rights
suggests that there is not a consensus among researchers and that there are multiple
dimensions of the term "human rights", to which no one measure does justice.  The
present research attempts to provide a more robust finding by employing two different
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measures: one designed to capture the concept of the universal right to life and liberty
and the second designed to capture those rights most closely identified as basic human
needs.
Determinants of Human Rights
Security Rights
Wolpin (1986) offers a study utilizing 105 less-developed countries from 1973-
1980.   Using only a bivariate analysis, Wolpin (1986) finds that military rule and ethnic
fragmentation have a negative impact on human rights.  Of particular interest is the
finding that military aid is also negatively related to human rights.  This result supports
arguments presented by dependency theorists and others (Meyer 1998) that foreign aid,
especially military aid, serves as a detriment to human rights conditions.  In addition,
Wolpin (1986) finds that education and literacy have a positive impact on human rights
conditions.  The major drawback to this study is that it only shows bivariate relationships
and offers no causal relationship.  Basically, this study offers an exploratory examination
of the possible variables that might influence the level of violence perpetuated by the
state.  It offers little theoretical reasoning for these relationships.
Park (1987) finds that there is a positive relationship between human rights and
ethnic diversity, governmental expenditures on welfare, percent of the population that
adheres to Christianity, and urbanization.  On the other hand, the study found a negative
relationship between human rights and governmental expenditures on education and the
military and the percent of the population that is Muslim.  The limitation of this study is
the narrow scope and the simplistic methodology employed.  This research is valuable,
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however, in that it established various tendencies and correlations among explanatory
variables and contributed to the development of human rights models.
Mitchell and McCormick (1988) also attempt to explain the causes of human
rights violations by analyzing 123 countries in 1985.  The authors look at the level of
poverty, economic development, economic dependency including level of trade and
investment, the colonial experience, and type of political regime.  The authors actually
use two dependent variables, one designed to capture the level of “arbitrary
imprisonment” and one that measures “the systematic use of killings and torture of
prisoners.”  A five-point ordinal scale is then utilized to “provide greater sensitivity to
these dimensions” (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, 484).  They posit three basic
hypotheses:  (1) that the relationship between wealth and abuse is linear based on the
theory posited by Robert McNamara; (2) that the relationship between wealth and abuse
is curvilinear based on the theory posited by Samuel Huntington; and (3) the Marxist
theory indicates that there is a positive relationship between investment and government
repression.
While the authors spend a great deal of time outlining the theoretical arguments
regarding the economic variables, they spend little time actually empirically testing the
hypotheses.  In fact, they place more emphasis on the other variables of interest: British
colonialism, age of the regime, and regime type.  The control variables in the study
include income, trade and population size.  In addressing economic explanations for
human rights violations, they find that, generally, the more wealthy the nation, the less
likely the regime is to engage in either repression dimension, particularly torture and false
imprisonment, thereby lending support to the McNamara proposition.  However,
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McCormick and Mitchell (1988) argue that there is a threshhold effect between wealth
and both dimensions of abuse.  Lastly, they find a positive relationship between trade and
imprisonment.
In regards to the political explanation for abuse, they find that totalitarian regimes
tend to imprison their citizens falsely, while authoritarian regimes engage in more violent
forms of behavior, particularly murder.  Lastly, they find that British colonialism tends to
be associated with less imprisonment.   While this study marks an improvement over the
previous study, both theoretically and in the size of the sample, the authors still rely on a
bivariate analysis at one particular period in time and they fail to follow up on the
theoretical propositions the offer.
Henderson (1991, 1993) also focuses on political and socioeconomic variables to
explain human rights conditions.  Henderson utilizes both bivariate and multivariate
analysis in his research. However, much like McCormick and Mitchell (1988), he only
examines one point in time and thus fails to address or identify any possible dynamic
trends in the relationship between the dependent and independent variable. He controls
for the level of democracy, economic growth, economic inequality, economic
development, investment, and his particular variables of interest, population levels and
growth.  His dependent variable is state repression derived from the State Department's
Country Reports on Human Rights for 1985.
In analyzing 152 countries for 1985, Henderson finds that there is a positive
relationship between physical integrity rights and the level of democracy and economic
growth.  He finds a negative relationship between the dependent variable and economic
inequality, however this finding is suspect at best considering the ten-year gap in the
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measure for the dependent and independent variable.   The two measures of population
have opposite effects on human rights conditions.  Population growth has a negative
impact on human rights conditions, suggesting that sudden increases in population put a
significant strain on resource allocation and the government’s ability to provide basic
needs.
Up to this point, the research on human rights conditions relied on a simple
bivariate or cross-sectional analyses.  Poe and Tate (1994) employ a statistical method
that allows for both space and time.  That is, they examined personal integrity abuse
cross-nationally (153 countries) and across time (1980-1987).  They first address the
issue of the dependent variable.  Arguing that State Department records can often be
biased, they utilized two separate measures of personal integrity abuse, both based on a
five-point ordinal scale: one based on the records of Amnesty International and the other
based on the State Department’s Country Profiles.
Their list of independent variables includes the level of democracy, economic
development and growth, population level and growth, regime type, colonial history, and
the involvement in civil or international war.  Their results indicate that democracy and
economic standing are negatively related to personal integrity abuse, while the size of the
population and the involvement in civil and international wars increase the probability of
personal integrity abuse.  In addition, they identify lagged repression as the strongest
indicator of human rights abuses.  However, recent research (Achen 2000) suggests that
the use of a lagged dependent variable serves to exaggerate or underestimate the
coefficients for the variables of interest.  Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) expanded the study
through 1993. They find several new variables to be statistically significant in their
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replication.  Specifically, military regimes are positively related to personal integrity
abuse, British colonial experience is negatively related to abuse, and leftist governments
tend to be less repressive than non-leftist regimes.
A subsequent study focused primarily on the democracy variable, which is the
strongest indicator of human rights (Poe and Tate 1996).  Using a path model, this
analysis enables the researcher to determine direct and indirect influences of the
independent variables.  The democracy variable is once again the strongest direct
indicator of human rights conditions. The only variable that exhibits both direct and
indirect influence on human rights is economic development.  The size of the population
and the existence of civil and international war have only a direct effect on abuse, while
population growth, the presence of a military regime and leftist governments exhibit only
an indirect influence.  The results of this analysis support their earlier findings.
All of the studies, thus far, assume a linear relationship between democracy and
human rights abuse.  The findings suggest that as the level of democracy increases the
level of abuse decreases.  Fein (1995) hypothesizes, however, that there is actually a
curvilinear relationship between the two variables, a thesis referred to as “more murder in
the middle.”  As democratic rights, such as personal freedoms, spread to more and more
individuals, the elites within the society have a greater motive for repression.  “Divided
elites, inequality, and violent challengers threatening the legitimacy of the current social
order impel the governing elite to resort to repression or state terror” (Fein 1995, 173).
She further suggests that more abuse occurs in regimes that are in the process of
democratization, but still fall short of fully institutionalized democracy.  This argument is
parallel to the argument regarding economic development posited by Olson (1963) and
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Gurr (1968) who assert that it is not the poorest of the poor that tend to revolt in
developing societies, but those who have achieved a modicum of economic success.
These results indicate that as democratic norms are realized, citizens begin to become
more politically aware and active.  Thus, citizen demands may increase a regime's
tendency to engage in repressive behavior.
Subsistence Rights
Shue (1980) argues that human rights consists of more than just security rights or
personal integrity rights. He contends that there are also subsistence rights and the right
to liberty as well as security rights and that collectively they constitute “basic rights.”
Empirical research with subsistence rights, or basic human needs, as the dependent
variable concentrates primarily on issues of economic growth and development (Chenery
and Strout 1966; Dixon 1984; Dixon and Moon 1987; Moon and Dixon 1985, 1992; Rosh
1986; Moon 1991; Milner 1998).  Additional research on the connection between forms
of monetary flow and basic human needs focuses on the concept of dependency and
military assistance (Hartman and Walters 1985) and food assistance (Vengroff and Tsai
1982; Nortin, Ortiz, and Pardey 1992).
The primary dependent variable utilized in the study of subsistence rights is
Morris’ (1979, 1996) Physical Quality of Life Index.  For example, Dixon (1984)
examines the influence of economic growth and the concentration of trade on basic
human needs by analyzing 72 countries over a twenty-year period, 1960 to 1980.  His
primary interest is determining the rate of improvement in this index, otherwise known as
the Disparity Reduction Rate, a derivative of the PQLI calculated by taking the average
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annual change in the PQLI.  Dixon (1984) finds that trade concentration, as a measure of
dependency, has little impact on the provision of basic human needs.
Similar to the literature on personal integrity abuse, Moon and Dixon (1985) add
political variables to an economic model of basic human needs (Physical Quality of Life
Index).  These variables include the level of democracy, ideology of the elites, and a
measure for state strength.  Controlling for wealth, Moon and Dixon (1985) find that both
democracy and leftist ideology have a positive influence on the provision of basic human
needs, supporting the liberal position.  State strength, as measured by government
expenditures and elites adhering to rightist norms, however, have a deleterious effect on
the provision of basic human needs.  They conclude that the political attributes of a state
matter when explaining the provision of basic human rights.  This study is important in
the development of basic needs models in that it recognizes that political factors, not just
economic factors, contribute to the state’s ability to provide subsistence needs.
Spalding (1986), again utilizing the Physical Quality of Life Index as the
dependent variable for "well-being." includes measures designed to capture a regime's
democratic structure, rights and liberties, health expenditures, energy consumption,
degree of capitalism, industrial production, proportion of labor in industrial and service
sectors, and wealth as independent variables.  Spalding (1986) finds that wealth is the
most powerful explanation for well-being, however capitalism has little, if any,
explanatory power.  Thus, private ownership of the means of production does not serve to
improve human rights conditions in less-developed countries.  In addition, rapid
development was found to have a deleterious effect on well-being, lending support to the
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thesis posited by Olson (1963).  Lastly, similar to most other studies on human rights,
Spalding (1986) finds democracy to be significantly and positively related to well-being.
Moon and Dixon (1985) build upon their previous research by examining military
factors that influence the provision of basic human needs.  After controlling for the
economic and political variables used in their previous work, they add three variables
designed to measure the defense burden on society, the extent of military participation in
society, and whether the military controls the ruling regime. Military spending is found to
inhibit a regime’s ability to provide for basic human needs while m
ilitary participation, as measured by military manpower, has a positive influence.
Military control of the government has no discernible impact on the ability of a regime to
provide for basic human needs. However, Rosh (1986) finds contradictory evidence in a
similar study examining the relationship between military expenditures and subsistence
rights.  He finds that the military burden on society and even the economic variable, per
capita GNP, to have little effect on the provision of basic human needs.
Moon (1991) provides the most comprehensive study to date on subsistence
rights.  He develops a model that includes the previous economic and military variables
and adds the following:  percent of labor in agriculture, British colonial experience,
dependency, socialist influence, years of independence, the level of mineral exports,
Buddhism and Islam.  He finds most of the variables to be statistically significant with
the measure for agricultural labor, military expenditures, dependency, and the influence
of Islam to be negatively related to subsistence rights.  On the other hand, the degree of
democratization, socialist influence, wealth, and the influence of the British and
Buddhism to be positively related to basic human needs.  This study established key
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economic, political, and social variables that are important in the realization of basic
human needs.
Foreign Assistance, Trade, Investment and Human Rights
Of interest to this particular study is the fact that researchers have begun to
examine monetary factors and their relationship to human rights conditions.  That is,
research has begun to examine the effect of foreign aid (Regan 1995; Meyer 1996, 1998,
Smith et al. 1998, 1999), direct foreign investment (Meyer 1996, 1998; Smith et al. 1998;
Rothgeb 1990, 1991, 1996), and trade (Ziegenhagen 1986; Carleton 1989; Pion-Berlin
1989; Alfatooni and Allen 1991; Davenport 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Timberlake and
Williams 1984; Kowalewski 1989; Rothgeb 1989; Barbieri and Davenport 1997) on not
only human rights abuse but on domestic conflict as well.  Conflicting results from these
studies suggest that further inquiry into the relationship between monetary flows and
human rights conditions is warranted.
Regan (1995) addresses, in an empirical fashion, the impact of foreign aid on
human rights practices.  He explores the relationship between U.S. economic aid and
human rights during the Carter and Reagan administrations.  As his sample, Regan uses
32 countries in Latin America and Asia that received most of the foreign assistance
granted by the U.S..  In addition, Regan includes nations that received little or no aid
during the same time period as a control group.  Controlling for population, democracy,
economic development, and the number of military personnel, Regan finds that although
the variable for economic aid is statistically significant, substantively the changes in
repression due to changes in aid are negligible.  He argues that aid is just one
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part of the signal that is sent to the recipients of U.S. assistance and
that those searching for mechanisms with which to manipulate human
rights practices should focus on the entire range of bilateral interactions…
[F]oreign aid can be used to foster economic development, alleviate the
suffering from national disasters, promote bilateral cooperation, and
reward allies for previous compliant behavior. But the evidence…
suggests that aid is not very effective at altering the repressive behavior
of recipient states” (Regan 1995, 624).
He also finds that democracy and the level of population have no discernible impact on
human rights practices, contrary to previous findings (Poe and Tate 1994, 1996;
Henderson 1991, 1993).   His study lacks a broad sample, choosing to concentrate on
Latin America and Asia, thereby leaving out less-developed countries in Africa.
Meyer’s (1996) primary interest is the relationship between human rights and
multinational corporations, but he also includes U.S. economic aid in his model.  His
fully specified model, which he tests on five different measures of human rights (civil
liberties, political rights, and the three components of the Physical Quality of Life Index)
includes GNP, direct foreign investment, U.S. economic aid, and debt.  He finds a
positive relationship between investment (or the presence of MNCs) and civil and
political rights in the Third World, thus lending support to the neoliberal perspective.  He
also finds a positive relationship between U.S. economic aid and first generation rights.
These findings remain relatively constant over the various dependent variables.  The
drawback of this research is that it is limited in the number of countries, fifty less
developed countries, and the lack of control variables found to be important in previous
research in the realization of human rights.
In a response to Meyer (1996), Smith et al. (1998, 1999) argue that the Western
emphasis on the importance of economic development as a cure-all for abusive regimes
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has been overstated.  They contend that transnational corporations are motivated by
economic concerns, to the general exclusion of human rights.  They criticize Meyer's
(1986) analysis based on the measure of the dependent variable, the inclusion of only
U.S. direct foreign investment, and the exclusion of the impact of the Cold War on
human rights conditions.  They attempt to replicate Meyer's (1996) analysis substituting
the Poe and Tate (1994) measure of personal integrity abuse for Meyer's Freedom House
measure and total world direct foreign investment for U.S. direct foreign investment.
Smith et al. (1998, 1999) could not reproduce the results for either U.S. economic aid or
direct foreign investment and ultimately argue that the neoliberal position falsely works
to negate the need for international regulators and institutions to monitor human rights.
Meyer’s (1996, 1998) results on aid and investment support the liberal perspective, while
Smith et al.’s (1998, 1999) results suggest that the liberal perspective is overstated and
the reliance on economic factors to improve the human condition is unrealistic.
Additional studies in the international political economy literature have examined
the effects of foreign investment, as well as international trade, on conflictual/cooperative
relations between countries (Polachek 1980; Gasiorowski and Polachek 1982;
Gasiorowski 1986; Pollins 1989a, 1989b; Reuveny and Kang 1996, 1998; Sayrs 1990).
Of more interest here, however, is that research has begun to examine the effect of
international economic factors on domestic sources of violence, which in turn may lead to
further state repression and abuse (Rothgeb 1990, 1991, 1996; Snyder 1978; Rogowski
1987;  Zimmermann 1993).  However, these studies fail to address human rights
violations directly.
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Nonetheless, the theories and arguments presented in this strand of literature
easily lend themselves to human rights.  The factors that influence political violence and
state repression are undoubtedly closely related. Rothgeb (1991) argues that "all types of
foreign investment tend to play a role as a missing factor of production in very poor
societies, and the end product is less political protest and an inclination toward a respite
from political turmoil" (Rothgeb 1991, 728).
The literature on the relationship between trade and human rights focuses
primarily on measures of state repression, or negative sanctions, and are motivated by
dependency and world systems theory.  Timberlake and Williams (1984) utilize the
Taylor and Jodice (1983) measure for negative sanctions as their dependent variable.
They test the hypothesis from dependency/world systems theory that increases in foreign
penetration of capital in peripheral nations lead to a decrease in nonelite participation and
an increase in government repression.  In an analysis of 72 countries, they find only weak
support for the first part of the hypothesis, that increased investment leads to a decrease
in political participation on the part of nonelites.  They find no direct effects of
dependence on repression, but some evidence of indirect effects through investments
effect on political exclusion.
Ziegenhagen (1986) and Pion-Berlin (1989) find a positive relationship between
trade dependency and state repression.  The former uses the Taylor and Jodice (1983)
measure for negative sanctions and measures trade dependency by the degree of trade
concentration in various export categories.  Pion-Berlin (1989) includes two sources of
information for the dependent variable:  first, the New York Times Index which is used to
count individual incidences of state repression and Amnesty International reports of
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abuse.  As the independent variable, Pion-Berlin (1989) uses international trade
agreements as a proxy for dependency, which is suspect and unconvincing as it is
difficult to establish dependency based upon trade agreements alone.  The actual amount
of exports and imports, as well as the unevenness of the trade relationship is necessary to
determine the extent of trade dependency.
Carleton (1989), examining only Latin American countries, finds similar results to
Ziegenhagen (1986) and Pion-Berlin (1989) substituting Freedom House measures for the
dependent variable and percentage of exports made of manufactured goods for trade
dependency.  Carleton (1989) is concerned with a new twist to the traditional
international division of labor.  He argues that a new division of labor is emerging,
namely the laborers in the Third World engaged in the manufacturing portion of MNC
production processes.  Carleton (1989) theorizes that states will engage in repressive
behavior to maintain a political and economic environment that is attractive to MNCs.
He finds that increases in manufacturing investment and the pursuit of export-oriented
industrialization are associated with higher levels of state repression.
Rothgeb (1989) conducts a cross-national study of 84 underdeveloped countries
and tests whether foreign investment, as measured by stocks and flows of manufacturing
and mining, is related to various forms of political conflict, including repression.  He
finds that higher levels of investment in manufacturing are associated, over time, with
less repression.  He concludes that foreign investment does not drain resources or stifle
domestic growth as dependency theorists argue.  In addition, he argues that international
investment works to integrate the host nation into the international arena.  “Such
integration leads to greater awareness of international standards and creates a greater
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desire for conformity so that a government’s domestic behavior will not become a barrier
to the expansion of international contacts and opportunities” (Rothgeb 1989, 119).  This
finding falls into line with the theories posited by neoliberal proponents of the positive
consequences of international trade and investment.
Kowalewski (1989) analyzes state repression from a very different perspective,
that of labor actions taken against transnational enterprises in underdeveloped Asian
countries.  From the dependency perspective, underdeveloped states will more likely
favor and support the TNE over workers in labor disputes.  Thus, Kowalewski (1989)
measures state repression in terms of labor repression (firings, injuries, detentions, and
coerced terminations).  The results on the relationship are mixed.  Some state officials do
tend to side with the TNE, thus Kowalewski concludes that labor repression does occur.
Davenport (1995b, 1996) concentrates on negative sanctions (Taylor and Jodice
1983) and finds a positive relationship between trade dependency and state repression.
His measure for trade dependency is similar to Ziegenhagen's (1986), trade concentration
in export categories.  However, Davenport’s (1995b, 1996) studies include a much
greater number of observations and more sophisticated methodology.
Conclusion
In summary, the research on personal integrity rights and subsistence rights has
identified conditions within nations that collectively explain why regimes abuse its
citizens.  These conditions, or determinants, can be placed into three categories:
economic, political, and social.   The economic determinants of the realization of security
and subsistence rights include domestic economic development, or wealth, (McKinlay
and Cohen 1975; Moon and Dixon 1985, 1986; Spalding 1986; Mitchell and McCormick
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1988; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994, Poe, Tate, and
Keith 1999) and economic growth (Olson 1963; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).
International economic factors, the subject of this research, provide far more
mixed results.  There is no consensus on the effects of foreign aid on recipient states
(Regan 1985; Meyer 1996, 1998; Smith et al. 1999).  The results of previous research on
trade and investment are also inconclusive: several results support the dependency
perspective which posits that repression is increased due to trade-dependency
(Ziegenhagen 1986; Carleton 1989; Pion-Berlin 1989; Alfatooni and Allen 1991;
Davenport 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1996b) while others find no relationship between trade-
dependency and repression (Timberlake and Williams 1984; Kowalewski 1989; Rothgeb
1989; Henderson 1996).3  Due to the conflicting results from this research, a more
comprehensive analysis of the impact of trade on human rights conditions is warranted.
At this juncture, there are no studies that examine, in a comprehensive fashion, the
relationship between all three types of financial flows from the U.S. and human rights
conditions in the recipient nation.
The political determinants of the realization of human rights include past levels of
abuse (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport 1996a), the level of
democracy (Moon and Dixon 1985, 1986; Spalding 1986; Moon 1991; Henderson 1991;
Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), the existence of a leftist
government (Moon and Dixon 1986; Boswell and Dixon 1990; Moon 1991; Poe and Tate
1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999), military burden (Moon 1991), religion (Moon 1991),
                                                          
3 Examining the relationship from a liberal perspective, Barbieri and Davenport (1997) find qualified
support for both the liberal and dependency perspectives depending on the time period and on how the
dependent variable is operationalized.
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involvement in either civil or international wars (Gurr 1986; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe,
Tate, and Keith 1999; Milner 1998), and the impact of the Cold War (Smith et al. 1998,
1999; Milner 1999).
Lastly, several social variables are important in the realization of human rights.
These include the level of population and population growth (Henderson 1991, 1993;
Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999), history of British colonialism (Mitchell
and McCormick 1988; Boswell and Dixon 1990;  Moon 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe,
Tate and Keith 1999) and the presence of certain forms of state religion (Moon 1991).
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CHAPTER THREE
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Introduction
This chapter examines the theoretical arguments regarding human rights and
American foreign policy. The concept of human rights – its definition, scope, and nature
– must first be established in order to proceed to the question of improving the realization
of such rights.  Of particular interest is the development and establishment of security and
subsistence rights within the literature and within American foreign policy.   The second
section addresses the rationale for interest in human rights in the United States.   This
includes a discussion of the evolution of the United States as the hegemon following
World War II and its reluctant leadership in the area of human rights.  The relationship of
human rights policy to other policies of national interest is discussed and examined, as
the former has traditionally taken a back seat to the latter.
 The third section examines the theoretical arguments regarding the relationship
between U.S. foreign assistance and human rights.  First, the positive and negative
arguments for the justification of the allocation of aid are presented.  The question of why
regimes allocate foreign assistance may give an indication as to the expected results of
that allocation.  Then, the positive and negative arguments regarding the effects of such
aid are offered.   Competing theories grounded in neo-liberalism and dependency provide
very different views on how recipient regimes are affected by the allocation of foreign
assistance.  The fourth section presents theories associated with economic globalization,
specifically those arguments relating to the effects or consequences of international trade
45
and investment on domestic conditions.  The last section of Chapter Three concludes the
chapter.
The Nature of Human Rights
The human rights debate includes such questions as whether universal or basic
human rights exist and whether cultural, collective, group, and environmental rights
should be included in the formation of a standard definition of human rights (Cranston
1964, 1973; Shue 1980; Donnelly 1984, 1989, 1994; Howard 1983).   While it is not the
purpose of this research to debate the specific nature of human rights, it is important to
understand how nation-states view human rights, particularly in light of their foreign
policies.  This research assumes that governments recognize that there are internationally
accepted human rights.  This assumption is based, in part, on the wording of the preamble
of the U.N. Charter which calls for the organization to “achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion”
(U.N. Charter, Article 1, paragraph 3).  In addition, the assumption is supported by the
fact that this charter has been signed by nearly every country of the world.
There are at least three areas of debate, pertinent to this research, within the
literature regarding the nature of human rights and the impact of human rights on
American foreign policy.  The first debate lies within the actual definition of rights.
Cranston (1973, 7) suggests that human rights are something that pertains to all men at all
times; “they are rights which belong to a man simply because he is a man”.  Donnelly
(1989, 12) concurs, stating that “[h]uman rights are a special class of rights, the rights
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that one has simply because one is a human being.”   Similarly, Vincent (1986, 13)
contends that “human rights are the rights that everyone has, and everyone equally, by
virtue of their very humanity.  They are grounded in an appeal to our human nature.”
Yet, disagreement emerges when one is asked for specificity.  For example, Cranston
(1964, 40) posits that the traditional rights to life, liberty, and property are “universal,
paramount, categorical rights.”  However, he continues stating that economic and social
rights are emphatically not universal and in fact “belong to a different logical category”
(Cranston 1964, 54).  Donnelly (1989) disagrees and suggests that civil and political
rights on the one hand and economic and social rights on the other are interdependent,
that is, they are realized together and cannot easily be separated into categories of human
rights and non-human rights.
When the United States refers to human rights in the context of foreign policy,
what rights are they referring to? Perhaps the best source for how the United States
actually defines human rights is found in a speech by Cyrus Vance, secretary of state
during the Carter administration, on Law Day before the University of Georgia's Law
School, April 30, 1977.1  Vance states:
Our human rights policy must be understood in order to be effective…Our
concern for human rights is built upon ancient values.  It looks with hope
to a world in which liberty is not just a great cause, but the common
condition. In the past, it may have seemed sufficient to put our name to
international documents that spoke loftily of human rights. That is not
enough. We will go to work, alongside other people and governments,
to protect and enhance the dignity of the individual.
Let me define what we mean by “human rights.”  First, there is the right to
be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person.  Such
violations include torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
                                                          
1 This speech is important as Carter’s presidency ushered in a new era in U.S. human rights policy.
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punishment; and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment.  And they include
denial of fair public trial, and invasion of the home.
Second, there is the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter,
health care, and education.  We recognize that the fulfillment of this right will
depend, in part, upon the state of a nation’s economic development.  But we
also know that this right can be violated by a Government’s action or
inaction which diverts resources to an elite at the expense of the needy,
or through indifference to the plight of the poor.
Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and political liberties: freedom of
thought, of religion, of assembly; freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
freedom of movement both within and outside one’s own country; freedom
to take part in government.
Our policy is to promote all these rights.  They are all recognized in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a basic document which the United
States helped to fashion and which the United Nations approved in 1948. There
may be disagreement on the priorities these rights deserve. I believe that, with
work, all of these rights can become complementary and mutually reinforcing
(Vance 1977).
Interpreting these remarks, one might conclude that the United States places an emphasis,
at least rhetorically and theoretically, on security rights, political and civil rights, as well
as what Shue (1980) refers to as subsistence rights.  However, the priority in American
foreign policy has been on the first two, while there has been a lack of  emphasis on
subsistence rights.2  Differences in countries’ human rights priorities emerge as states
attempt to clarify exactly what constitutes human rights.  For example, certain non-
Western religious and cultural practices such as female genital mutilation rituals in Africa
                                                          
2 The United States does engage in a variety of programs aimed at improving subsistence rights; however,
in foreign policy diplomacy, which includes debates and negotiations regarding human rights, the emphasis
is on civil and political rights, as well as security rights.
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and “honor killings” in Islamic culture are deemed human rights violations in the West.3
In addition, non-Western countries place an emphasis on collective and group rights
while individual rights and liberties are emphasized in the West.  This leads to the second
debate regarding the nature of human rights.
The next debate relevant to this research is the one between cultural relativism
and universalism. Specifically, do universal rights exist?   The adoption of the U.N.
Charter as well as the adoption of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights suggests that
there is an internationally accepted minimal standard of human rights.  While the passage
of the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights binds the states of the world together and seeks
to address human rights under one umbrella, it does so only in a political and moral way.
The legal weight that the declaration carries is not a heavy one (Cassese 1990).  The
Third World is quick to criticize the universality of human rights arguing that the Third
World countries had little input into the drafting of the document due to the colonial
status at the time of passage.  In addition, the developing states contend that the rights
outlined in the declaration are ethnocentric reflecting Western conceptions of human
rights and omitting non-Western views on human rights.
Lastly, critics contend that too much emphasis is placed on the rights of the
individual at the expense of the rights of groups and collectivities which are more
predominant in the developing world (Baehr 1994).  The United States has signaled,
                                                          
3 An “honor killing” refers to the murder of women in Islamic states for the crimes of adultery and other
sexual offenses.  According to a position paper sponsored by the Muslim Women’s League, “women who
bring dishonor to their families because of sexual indiscretions are forced to pay a terrible price at the
hands of male family members. Attempted murder and other forms of corporal punishment have been
reported. The most severe manifestations of punishment affect only a small percentage of women, even
though the notion of family honor and shame is extremely important in most communities of the Muslim
world.”  The position paper is available online at http://www.mwlusa.org/pub_hk.shtml.
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through the passage of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (1976),
that the types of rights they deem as universal include civil and political rights and those
rights referred to as security rights.  The U.S. Senate has failed to support any other
international human rights documents, including the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976).  This signals to the international
community that the United States does not want to be held accountable or responsible for
the provision of these types of rights.  This last critique leads to the next debate within the
human rights literature, that is, what types of rights are addressed in foreign policy
decisions.
A third and final debate involves the role of human rights in the formulation of
domestic and foreign policy, specifically, which rights governments focus on in the
formulation of foreign policy.  In the United States, the focus is on political, civil, and
property rights of individual citizens.  The origins of these rights as they apply to citizens
within states, at least in the Western context, can be traced to the Virginia Bill of Rights
(1776) that was incorporated into the U.S. Constitution in 1791 and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen in 1789 (Baehr 1994).  Individual rights and
liberties are laid out, primarily derived from the writings of Locke, Montesquieu, and
Rousseau.   These include the right to life, liberty, and property as well as the right not to
be tortured or falsely imprisoned by one’s government. These have evolved into what are
referred to as political, civil and security rights, or first generation rights.  It is these
rights on which U.S. statesmen, tend to focus their foreign policy.  In addition, the
violations of these types of rights also tend to be the focus of the media and NGOs.
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In the international arena, human rights have been codified in a variety of treaties
and resolutions.  The protection of the so-called “first generation rights” is found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (1976), The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951), and The Declaration on the Protection of
all Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (1975), among others.  These documents attempt to protect the
civil and political rights, as well as the physical integrity rights, of citizens throughout the
world.
The international community also has recognized the need to go beyond these
“first generation” rights and address additional types of “basic rights.”  These are codified
in such documents as the Helinski Agreement (1975), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1976), the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979), and the United Nations Declaration on
the Right to Development (1986).  These documents seek to address the economic, social,
and cultural rights of citizens.  These types of rights are seemingly more difficult to
realize as they require fundamental structural changes within a society.
In attempting to use foreign policy tools to alter regime behavior (mostly Third
World regime behavior), the American government has adopted a predominantly western
view of human rights, specifically that certain security rights are “universal.”  Foreign
policies based on these types of rights are quite straightforward and easily lend
themselves to the carrot-and-stick approach to foreign policy.  For example, the message
may be, stop abusing the security and political rights of citizens and the United States
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will commence trading relationships or conversely, the message might be if abuse
continues the United States, and perhaps the rest of the international community, will
impose economic sanctions.
In addition, the United States has placed an emphasis on the development of basic
human needs as evident in declarations of Cyrus Vance as well as the formation of such
aid programs as Food for Peace, the Improved Maternal and Newborn Survival Program,
Child Survival Program, and the Achieving Broad-Based Economic Growth Program.4
Foreign policies regarding these types of human rights conditions are not nearly as
straightforward as security rights.  Solving these types of problems requires long-term
commitments, continued engagement and innovative prescriptions, in other words,
foreign policies that don’t fit neatly into the carrot-and-stick approach.  However, the
utilization of foreign assistance, trade, and investment as policy tools does signal the U.S’
interest in promoting a wide range of human rights.
U.S. Foreign Policy and Human Rights
  The United States has long advocated the neo-liberal position of social and
political advancement through economic means, particularly regarding less-developed
nations.  Eberstadt (1988) argues that it is the United States' responsibility to use all of its
power (including financial power) to maintain and encourage the liberal international
economic order. The ultimate foreign policy goal, at least rhetorically, is the development
of democratic nations, free of domestic violence and human rights abuses, and friendly to
the United States.
                                                          
4 For additional lists of current U.S. Agency for International Development programs see their website at
http://www.usaid.gov/
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The United States’ leadership role in international affairs is relatively new,
emerging as the world's economic and political leader after World War II.  This
occurrence came after its unwillingness to assume hegemonic responsibility after World
War I and the subsequent economic and political chaos of the interwar period.  The
economic, political, and social destruction caused by World War II and the expansionary
motives of the USSR left the United States with no other perceived option than to
shoulder most of the responsibility of postwar rebuilding.  The U.S.’ tool in attempting to
achieve the goals of economic, political, and social development, it can be argued, was a
monetary one.  For example, rebuilding Europe was funded first with massive amounts of
economic aid and later with American investments; fledgling democracies were bolstered
with both economic and military aid; and the United States attempted to alleviate poor
living conditions with varying forms of humanitarian aid.  The United States initiated and
managed the Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Program, which was designed to
help Europe recover economically.  In fact, in 1947 the plan provided $497 million in
reconstruction loans while, in 1952, the plan allocated over $13 billion dollars, 89% of
which went to the European states.  Non-European recipients were Korea, the
Philippines, Taiwan, and Turkey, for obvious geopolitical concerns (Brown 1953) .
At the same time, the Truman Doctrine formulated a national security policy of
containment based partially on the allocation and distribution of military and economic
aid to weak nations susceptible to Soviet aggression.  Thus, foreign aid granted to
Europe, and eventually Latin America and Asia, was primarily a strategic strategy aimed
at containing communism and maintaining America’s national security with little concern
for human rights.  “The Soviet Union’s threat to the West’s position of dominance in the
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developing world led the United States for the first time to conclude that economic
assistance to the South could be a powerful tool in the Cold War.” (Spero and Hart 1997,
169).   Thus, it is safe to suggest that foreign assistance served as a valuable “carrot” to
attract client-states in the East-West geopolitical struggle.  At the same time, the United
States was dedicated to the development of democratic states and a free market economy,
at least rhetorically, particularly in response to the spread of communism and the rise of
demand economies.
The aftermath of World War II also left many nations destroyed socially. The
human rights atrocities associated with the war led to a postwar emphasis on human
rights, with the United States leading in the insistence that Nazi leaders should be
punished for their crimes against humanity (Orentlicher 1992).  The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights was signed and adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
1948, with additional covenants regarding economic, political, and social rights following
in 1976.   Implementation of human rights policy, however, was another matter.
The U.S.’ leadership in the formulation of a human rights regime, but its
reluctance to “submit to the jurisdiction of international bodies that enforce or monitor
human rights commitments” is tied to foreign policy (Orentlicher 1992, 341).  This
reluctance was justified by a fear of U.S. laws being superseded by international law, or
the loss of sovereignty, as well as U.S. concern for national security.  A recent example
of such fear is the U.S. refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal
Court.  Fearful that the far-reaching jurisdiction of the ICC will eventually lead to the
prosecution of American soldiers as well as infringe upon the sovereignty of the state, the
United States finds itself as one of the most vocal opponents of the ICC (Scheffer 1996;
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Tepperman 2000; Bosco 1998).5  The combination of these factors hinders the U.S.
commitment to human rights (Orentlicher 1992).  Although the U.S. Senate did not ratify
many of these documents, policy makers nonetheless became interested in improving the
living conditions in the less-developed countries and began a commitment, at least
rhetorically, to the improvement of human rights. These efforts are evident in
congressional legislation passed tying foreign assistance to human rights practices, as
well as passing legislation to fund programs under the direction of the U.S. Agency for
International Development.
Luard (1992) discusses several possible foreign policy constraints on human
rights policy.  One such constraint is the fact that governments critical of human rights
practices believe they must maintain a working relationship with the abusive regime.  The
assertion is that increased criticism of a regime may cause resentment leading to a
difficult diplomatic relationship.  The current U.S.-China relationship is indicative of this
type of argument.  For example, shortly after the U.S. State Department issued its 2000
annual report on human rights, the Chinese foreign minister accused the United States of
a double standard when it comes to human rights.6  Strategic concerns may also be a
foreign policy constraint on human rights policy.  For example, foreign aid was often
used as a policy tool to maintain political and economic control of Third World nations
during the Cold War.  In addition, governments are hesitant to criticize repressive
                                                          
5 Ironically, the failure of the United States to ratify the Rome Statutes implementing the ICC places it in
the category of “rogue states” along with Libya, China, Algeria, Yemen, and Qatar (Bosco 1998;
Tepperman 2000).
6 See the news article at http://www.itn.co.uk/news/20010227/world/08china.shtml for details.
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regimes that control precious resources (such as oil) or where sensitive negotiations are at
stake (US/USSR SALT Treaty).
A third foreign policy constraint is the concept of sovereignty, one of the most
heralded rules of diplomatic relations.  Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, state
sovereignty and territorial integrity have served to allow states to control domestic
conditions free of international intervention.  The emergence of human rights concerns in
the latter half of the twentieth century has been slow to penetrate this enduring tenet of
international relations.  Fourth, it is argued that criticizing a state’s human rights practices
is not a very effective tool in human rights diplomacy.  Government leaders maintain that
this constitutes a waste of energy because resources could be utilized elsewhere.  Lastly,
increased governmental criticism may alienate the repressive government, which only
serves to decrease the influence of the United States.
The United States has been criticized for not accepting responsibility for
advocating and leading in the efforts at establishing universal standards of acceptable
human rights practices.  Additionally , it is argued that the United States should take
social and economic rights more seriously (Shue 1980; Donnelly 1989; Howard 1983;
Forsythe 1990).  According to Forsythe, the United States focuses on political and civil
liberties and security rights to the exclusion of the basic needs for survival.  He concludes
that the
human rights movement in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America
demands rights that go beyond the American tradition.  They demand
entitlements to adequate food, clothing, shelter, health care, and education.
To argue that these demands on public authorities are not as essential to
human dignity and welfare as demands for civil and political rights is to
fail to understand and relate to less affluent, less individualistic societies
(Forsythe 1990, 453).
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Forsythe (1987) also concludes that Congress has been unable, if not unwilling, to
implement policy in line with legislation regarding human rights.  In terms of military
assistance, Congress has chosen to defer to the president and the idea that “the public
naming of a gross violator of internationally recognized human rights was not a good idea
in U.S. foreign policy” (Forsythe 1987, 404).  In doling out economic aid, Congress has
preferred to focus on assisting those most in need, ignoring the abusive nature of the elite
regime.
From a public opinion perspective, Forsythe (1995) posits that the American
public demands a foreign policy based on their own self-image of “an exceptional people
who stand for freedom around the world” (Forsythe 1995, 111).  This sentiment of
American “moral exceptionalism” and the demand and will of the American people is the
basis of many arguments for U.S. involvement in promoting human rights around the
world (Eberstadt 1988; Schifter 1992; Forsythe 1995; Ruttan 1996).  Thus, foreign policy
is tied to domestic politics in the sense that the general public has a sincere concern for
people around the world and insists that the United States take this into account when
formulating policy, particularly economic policy.  This is especially true when citizens
hear reports of abusive regimes and the denial of basic freedoms (Schifter 1992).
Donnelly (1984) advocates a new direction in foreign policy for the United States
characterized by “positive nonintervention,” and a “gradual phasing out of all relations
with the human rights-violating regime” (Donnelly 1984; 1989).  He concludes, in
agreement with Forsythe, that the United States must take a more active and positive role
in pursuing internationally accepted standards of human rights.  Additionally, Donnelly
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suggests that U.S. foreign policy should follow the guidelines of such standards instead
of simply adhering to self-motivated interests.  This research adds that the United States
also should be cognizant of the consequences of their foreign policy decisions,
particularly when it comes to human rights.
Foreign Assistance and Human Rights
Banfield (1963, 2-3) posed the following question almost forty years ago: “Why
is aid so confidently proposed by policy makers and so readily supported, or at any rate
tolerated, by the public?”  That same question is relevant today in light of the recent
Colombian aid package.  Specifically, why does the executive branch and members of
Congress so readily support this type of government intervention and why does the public
go along?  I contend that there are two possibilities.  The first is that there is a self-
interest (or donor-interest) motivation, mainly the domestic drug problem.  Second,
politicians and the public have no concept of the actual consequences of such action.  It is
further argued that regardless of the first possibility, the knowledge of the second is
imperative given the U.S.’ role in the international system.
The first concerted effort at addressing specific human rights violations with
foreign assistance policy at the executive level was initiated by Jimmy Carter.7  The
                                                          
7 The Foreign Assistance Act was passed in 1961 and served to separate the allocation of military and non-
military aid to recipient states.  The 1960s brought the focus of foreign assistance to developing nations
with an emphasis on economic, political and human development.  It relied heavily on the theory of
economic development posited by Rostow.  While the program addressed the human condition, it did not
speak directly to human rights violations.  This original piece of legislation contained little restrictions on
how assistance was to be provided, and perhaps more importantly who was eligible for assistance
(USAID).  It was the Carter administration that first attempted to tie human rights practices to foreign
policy.
58
Carter administration attempted, with little success, to make adherence to accepted
human rights practices a key component in granting assistance to a recipient nation. The
presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George Bush witnessed the return of national security
as the main factor in granting assistance. Of keen interest was the prevention of
communist infiltration in Latin and Central America.  As a result, the United States
supported authoritarian, right-wing regimes in countries like Nicaragua, Guatemala, and
Panama in the name of “democracy”.  Interest in human rights was not exclusive to the
executive branch.  Congressional interest in the allocation of foreign aid was piqued
during the early 1970s, primarily in response to the realpolitik policies of Nixon and
Kissinger.  In 1971, the Senate rejected a foreign assistance bill for fiscal years 1972 and
1973 signaling the first time that Congress vetoed a foreign assistance authorization since
the Marshall Plan was enacted.  Several reasons have been offered for this action
including opposition to the Vietnam War, over emphasis on short-term military goals,
and the idea that economic aid was not helpful in achieving any foreign policy goals
(USAID).
The U.S. Congress concluded that human rights should be a consideration in
determining whether the United States would grant foreign assistance.  The 1982 Harken
Amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act mandated that
No assistance may be provided…to the government of any country which
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing
the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention
of those persons or other flagrant denial to the right of life, liberty, and
the security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the
needy people in the country (U.S. Code, quoted in Claude and Weston 1992,
293. Italics added by this author).
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Congress also addressed the allocation of military aid.  Section 502b of the Foreign
Assistance Act dictates that military aid will not be continued or granted to countries that
engage in gross human rights violations.  However, just as there is a loophole with
economic aid, military aid may be granted if the president indicates in writing “that
extraordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance” (Claude and
Weston 1992, 293).  An example of this caveat is President Clinton’s decision to sell
fighter jets to Indonesia in spite of that country’s human rights records.  According to the
1996 State Department Report, the Indonesian government
Continued to commit serious human rights abuses…Reports of extrajudicial
killings, disappearances, and torture of those in custody by security forces
increased.  Reports of arbitrary arrests and detentions and the use of excessive
violence (including deadly force) in dealing with suspected criminals or
perceived troublemakers continued.  Prison conditions remained harsh, and
security forces regularly violated citizens’ rights to privacy…The Indonesian
people continue to lack the ability to change their government.  The
government continued to impose severe limitations on freedoms of speech,
press, assembly, and association (State Department Country Profile Reports,
1996).
The more recent waiver is that allowing approximately $1.6 billion of aid to Colombia.
In signing the waiver, President Clinton in essence is “certifying that the war-torn nation
has met minimum human rights requirements and waiving conditions it has yet to meet”
(CNN.com 2000).8  As a result of extenuating circumstances in the granting of foreign
assistance, the United States continues to financially assist, either through economic or
military aid, countries that are guilty of human rights violations.  Thus, the United States
engages in a conscious trade-off in the area of foreign assistance and human rights.  The
question becomes, is this trade-off beneficial or detrimental to human rights conditions?
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Given the interests of politicians, the importance of basic human needs and the
desire to alleviate security rights abuse on a normative level, the question arises, does the
U.S. foreign assistance program attempt to address them?   Morgenthau (1962) argues
that there are actually six purposes for the allocation of U.S. foreign aid: to provide
subsistence to recipients, for economic development, to serve humanitarian purposes, for
military purposes, to bolster American prestige around the world, and to serve as a bribe
in diplomacy.  The first three purposes fit into what Ruttan (1989) calls “ethical
considerations” and are congruent with the philosophy of neo-liberal political thought.
This position is also consistent with the concept of American “exceptionalism” and moral
responsibility.
On the other hand, Morgenthau’s last three correspond to Ruttan’s (1989) “donor
self-interest” category and are consistent with the neo-realist or realpolitik perspective on
international relations, specifically that aid is justified on the grounds that it will enhance
U.S. national security (Cingranelli 1993).  Taking this line of reasoning further, allocating
foreign assistance on the basis of ethical considerations suggests a positive relationship
between aid and respect for human rights.  On the other hand, one might not expect
improved respect for human rights from the allocation of  foreign assistance on the basis
of donor self-interest.  It is this latter motivation that leads critics, particularly those from
the Left, to argue that foreign assistance does more harm than good (Ruttan 1989).
Turning to the arguments regarding the consequences of foreign assistance,
previous research has outlined the detrimental effects of aid in connection with human
rights.  The first argument focuses on the connection between foreign aid and repression,
                                                                                                                                                                            
8 The complete CNN report is found at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/08/23/colombia.aid/.
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specifically that security aid serves to increase repression in less-developed countries.
Essentially this form of aid lands primarily in the hands of Third World elites, the
military in particular (Clark 1991; Meyer 1998).  Economic and food aid also ends up in
the hands of elites.  The centralization of food aid, for example, means that individuals in
remote and rural locations face several obstacles in order to gain any benefit, namely the
time and expense of travel and the opportunity cost associated with leaving their farms.
Lastly, Meyer (1998) points out that international aid perpetuates the anti-democratic
tendencies in Third World nations.  “Chomsky and Herman charge that aid is used to
marginalize 80 percent of the Third World’s population, excluding them from the
political process and denying them their legal and human rights” (Chomsky and Herman
1979, 54, quoted in Meyer 1998).
The second argument focuses on the negative impact associated with economic
aid, specifically to the recipient’s economic infrastructure. Development of the periphery
is hampered by the restrictions and conditions placed on aid.  Dos Santos (1970) contends
that these limitations prevent recipient nations from utilizing aid as a substitute for
economic surplus necessary for development.   In addition, economic aid is used to
introduce antiquated and ill-suited technology to the periphery and is used to finance
foreign investment in industries that are considered a low priority for development or,
even worse, aid is used merely to attract foreign investment that does little to create
domestic industries (Dos Santos 1970, Frank 1969).  Economic aid is often granted in the
form of a loan that underdeveloped countries find difficult to repay.  In addition, it is
argued that foreign assistance in the form of loans inhibits a nation’s propensity to save
because any profits are used to repay the initial loan.  Aid in the form of technology
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transfers, critics contend, serves to disrupt the traditional production process leading to
increases in unemployment and the “disintegration of stable communities and families”
(Clark 1991, 288).  Lastly, aid is often viewed by developing nations as a form of
imperialism, in this case, yankee imperialism.
In contrast, there are a few arguments suggesting that aid actually has a positive
impact on human rights.  First, Meyer (1998) points out that one goal of the U.S.
allocation of aid is the opening of future private investment opportunities.  Foreign
assistance, it is argued from the neo-liberal position, helps increase economic
development, evidenced by high rates of growth in certain countries such as Pakistan,
South Korea, and Taiwan (Spero and Hart 1997).  Second, several studies have
demonstrated that aid has benefited Third World nations, particularly in the areas of
education and health (Zimmerman 1993).  Spero and Hart (1997) point out that the
quality of life of many countries would have suffered or would have been worse had it
not been for distribution of poverty-alleviation and medical aid.
Given the concept of American “moral exceptionalism,” the impact of foreign
assistance on recipient regimes should be a concern for the United States.  One concern is
the danger that self-interest may be pursued in the name of foreign assistance, regardless
of the impact on the recipient nation.  “If the donor self-interest argument is used as a
primary rationale for developing assistance, it imposes on donors some obligation to
demonstrate that this assistance does no harm to the recipient” (Ruttan 1989, 414).  As
previously described, the political and strategic self-interest of the donor country is often
masked in economic programs aimed at the recipient nation.  “Political considerations in
both donor and recipient countries have, however, often made it advisable to cloak the
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objective of short-term political or strategic assistance with the rhetoric of economic
assistance” (Ruttan 1989, 413).  This lends credence to the idea that U.S. policy makers,
in spite of rhetoric supporting the economic and political development of recipient
nations, may primarily be interested in political objectives.
Thus, while there are divergent theories regarding the motivation of aid, from a
normative position it is paramount that the donor acknowledge the consequences of its
actions.  In other words, the motivation of the aid is irrelevant to those that it impacts.
Whether the aid is for donor or recipient interest does not negate the fact that U.S. dollars
are flowing into the recipient state.  This research seeks to address the nature of these
consequences (is there a positive or negative effect of foreign aid on human rights?) And
then make policy prescriptions regarding appropriate actions the U.S. government should
take in response to the empirical results.
Globalization and Human Rights
According to the International Monetary Fund, globalization
is a historical process, the result of human innovation and technological
progress. It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the
world, particularly through  trade and financial flows...The term has come
into common usage since the 1980s, reflecting technological advances that
have made it easier and quicker to complete international transactions—
both trade and financial flows. It refers to an extension beyond national
borders of the same market forces that have operated for centuries at all
levels of human economic activity—village markets, urban industries, or
financial centers” (IMF 2001).9
In addition to economic factors, globalization also extends to include the increasing
cultural, environmental and political exchange that occurs between states.  The effect of
                                                          
9 For a complete discussion of the IMF’s position on globalization see
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm#II.
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the economic aspects of globalization is of primary interest here and the effects that it has
on domestic conditions, namely human rights conditions.
Foreign economic domination in the Third World began in the form of
colonialism and imperialism in the late fifteenth century with the quest for empires on the
part of European states.  A second wave of European imperialism occurred in the latter
half of the nineteenth century leading up to World War I.  Self-determination and issues
of state sovereignty have not squelched foreign interest in overseas markets.  The
attraction of cheap labor and relatively inexpensive resources in developing countries
provide incentives for multinational corporations to invest in these developing nations. In
addition, as the global economy continues to expand, there is an increasing opportunity
for trade between diverse regime types. The effects of foreign investment and trade can
be viewed from two different perspectives.
The neo-liberal view suggests that international sources of capital have a positive
impact on local conditions, specifically that “[t]hrough trade, international aid, and
foreign investment, the less-developed economies acquire the export markets, capital, and
technology required for economic development” (Gilpin 1987, 265).  Trade and
investment contribute to the transition from a traditional to a market economy by
addressing certain deficiencies within the developing state.  These deficiencies include
the lack of an economic middle class, the presence of an agriculturally based economy,
and the inefficient use of natural resources. Classical liberals defend the trade and
investment practices against critics who suggest that such activity is harmful to domestic
workers.  The primary defense is that trade and investment lead to efficiency in
employment that leads to higher wages, works to reduce inflation thereby providing
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lower consumer prices, and contributes to overall peace given the increased level of
interdependence among trading partners.  Thus, the influx of foreign capital, whether
through trade or investment, will make up for these deficient resources in the host
country, thus improving both economic and social conditions (Clark 1991).  This
economic development, it is argued by neo-liberals, should also lead to improved human
rights conditions as there is a “tenet of faith among politicians, financiers, and
academicians” that “economic development enhances human rights conditions”
(Pritchard 1989, 1).10
As Shue (1980) points out, these “human rights conditions” can be categorized as
subsistence, security, and liberty rights.  While there is disagreement as to the primacy of
any one of these rights (Shue 1980; Donnelly 1989), there is consensus that economic
development plays a key role in improving the human condition.  Just as Lipset (1959)
argues that economic development is a “requisite for democracy,” it appears that
economic development may also be a “requisite for human rights.”  It seems consistent,
therefore, to expect that trade and investment dollars from the United States would
improve human rights conditions in the recipient nations.
Critics of globalization argue that there are actually deleterious effects of
globalization, particularly to the nations of the South (Coker 1999; Galbraith 1999;
Thomas and Wilkin 1997, 1999; Klak 1998).  The Copenhagen Declaration and
Programme of Action adopted at the World Summit for Social Development Conference
(1995) cautioned that as part of the phenomenon of globalization, “the rapid processes of
                                                          
10 The empirical research has revealed that there is indeed a positive relationship between economic
standing or wealth and human rights (Spalding 1986, Moon and Dixon 1985, 1986; Dixon 1991; Mitchell
and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).
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change and adjustment have been accompanied by intensified poverty, unemployment,
and social disintegration.”11  Along the same vein of dependency and world-systems
theorists (Prebisch 1950; Frank 1966, 1969, 1979; Dos Santos 1970; Wallerstein 1974a,
1980), critics of globalization argue that the presence of Western capitalism, that is
multinationals, the influx of foreign capital, as well as uneven trade relationships, places
a greater emphasis on the function of the elite in developing societies, as well as,
decreases state autonomy regarding economic policy.  Baran (1967) argued that not only
are Third World countries slow to develop, but their development is blocked by trade and
investment from the industrialized states.  This lack of economic development speaks
directly to human rights conditions.  In general, critics contend that less economically
developed countries are more susceptible to a dependent trade and investment
relationship with more developed nations, that, in turn, serves to perpetuate their
economic stagnation (Myrdal 1956).  In addition, they argue that the benefits of trade are
enjoyed by the developed states, but actually tend to exacerbate the problems of
developing states, specifically the problem of vast economic inequities within a society.
Critics also suggest that the effects of foreign investment, trade, and presumably
aid benefits the local elite and works to marginalize the masses.  This marginalization
simply adds more power to the elite, creating a wider gulf between the rich and the poor.
The emphasis on economic development, particularly the competitiveness associated with
trade and investment, is believed to have negative consequences on vulnerable segments
of the population, especially migrants and women workers, as well as indigenous
peoples.  “Globalization has been cited as a contributing factor in violations of the right
                                                          
11 Quote is from paragraph 14 of the Copenhagen Declaration and Programme of Action.
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to life, the right to protection of health, minority rights, freedom of association, the right
to safe and healthy working conditions and the right to a standard of living adequate for
health and well-being in many countries” (Leary 1998, 268).  This schism in a developing
society creates conditions that might lead to social unrest, domestic violence, and
ultimately poor human rights conditions.  The elite, hoping to retain their position as well
as the financial rewards from the influx of American dollars, will engage in behavior that
will maintain the status quo, perhaps even using repression and domestic violence to do
so.  “Foreign capitalists seek to secure their assets in Third World countries by forming
political alliances with feudal landowners, resulting in authoritarian governments
opposed to labor unions, civil rights, and democracy” (Clark 1991, 279).
These two arguments are discussed within the literature as the engine of
development thesis and the Hymer thesis (Hymer 1979a, 1979b; Meyer 1996, 1998).  The
engines of development thesis implies that a positive relationship exists between
investment and the respect for human rights by the recipient regime, or, stated
conversely, that higher levels of investment decrease the likelihood that regimes will
engage in abusive human rights practices.  Proponents of the engine of development
thesis argue that foreign investment increases the standard of living in the recipient nation
by providing jobs, increasing the tax base, and generally improving the infrastructure
(Spero and Hart 1997).
The Hymer thesis implies that a negative relationship exists between external
financial flows and human rights conditions.  While Hymer did not address human rights
directly and refers to the behavior of MNCs, he concludes that as a MNC “crosses
international boundaries, it pulls and tears at the social and political fabric and erodes the
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cohesiveness of national states” (Hymer 1979b).    Hymer argues that a hierarchy
develops in the recipient nation benefiting the top one-third of the population, leaving the
bottom two-thirds to suffer.  This line of reasoning is consistent with that of critics of the
effects of globalization.  The effect of U.S. trade and direct foreign investment, along
with foreign aid, will be examined to assess the consequences of globalization on human
rights.
Conclusion
The arguments of the engines of development theory and the positive aspects of
aid are analogous and basically represent the neo-liberal perspective regarding the effects
of foreign assistance and globalization on human rights.  That is, higher levels of aid,
trade, and investment lead to improved human rights conditions in the recipient nations.
Conversely, the Hymer thesis and the negative aspects of aid are analogous to one
another and basically echo the critics' arguments regarding the negative effects of foreign
assistance and globalization.  Specifically, recipient nations are not the primary
beneficiaries of aid, trade, investment, or development in general.  Globalization,
according to critics, is detrimental to the improvement of human rights conditions and
serves to maintain the relatively weak position of the recipient nation.
The conflict between donor interests and recipient interests in the area of foreign
assistance can be generalized to other foreign policy decisions in connection with
investment and trade.  If the U.S. objective is to promote peace and improve human rights
conditions, then knowing if its policy decisions concerning foreign assistance, direct
foreign investment, and trade run counter to these objectives is an important contribution
to both the academic literature and to policy makers.
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CHAPTER FOUR
HYPOTHESES, MEASURES, AND METHODS
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the security and subsistence models of human rights
developed for this study.  The first section defines and develops the measurements of the
two dependent variables.  The justification for the use of security rights and subsistence
rights is explained, as well as how the data for the two variables are gathered and coded.
The second section concentrates on the variables of interest in this study: U.S. foreign
assistance, trade, and investment.  This section also details the theoretical foundations for
the presence of curvilinear and interaction relationships.  The third section of this chapter
identifies the control variables.  These are independent variables that have been identified
as determinants of security and subsistence rights.  They are divided into economic,
political, and cultural variables.   The third section concludes with a summary of the
independent variables. The last section details the methodology adopted for the analyses.
Dependent Variables
As discussed in Chapter Two, measuring and defining human rights and
subsequently human rights violations has been problematic with much disagreement
among researchers in the field as to what constitutes the best measure.  In addition, there
is little consensus whether research should focus on security rights and civil and political
rights (so-called first generation rights) or social and economic rights (so-called second
generation rights).  It could be argued that one reason for the division of rights is for
political expediency.  Foreign policy decisions regarding the violations of physical
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integrity rights such as torture and extrajudicial executions seem far more cut and dry
than decisions regarding how to alleviate societal and economic problems such as
poverty, malnutrition and illiteracy.
In addition, the division of rights seems to be a convenient tool for political
science researchers.  “One way to avoid the problems caused by global measures of
human rights is to concentrate on a small subset of core rights…which are usually
defined as freedom from torture, freedom from imprisonment for the mere expression of
beliefs and freedom from political execution” (McNitt 1986, 73).  This research
concentrates on two “subsets” of rights, the aforementioned security rights as well as a
measure of basic human needs designed to capture one component of social and
economic rights – a humane standard of living.
The two dependent variables reflect several principles contained within the
various articles in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights.  Specifically, the measure for
security rights captures the “right to life, liberty, and the security of person” (Article 3),
the right not to be “subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment" (Article 5), and the right not to be “subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention,
or exile (Article 9).  Article 25 of the Declaration states that “everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family,
including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services…”
Article 26 indicates that the signatories agree that everyone also has a right to education
of the parent’s choosing.  This right to an adequate standard of living and education is
best captured by the physical quality of life index.  Many of these concepts are further
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clarified and expanded in the International Covenant of Political and Civil Rights (1976)
and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976).
Security Rights
In selecting the measure for security rights, researchers are faced with at least two
dilemmas: first, whether to use a standard-based or an events-based measure and second,
whether security rights are a uni- or multi-dimensional phenomenon.  Two types of data
dominate the field: events-based measures such as Taylor and Jodice’s World Handbook
of Political and Social Indicators (1983) and Bond and Bond’s  PANDA data set (1995)
and standard-based measures such as the political terror scales based on the standards
first established by Gastil (1980).  In general, events-based measures are data on specific
individual violations within a certain time period, while standard-based data are
measurements of human rights conditions at the national level based on a set criteria.
Recent research (Lopez and Stohl 1992; Stohl et al. 1984; Poe and Tate 1994) indicates
an inherent bias in events-based data measurement techniques.  Specifically, Lopez and
Stohl (1992) argue that events-based data fail to capture the “afterlife effect” of human
rights violations.  That is, the terror experienced by the victims at time t lingers into the
future and this institutionalized abuse cannot be detected by an events-based
measurement.1
                                                          
1 Empirical research that employs a standard-based measure for the dependent variable of personal integrity
abuse includes Stohl and Carleton (1985), Carleton and Stohl (1987), Gibney and Stohl (1988), Henderson
(1991, 1993), Poe (1992), Poe and Tate (1994); Gibney and Dalton (1997), Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999)
while other research utilizes an events-based measure (Davenport 1995a, 1995b; Barbieri and Davenport
1997).  In addition, a new unidimensional measure developed by Cingranelli and Richards (1999) addresses
not only the level and pattern, but also the sequence of government respect for human rights.  See the
literature review in Chapter Two of this study for a further discussion.
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As a result, a standard-based political terror scale derived from Gastil’s (1980)
criteria is used in this study for the measure of security rights.   Gastil (1980) established
a five-level ranking of political terror based upon a set of criteria including the degree or
extent of imprisonment due to political beliefs, torture, political murder, and politically
motivated disappearances.  Carleton and Stohl (1985) apply this set of criteria in coding
raw data from two annual reports: the U.S. Department of State Country Reports and
Amnesty International Reports.  This initial effort yielded a data set of fifty-nine
countries for the years 1977-1983.  Poe and Tate (1994) further expanded and combined
several data sets based on this set of criteria, specifically, the data set from Poe and
Sirirangsi (1993, 1994) and data provided by Stohl and his colleagues (Stohl et al. n.d.).
This data set consists of 153 countries for the years 1980-1987.  Poe and Tate (1994,
1996) have updated the data set to include the years 1976-1996 and have made the data
available.2
The method of deriving the standard-based measure involves coders reading the
Amnesty International and State Department reports.  One problem facing coders is that
the two reports do not necessarily cover the same countries.  For example, the State
Department generally releases reports on more countries than Amnesty International.
Citing the high correlation between the two measures, Poe and Tate (1994, 855) “chose to
substitute the value coded for the State Department scale when profile information was
unavailable on a country in the Amnesty International reports and vice versa…”  Thus,
two measures are actually created: one is based on State Department Reports
supplemented by Amnesty International data when necessary and the other based on
                                                          
2 These data were obtained from Poe and Tate and their website at ttp://www.psci.unt.edu/ihrsc/poetate.htm
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Amnesty International Reports and supplemented by State Department data when
necessary.  The latter measurement is utilized in this present research.3
This variable is designed to capture the level of government abuse of physical
integrity rights or security rights.  The variable ranges from “1,” representing the most
abusive record, to “5," representing the greatest degree of the realization of security
rights.4   The variable is a one-dimensional measure, thus bringing us to the second
dilemma for researchers interested in security rights – whether human rights is a one-
dimensional or multi-dimensional phenomenon.
There is a significant amount of research using one-dimensional measures
(Carleton and Stohl 1985; Poe and Tate 1994, 1996; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999).
However, McCormick and Mitchell (1988; 1997) suggest that this line of research is
flawed because it fails to take into account their argument that security rights are
multidimensional.   They argue that the use of imprisonment is quite different than the
use of torture and killing.  “[W]e contend that human rights violations differ in type not
just amount, such that they cannot be clearly represented in a single scale" (McCormick
and Mitchell 1997, 573).  In a substantive manner, they contend that the two types require
different government activity, different uses of government resources, and, of course, the
two types of abuse cause different consequences for the victims.  On the normative side,
they suggest that there is a great difference between a regime which resorts to
                                                          
3 Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) report differences in the two measures certainly resulting from the respective
biases in the reporting from the two different organizations.  The Amnesty International based measure is
preferred for this study in order to avoid the U.S. bias in the dependent variable, particularly as this
research aims at addressing U.S. foreign policy decisions.
4 For the purposes of this study, the ordinal ranking of countries has been inverted from the original data set
by Poe and Tate (1994) in order for both respect for human rights and subsistence rights to be in the same
direction.
74
imprisonment and a regime that engages in torture and killing in order to maintain
political order and control.  Ultimately, McCormick and Mitchell (1997) conclude that
torture/killing and imprisonment represent two distinct types of personal integrity abuse
and should be analyzed separately.
Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999, 298) agree that in some instances such a separation or
division might be useful.  Citing the work of Most and Starr (1989), they contend that
these types of abuses are, in essence, just several options open to abusive regimes.  For
example, killing the political or regime opponent simply negates the necessity to
imprison them. “Thus statistical analysis focusing on one or the other of McCormick and
Mitchell’s imprisonment and torture/killing indices might produce misleading or
meaningless results – if one desires to explain the propensities of governments to repress
or abuse personal integrity rights” (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999, 298).
Several of McCormick and Mitchell’s (1997) arguments are addressed in the
measure by Cingranelli and Richards (1999), specifically those situations where rankings
cannot accommodate regimes that have a "take no prisoners" philosophy.  One of
McCormick and Mitchell’s major complaints is that there can conceivably be countries
that have no political imprisonment (a ranking of 1), but torture and killing may be
common (a ranking of 4).  Cingranelli and Richards (1999) have derived a data set based
on the level, pattern, and sequence of a government’s respect for personal integrity rights
based on Mokken coding techniques.  As a result of their analysis, Cingranelli and
Richards (1999) have demonstrated empirically that security rights are one-dimensional.
However, due to the limited number of years (1981, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1993, and 1996
only) provided by Cingranelli and Richards (1999) and considering their convincing
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argument of the uni-dimensionality of the nature of security rights, the data provided by
Poe and Tate are utilized.5  This data set is the most comprehensive measure of security
rights available.
Subsistence Rights
The second dependent variable, subsistence rights, is measured by the physical
quality of life index (Morris 1979, 1996).  This measure is designed to capture the ability
of a country to meet the basic needs of its people.  The variable is a composite index of
“infant mortality per thousand live births, life expectancy at age one, and basic literacy as
the proportion of the population fifteen years and over who are literate” (Milner 1998,
74).  Infant mortality and life expectancy together measure the overall health of a society.
Infant mortality itself is tied more to water purity, maternal morbidity and the overall
well-being and health of the home environment.  Life expectancy at age one, however,
addresses the available nutrition and health conditions outside the home.  The literacy
variable gives an indication of the general level of development within a society and
specifically reveals whether social benefits actually extend to women and children
(Morris 1979, Dixon 1985, Milner 1998).  The variable potentially ranges from zero,
indicating the lowest level of quality of life, to 100, representing the highest level of
quality of life.
Morris’ (1979) original computation of the index included the early 1970s, as well
as, indices for males and females for the years 1950, 1964, and 1970 (Morris 1979).  This
                                                          
5 A correlation test was conducted comparing the Cingranelli and Richards (1991) data set with the data
from Poe and Tate.  The two data sets are highly corrected (Ktau-b = 0.7073; Spearman = -.8107).  The
inverse relationship is due to Cingranelli and Richards' ranking based on respect for security rights, while
Poe and Tate’s measure is based on personal integrity abuse.
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index was updated by Morris in 1996 and included the years 1960, 1981, 1985, and 1990.
Milner (1998) collected additional data and filled in many of the missing years to have a
comprehensive cross-sectional time series data set.   Thus, Milner (1998) was able to
include the years 1980-1993 in his study of globalization and the realization of basic
human needs.6  In order to further update the data for this present study, I gathered
additional years (1976-1979 and 1994-1996) of data.
The process for updating the index involved gathering data for (1) life expectancy
at age one; (2) infant mortality; (3) and illiteracy rates for adults.   The World
Development Indicator data base was used to gather the initial data for the three separate
measures.  This source provided a comprehensive amount of data, particularly the rates of
illiteracy.  These data were compared to the Milner (1998) data set.  In instances where
data were missing, data from the Milner (1998) data set were added to the initial data
from the World Development Indicator data.  Additional sources of missing data were
gleaned from the World Development Report, UNESCO, and UNICEF’s Children of the
World Report.  Upon gathering as much missing data as possible, the three separate
measures were converted to a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing the worst
performance and 100 representing the best performance.  The three indexed measures are
then combined into the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) using the formula created
by Morris (1979, 1996).
The computation of PQLI includes a measure for infant mortality per thousand
live births (IMR).  According to Morris (1996, 3), “improvements in the infant mortality
                                                          
6 Wesley Milner generously provided his updated data for the years 1980-1993.
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component reflect social improvements inside the home, particularly the well-being of
women.”   This infant mortality rate uses 250 per 1,000 live births as the worst possible
performance with 0 per thousand reflecting the best performance.  Each country’s
performance is converted using the following formula:
250-IMR/2.50.
The measure for life expectancy at age one (LE1) assumes that 38 years is the
worst performance and 85 years is the best performance.  The resulting index for each
country is derived from the formula
LE1 –38/0.47.
However, the data available discloses infant mortality at birth (LE0). Thus, the conversion
formula to obtain the measure for life expectancy at age one (LE1) is as follows:
LE1 = LE0 – 1 + Q0(1-K0)/1-Q0
Where Q0 is the infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births; K0 is the average survival
period during the first year.  This survival period is assumed to be .03 year; LE0 is life
expectancy at birth; and LE1 is life expectancy at age one.
The original raw data on literacy rates was actually given as illiteracy rates. Thus,
the data had to be converted simply by subtracting the raw data from 100.   After each
individual measure is converted to a scale from 0 to 100, the composite index is
calculated by simply averaging the sum of the three components.  Each component is
thus weighted equally.7
                                                                                                                                                                            
7 The information for the formulas and additional information regarding the derivation of the Physical
Quality of Life Index is from Morris (1996).
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Table 1 displays the mean values of the variables measuring security rights and
subsistence rights.  The first section of the table reveals the summary statistics for the
Table 1.   Security Rights and Subsistence Rights – Summary Statistics
Total Sample: OBS      MEAN STD. DEV Min Max
Security Rights 3281        3.56     1.177     1     5
Subsistence Rights 2834       68.82    19.967   7.28    95.27
OECD Nations
Security Rights 436        4.76     .441       3     5
Subsistence Rights 404       91.57    1.474 87.44  95.27
Non-OECD Nations
Security Rights 2845        3.37     1.145      1     5
Subsistence Rights 2430       65.03    19.085   7.28    92.48
total sample for the two measures of security rights and subsistence rights.  The next two
sections of the table represent the summary statistics for OECD states and non-OECD
states respectively.  There is a great discrepancy between the levels of respect for human
rights and whether the country is an OECD or non-OECD state.  For example, the mean
value of security rights in OECD states approaches the maximum value of “5,” while the
citizens enjoy a very high quality of life (91.57).  However, the mean value of security
rights for non-OECD states is approximately 1.5 points lower on the scale.  In addition,
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non-OECD states lag behind OECD states in the quality of life measure by approximately
25 points.8
Primary Variables of Interest:  U.S. Foreign Aid, Trade, and Investment
Foreign Aid
The first primary independent variable of interest is U.S. foreign
assistance. Regardless of whether foreign aid is the dependent or independent variable, it
has traditionally been conceptualized in three different ways: economic aid (Poe 1992;
Carleton and Stohl 1987: Poe and Sirirangsi 1993, 1994; Regan 1995; Smith et al. 1998,
1999), military aid (Poe 1991; Poe and Meernik 1995), and total aid (Stohl et al. 1984;
Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Carleton and Stohl 1985; Meyer 1998, 1999).9   This
study focuses on economic and military aid and their respective effects on human rights.
In keeping with convention, the data for the allocation of economic and military
U.S. aid represents the total bilateral economic and military assistance packages,
including grants and loans, that is allocated to each recipient state.  The data is taken from
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Aid from International Organizations published
annually by the Agency for International Development (Poe and Meernik 1995).10   The
data are reported in the millions of dollars.  Table 2 provides summary statistics for U.S.
economic and military aid.  Similar to Table 1, this table provides a breakdown
                                                          
8 The levels of respect for human rights for the different sub-samples are provided here for a comparison.
The analysis will not include the sample of OECD states only, as there is little concern regarding their
human rights practices.
9 Additional studies have conceptualized aid by differentiating the different types of aid programs. For
example, Hofrenning (1990) uses subsets of economic aid including AID development assistance and P.L.
480-Title I commodity credits.
10 The data for economic and military aid were generously provided by Dr. Steven Poe and Dr. James
Meernik.  Additional and missing data were gathered from the original source.
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Table 2.   U.S. Foreign Assistance  – Summary Statistics
(Millions of 1992 Dollars)
Total Sample: OBS      MEAN STD. DEV Min   Max
Economic Aid 3121      42.658   155.499    0 2489.001
Military Aid 3121          31.801   186.122              0 2349.785
OECD Nations
Economic Aid 417      1.256      6.841    0     75.384
Military Aid 417      8.132    57.186    0    556.346
Non-OECD Nations
Economic Aid 2704      49.043    166.126    0   2489.001
Military Aid 2704      35.451    198.450    0   2349.785
of the summary statistics for the three measures of foreign aid into the total sample of
countries, OECD states, and non-OECD states.  The mean value of economic aid for the
entire sample is 42.66.  However, when considering OECD versus non-OECD states,
there is a large discrepancy in the values, 1.26 and 49.04 respectively.  Similar patterns
are observed for military aid as well, with non-OECD states averaging almost four times
as much military assistance from the United States.  It also should be noted that there is a
wide variance in the sample, particularly in the case of non-OECD states.
However, the raw dollar figures can be misleading.  For example, Egypt receives
a disproportionate amount in terms of economic ($1,227 million) and military ($1,312
million) aid compared to the mean values in the sample of $42.66 and $31.8 million
respectively.   While this is an extraordinary amount of aid allocated to Egypt, the total
percentage of economic and military aid compared to overall GDP comes to roughly 4%
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each.   In 1984 both Gibraltar and Lesotho also had an economic to GDP ratio of
approximately 4%, however their raw dollar allocation was only $6.74 million and
$29.46 million respectively.  Similarly, in 1988, Belize’s aid to GDP relationship totaled
4.05%, however the total amount of economic aid allocated to Belize that year was
$12.07 million.   On the other hand, small amounts of U.S. aid can constitute larger
percentages of GDP.  In 1983, the United States allocated $24 million to Belize, an
amount drastically smaller than the amounts for Egypt, however this $24 million
constituted almost 16% of the country’s GDP.  In 1978, $53 million in economic aid was
allocated to Guyana, which equaled 11.56% of their GDP.  This larger percentage
suggests a greater reliance, or dependency, on the United States for economic standing.
In this vein, it is intuitive to expect that there is a bigger influence of U.S. dollars on the
domestic conditions within the recipient state.  As such, economic and military aid is
measured as a percentage of GDP.
The summary statistics of the transformed variables of economic and military aid
are presented in Table 3. The table is broken down, once again, into the total sample and
OECD and non-OECD states.  There is an obvious difference in the percentage of GDP
that economic and military aid constitutes when comparing OECD and non-OECD states.
In addition, economic aid has a much stronger presence in recipient states, almost nine
times as much as military aid.
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Table 3.   U.S. Foreign Assistance  – Summary Statistics
(As a percentage of GDP)
Total Sample: OBS      MEAN STD. DEV Min   Max
Economic Aid 3065      .00852   .017868    0 .1983507
Military Aid 3065         .00156   .007671              0 .1519511
OECD Nations
Economic Aid 417      .000021      .000203    0  .0033129
Military Aid 417      .000045   .000327      0  .0031067
Non-OECD Nations
Economic Aid 2648      .009869         .018877               0        .1983507
Military Aid 2648      .001800         .008227    0        .1519511
Considering the time necessary to transfer foreign aid funds from the United
States to a recipient nation and the actual implementation of aid, it is unlikely that aid
granted at time t will have a contemporaneous impact on human rights violations at time
t.  A more realistic model assumes that there is a lagged effect of foreign aid on security
rights.  However, there is no sound theoretical argument suggesting a certain time lag
over another.  Regan’s (1995) model includes a one-year lag, while Meyer (1996, 1998)
uses a three-year lag.  A three-year lag was chosen for two reasons.  First, even one year
seems too short a time period to conclude that any effect on security rights would have
been realized.  The coding of the variable is annual allocation of aid.  There is no means
of determining whether the aid was actually allocated in the early months of a year or in
December.  Second, results from a three-year lag will provide a chance for comparison to
the Meyer model.
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A neo-liberal view, as well as political rhetoric, suggests that higher levels of aid
are more likely to result in improved human rights conditions, or increases in both the
level of security rights and increases in the physical quality of life or subsistence rights.
For example, Madeline Albright, U.S. secretary of state, argued that the Colombia aid
package and President Andres Pastana “merits our support for his plan to fight drug
trafficking, achieve peace, promote prosperity and improve governance throughout his
country” (Albright 2000, 1).11  This hypothesis is derived from arguments that foreign aid
can bring peace; help governments meet educational and health goals; build schools and
health clinics; train teachers, nurses, doctors, and other related health workers; provide
medical supplies; provide improvements in access to food and nutrition through the PL
480 food programs; create new employment opportunities as aid contributes to the
building of large infrastructure projects; connect rural and urban area through road
projects; assist in developing food cooperatives; provide vocational training; and assist in
developing labor organizations (Zimmerman 1993).
H1: The higher the level of economic aid  and military aid, ceteris paribus, the more
likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence
rights.
On the other hand, arguments are just as plentiful that foreign aid contributes to
poor human rights conditions, particularly in the case of military aid and repressive
governments.  Leaders in such regimes simply use the military assistance to maintain and
perpetuate their power, including suppressing the rights of the political opposition.  This
is a concern expressed by opponents in Congress of granting the Colombian aid package.
“We at least need to see a concerted effort by the Colombian Army to thwart the
                                                          
11 Albright cited from CNN at http://www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/04/15/colombia.pastrana/ .
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paramilitary groups, who are responsible for most of the atrocities against civilians, and a
willingness by the Colombian Armed Forces to turn over to the civilian courts their own
members who violate human rights” (Leahy 2000, quoted by the AP).12  As for economic
aid, the restrictions and conditions imposed on many types of aid prevent any assistance
from actually improving domestic conditions (Dos Santos 1970).  For example,
antiquated techniques and materials often are introduced into the recipient state which
then require them to seek further aid down the road.  This seems to perpetuate the foreign
assistance relationship between the United States and the recipient state.  In addition,
economic aid also is used by elites in recipient states to fund their own agendas and the
benefit of this aid is not distributed to the masses.
H2:  The higher the level of economic aid  and military aid, ceteris paribus, the less likely
the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence rights.
Trade and Investment
In the international political economy literature, studies have examined the effects
of direct foreign investment and international trade on conflictual/cooperative relations
between states (Polacheck 1978, 1980, 1992; Gasiorowski 1986; Pollins 1989a, 1989b;
Reuveny and Heejoon 1996, 1998; Sayrs 1990).  More of interest here, however, is that
research has begun to examine the impact of international economic factors, such as trade
and investment, on domestic sources of violence (Rothgeb 1991; Snyder 1978; Rogowski
1987; Zimmerman 1983).   Previous research on the specific relationship between
international economic factors and human rights has conceptualized trade in a variety of
                                                          
12 Senator Leahy’s comments can be found at http://www.colombiasupport.net/200001/ap-farcresponse-
0112.html.
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ways including trade concentration of certain export categories (Ziegenhagen 1986;
Davenport 1995, 1996), manufactured exports as a percentage of total exports (Carleton
1989; Henderson 1996), and international financial agreements regarding trade (Pion-
Berlin 1989).
This current research is interested solely in the amount of bilateral trade between
the United States and all other countries.  Thus, U.S. trade figures are collected from the
International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook for the years
included in the study.  The total dollar value of U.S. exports to each state and imports to
the United States from each state are added together, divided by GDP, and then
multiplied by 100 to calculate a trade openness variable.13  In studies interested in the
effects of investment on domestic conditions, measures for investment have included
both total world investment (Smith et al. 1999; Rothgeb 1987, 1989, 1991) as well as
investment from one particular country (Meyer 1996, 1998).  Again, considering this
research is interested in the influence of U.S. investment, the data for U.S. direct foreign
investment (hereafter USDFI) data is from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau
of Economic Analysis.   It is measured as a percentage of GDP, similar to the other
independent variables measuring aid and trade. Both variables are measured at a lag of
one year as there is no expectation that investment today will affect conditions today.
There is a time lapse in order for trade and investment to penetrate the domestic
economy.  A longer time period is not used, as in the case of foreign assistance,
                                                          
13 Heston and Summers derived a trade openness variable be adding total imports and total exports and
dividing by GDP.  This measure is based on the same concept, however U.S. figures are substituted for
world trade figures in the Heston and Summers measure.
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considering there is, for the most part, a steady stream of trade and investment throughout
the year.
Table 4 offers a preliminary view of the total dollar amounts of trade and
investment that flow between the United States and recipient states.  The first section of
this table reflects the summary statistics for the entire sample.  The subsequent sections
reveal the summary statistics for OECD states and non-OECD states.  The comparison
between the mean levels of trade and investment between OECD and non-OECD states is
Table 4.   U.S. Trade and Investment  – Summary Statistics
(Millions of Dollars)
Total Sample: OBS      MEAN STD. DEV Min   Max
Trade – U.S. Exports 3271     1907.016   7268.594    0 132,584
Trade – U.S. Imports 3298     2533.285  10,256.25    0 159,746
Investment 2453     3287.29  10,186.44      -8552 112,907
OECD Nations
Trade – U.S. Exports   399     9548.378   17,458.4   35 132,584
Trade – U.S. Imports   399    12,446.72  25,156.85  125 159,746
Investment   417     15,040.6  20,465.4   .46 112,907
Non-OECD Nations
Trade – U.S. Exports 2872       845.419     2946.10    0   56,761
Trade – U.S. Imports 2899     1168.862     4167.12    0   74,111
Investment 2036       880.056     2302.77      -8552   26,410
striking.  In terms of trade, OECD states enjoy over ten times the amount of trade dollars
than non-OECD states.  The discrepancy in investment is even greater.  The United States
87
invests over seventeen times the amount of money in OECD states than in non-OECD
states.
Much like the figures from U.S. aid, these trade and investment figures can be
misleading and fail to adequately describe the nature of the relationship between the
United States and recipient states.  Table 5 displays the measure for trade openness
Table 5.   U.S. Trade and Investment  – Summary Statistics
(As a percentage of GDP)
Total Sample: OBS      MEAN STD. DEV Min   Max
Trade Openness 3179     .0869745  .1200461    0 1.042042
Investment 2403     .0555904      .1842852      -.4224       2.582443
OECD Nations
Trade Openness   399        .0615194       .0710827    .0110922     .5129359
Investment 418        .0712977           .0818263    .0000641     .4402513
Non-OECD Nations
Trade Openness 2780        .090628           .1251005             0       1.042042
Investment 1985        .0522828         .1991128     -.4224      2.582443
and investment, both as a percentage of GDP.  Here it is evident that while in raw dollars
the OECD nations receive greater amounts of trade and investment dollars, in terms of
relation to GDP the discrepancy is greatly reduced.  In fact, trade constitutes greater
amounts of GDP in non-OECD (.09) states than in OECD (.06) states.  What is more
striking is the range of the respective variables.  There is a greater likelihood that trade
and investment comprises a larger percentage of GDP in non-OECD states.  This
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indicates a greater influence of U.S. trade and investment on the economies of non-
OECD states.
The neo-liberal perspective, and again political rhetoric, posits that there is a
positive relationship between globalization and the realization of human rights.  Liberal
thought suggests that “foreign trade serves to strengthen the merchant and manufacturing
classes within the developing nations, thereby breaking the grip of traditional elites on the
economy.  Market forces also shift peasants out of subsistence farming and into factories
where their productivity is enhanced and their standard of living can rise” (Clark 1991,
275).  The benefits realized by the host state include increased economic resources and
domestic economic stimulation that comes from multinational investment.  These new
economic resources provide the funding for new social programs in the host state, further
improving human rights conditions (Rothgeb 1989).  In addition, Gilpin (1975) argues
that foreign investment provides technology to the host state, enabling a more efficient
use of resources.  Thus the neo-liberal perspective hypothesizes that investment and trade
flow from the United States will have a positive impact on the physical quality of life and
respect for security rights.
H3: The higher the level of trade and investment, ceteris paribus, the more likely the
government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence rights.
Critics of globalization and dependency theorists, particularly the more radical
branch, argue that dependent trade and investment relationships serve to weaken regime
support and encourage class conflict.  Rather than trade and investment serving to diffuse
wealth from the developed world to the developing states, these two external economic
influences stifle economic development and growth, conditions necessary for the
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improvement of human rights.  Specifically, core countries reap the benefit of raw
materials and exploit labor found in periphery states.  Thus, periphery states simply
contribute to capitalism in the core states at the expense of their own domestic economic
development.  In addition, foreign trade and investment entities tend to form coalitions
with elites in the periphery which often block potential reforms that endanger the existing
regime, and perhaps more importantly, the regime's profits.   The profits are often then
diverted into the military as well as into “individual displays of wealth and status” (Clark
1991, 285).  What ultimately occurs in the periphery state is “backwardness, misery, and
social marginalization within its borders.  The development that it produces benefits very
narrow sectors, encounters unyielding domestic obstacles to its continued economic
growth…and leads to the progressive accumulation of balance-of-payments deficits,
which in turn generate more dependence and more superexploitation” (Dos Santos 1984,
103).  Others argue that the technology advancements from trade and investment are
often not useful to the domestic economic development needs.
H4: The higher the level of trade and direct foreign investment, ceteris paribus, the
less likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence
rights.
Threshold Effects
Research suggests that levels of democracy (Fein 1995) and wealth (Olson 1963;
Gurr 1968) make a difference in the level of repression and political violence within
states.  At certain levels of each, more repression and political violence are going to
occur, followed by a diminishing effect.  Thus, while curvilinear relationships between an
independent and dependent variable are not novel in the area of human rights, the idea
that there is a threshold effect regarding human rights and foreign aid, trade, and
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investment has yet to be explored.  The theoretical arguments for this threshold effect are
grounded in the two major competing theories' characteristics in the analysis of the linear
relationship – dependency theory and neo-liberalism.
How might these potential curvilinear or threshold effects manifest themselves?
First, one must consider that aid, trade, and investment have the potential to influence or
affect not only the domestic economic structure but the domestic political structure as
well.  This is especially so in the case of foreign assistance.  While foreign assistance
consists of money that is introduced into the recipient’s state, this type of intervention
inherently involves politics.  Foreign assistance often is used to influence both political
and economic policies in the recipient state.  For example, the United States often places
“economic conditions on aid that shapes monetary and fiscal policy, investment policy,
and international economic policy, such as exchange rate and nationalization policy”
(Spero and Hart 1997, 185).  In addition, aid is given to government officials.  On the
other hand, the money from trade and investment flows primarily into the recipient state’s
economy.  While there might be government ownership of certain industries, the
governments in recipient states receive this type of capital infusion primarily in an
indirect fashion and, thus, have less influence on the allocation and spending of trade and
investment dollars.
Second, given that aid, trade, and investment dollars are controlled differently
once introduced into the recipient state, the question becomes do different levels of each
make a difference?  In the area of foreign assistance, low levels of economic and military
aid may signal a minor interest on the part of the United States in the recipient state.  For
example, such an interest might be characterized by a minor client-state relationship, a
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short-term relationship such as humanitarian relief, or the United States may not have any
real and lasting engagement with that state.  In these types of situations, human rights
conditions may not be affected.  However, as the level of aid begins to increase elites in
charge of the government may simply use whatever aid is granted at their own discretion
oftentimes ignoring the needs of the citizens.  In addition, elites may resort to repression
in order to remain in power. This scenario is supportive of the dependency perspective.
Higher levels of aid signal a greater U.S. interest in the recipient state and are
indicative of a long-term client-state relationship, one with real or high levels of U.S.
political engagement.  For example, “[a]id contributed in important ways to growth in
certain countries such as Pakistan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which received massive aid
inflows” (Spero and Hart 1997, 184).  Additional countries that received large amounts of
aid and which can be characterized as having a long-term relationship with the United
States are Egypt, Israel, and most of the Latin and Central American states.  This scenario
leads to two possible outcomes.  First, due to heavy U.S. engagement and influence,
elites must compromise and even relinquish some of their power to contending groups.
Elites, or government, must make concessions, including altering human rights practices,
to satisfy American concerns and interests.  In addition, larger amounts of aid,
particularly economic aid, suggest that education, health, and agricultural programs are
receiving additional funding, ultimately contributing to better living conditions.  This
outcome most resembles a neo-liberal argument favoring foreign assistance allocation.
A second outcome mirrors the arguments presented by dependency theorists.
Again, greater U.S. interest in the client-state leads to higher levels of foreign assistance,
as well as higher levels of U.S. engagement and influence.  The elites in the recipient
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state resort to greater human rights abuse to silence political opposition, rather than
compromise to satisfy American pressure and desire for a stable government, democratic
or not.  For example, Donnelly (1989) points out that the economic recovery miracle of
South Korea was supported in large part by massive amounts of U.S. economic aid.
“Twenty-five years ago South Korea was widely viewed as an economic disaster saved
from complete collapse only be massive and seemingly endless infusions of American
aid, which amounted to half the national budget” (Donnelly 1989, 170).  However,
improvements in the South Korean economy and subsequent improvements in
subsistence rights as a result of foreign aid are offset by the fact that “its record on civil
and political rights has been dismal.  In addition to abrogating political freedoms and
civil liberties, the military regimes that until very recently ruled Korea…regularly
engaged in such practices as mysterious death, kidnapping, political imprisonment, and
torture” (Donnelly 1989, 184).
As for trade and investment, there are again competing theories that suggest a
curvilinear relationship exists between economic factors of globalization and human
rights conditions.  In one variant or another, one of the major arguments presented by
dependency theorists is that Third World countries become too economically dependent
on foreign countries and thus they fail to develop domestic industries and markets (Frank
1966, 1969, 1977; O’Donnell 1988; Cardosa 1979; Dos Santos 1970, 1973, 1984;
Wallerstein1974a, 1974b, 1980).
For the dependent countries these relations represent an export of profits
and interest which carries off part of the surplus generated domestically
and leads to a loss of control over their productive resources.  In order to
permit these disadvantageous relations, the dependent countries must
generate large surpluses, not in such a way as to create higher levels of
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technology but rather creating superexploited manpower. The result is
to limit the development of their internal market and their technical and
cultural capacity, as well as the moral and physical health of their people
(Dos Santos 1984, 96).
Dos Santos (1984) implies that not only is the economic structure affected, but the living
conditions of the citizenry are affected by such dependent economic relationships.
This dependent relationship developed from the very beginning during the years
of imperialism.  Thus, even at initial or low levels of trade and investment with wealthier
states, dependency theories indicate that domestic conditions suffer.  Higher levels of
U.S. economic penetration into recipient economies continue to cause domestic markets
and conditions to suffer due to the propensity of less developed countries to become even
more economically dependent on the core country.   The higher the level of U.S. trade
and investment, the more elites within Third World states will suppress the citizenry to
provide and maintain a stable economic environment and to maintain the flow of trade
and foreign investment.  In addition, the relationship between businesses in the
industrialized states and business elites in the periphery states serves to exclude infant
and developing industries in the periphery and to prevent the diffusion of capital from the
elites to the majority of the citizens.
On the other hand, it can be argued that lower levels of trade and investment
signal little U.S. penetration into the recipient state. At these low levels there may be no
changes in human rights conditions, particularly where subsistence rights are concerned
as there is little additional income flow into the domestic economic system.  Higher
levels of trade and investment, on the other hand, indicate that U.S. firms have indeed
penetrated domestic markets.  As such, more and more money is introduced into
94
circulation contributing to the level of wealth within recipient states.  An increase in
wealth, in turn, contributes to improved human rights conditions (Mitchell and
McCormick 1988; Moon and Dixon 1985; Spalding 1986; Henderson 1991; Moon 1991;
Poe and Tate 1994; Milner 1998; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).  This scenario illustrates the
neo-liberal perspective that free trade and liberal investment conditions are integral parts
of a positive sum game affecting not only the international economy and domestic
economies, but human rights conditions as well.  The increase in economic well-being
and improved political and security rights occur somewhat simultaneously as suggested
by theories in the field of human rights, specifically that political and economic rights are
interdependent and interrelated (Howard 1983; Donnelly 1989).  In addition, empirical
evidence suggests that the realization of political and economic rights are related  (Milner
1998; Milner, Poe, and Leblang 1999).
H5: The level of aid, trade, and/or investment has a conditional effect on human rights
conditions.
Interaction Effects
A third analysis will consider the hypotheses that the relationships between
human rights and the economic variables of aid, trade, and investment are moderated by
the level of democracy and economic standing within the recipient state. What are the
theoretical arguments in support of this hypothesis?  At higher levels of democracy, states
are characterized by increased “openness of political institutions” (Jaggers and Gurr
1996).  That is, democratic states tend to have institutions and procedures whereby
citizens can effectively participate in competitive elections of their leaders as well as
adequately express their preferences regarding policy alternatives.  In fact, most
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definitions of democracy include aspects of regular, peaceful, and competitive elections
(Dahl 1971; Sorenson 1993), citizen participation in policy making decisions (Cohen
1971; Dahl 1971, Sorenson 1993), as well as the protection of civil and political liberties
which guarantee such citizen participation (Sorenson 1993).  Ultimately, Dahl (1971)
contends that the keys to democracy are competition and participation.
Citizens living in states with lower levels of democracy have less opportunity for
participation in decisions regarding policy alternatives, particularly redistributive
policies.  Thus, at lower levels of democracy it is more likely that aid, trade, and
investment will have negative effects on human rights as elites within society utilize the
benefits from aid, trade, and investment to their own advantage.  As states become more
democratic, however, more citizens are included in this electoral process and the result is
an increase in demands for redistributive policies.  Given these conditions, neo-liberal
theory suggests that in more democratic states, citizens are likely to have more say in the
distribution of foreign aid dollars, as well as the ability to voice opinions regarding the
policies directing trade and investment.   At higher levels of democracy, the influx of aid,
trade, and investment dollars is more likely to improve human rights conditions, due to
citizen involvement and institutions based on democratic norms.
Dependency theorists would basically agree that at low levels of democracy, aid,
trade, and investment are detrimental to human rights conditions.  However, as states
become more democratic, there is a higher likelihood of political unrest and violence due
to increased opportunities for the political opposition to voice their demands.  The influx
of aid, trade, and investment dollars from the United States will only exacerbate the
political unrest indicative of fragile democracies.  For example, elites within society will
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use foreign assistance and the economic benefits from trade and investment to fund their
repressive activities, or at the very least fund their own agendas to the exclusion of the
potential political opposition.
In Third World societies…the masses have been granted access to
the political arena when their economies are much more underdeveloped
than was the case in the developed world.  This means that the vast
majority in these societies, in addition to having low incomes, have little
or no access to very basic social and municipal services – schools,
hospitals, potable water, a regular electricity supply and so forth – and
yet have been encouraged to expect and demand these things by politicians
during the phase of political mobilization…As a result the sheer volume of
demands vastly exceeds the poorly endowed state’s capacity to deliver the
goods.  The meager size of the national cake in underdeveloped states
induces not the sedate competition of the western democracies but a
frenetic scramble which can often be extremely vicious…Those powerful
enough grab on a spectacular scale and have no compunction about using
violence to achieve their goals.  The use of hired thugs to intimidate and if
necessary kill political opponents and their supporters is a normal feature
of the political process in many Third World states (Randall and Theobald
1985, 190).
Thus, introducing foreign aid will only serve as an additional destabilizing factor in the
democratization process as elites within the society will use this aid to maintain the status
quo and suppress the rights of the masses.
Globalization critics also suggest that international trade and investment not only
acts as disruptive economic forces, but as destabilizing political forces as well.  In
essence, multinational firms become bedfellows with “a political and social coalition of
wealthy compradors, powerful monopolists, and large landowners dedicated to the
defense of existing feudal-mercantile order” (Baran 1957, 195).  As such, local officials
have little incentive to provide or initiate any social and political reforms.  In fact,
regimes may even resort to repressive action in order to maintain and attract
multinational investments (Rothgeb 1989).   Interactions terms will be used to determine
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if aid, trade, and investment are intervening variables between the influence of
democracy and human rights.
H6:  The effect of aid, trade, and investment on human rights is moderated by the level
of democracy.
Does the level of economic development matter?  That is, will aid, trade, and
investment affect human rights conditions differently at different levels of wealth?  It
seems intuitive that the introduction of aid, trade, and investment to the poorest countries
will have a different impact than the introduction of such external economic factors on
richer societies.  In countries with the lowest levels of economic development, by
definition the citizens are living in dire poverty with only immediate goals of subsistence.
The introduction of external sources of income in the poorest of the poor countries, one
could argue, doesn’t seriously threaten the social position of those elites that do exist.  In
these poor societies, regimes have very little need to repress its citizens.  Generally, the
poor are busy being poor (Olson 1963, Gurr 1968).  In such situations, providing
subsistence in the form of aid, trade, and investment to the poorest in society may
actually reduce the level of political protest and turmoil (Rothgeb 1991).  Thus, while
security rights may not improve, there is no expectation that security rights will worsen.
As for subsistence rights, the introduction of economic resources may serve to improve
the state’s ability to provide for basic human needs following the neo-liberal argument
that external sources of income are diffused throughout society.
As states become more wealthy, however, the presence of foreign investment
“creates both anxiety about their social position for some groups and the promise of new
opportunities for others" (Rothgeb 1991, 31).  Alexis de Tocqueville, in his commentary
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of the French Revolution, stated that, “…those parts of France in which the improvement
in the standard of living was most pronounced were the chief centers of the revolutionary
movement.”  Even Marx argued that improvement in workers’ economic conditions led
to social unrest due to their increased inability to satisfy increasing wants.  Thus, rather
than "more murder in the middle", in this case there is more political unrest in the middle
class.   The government may resort to repression in order to maintain economic and
political control of the state. Thus, security rights are more likely to be violated as friction
between the emerging economic classes and the elites continues.  Subsistence rights, on
the other hand, may see improvement as the level of wealth increases as more and more
aid, trade, and investment dollars are introduced into the recipient state’s economy.
At the highest levels of economic wealth, the effects of the introduction of aid,
trade, and investment on human rights may be negligible.  First, at this level of economic
development, aid is not likely a factor.  Second, the influx of additional trade and
investment in the wealthiest countries probably does not noticeably alter the level of per
capita GDP.  Last, countries at extreme high levels of wealth generally have good human
rights records.  In fact, wealth is a leading characteristic of states with good human rights
records (Mitchell and McCormick1988; Moon and Dixon 1985; Spalding 1986;
Henderson 1991; Moon 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Milner 1998; Poe, Tate, and Keith
1999).
H7: The effect of aid, trade, and investment on human rights is moderated by the level
of economic wealth.
Independent Control Variables
Both models include several control variables identified by previous literature as
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important determinants of both personal integrity rights and subsistence rights.   They are
divided into economic, political, and cultural variables.  The following section offers a
description of these variables, how the variables are measured and the data gathered for
the analyses.
Economic Factors
Two variables measuring a country’s economic condition are included as control
variables. 14   Previous research in the field of human rights indicates that economic
standing, or the wealth of a nation, is positively associated with respect for human rights
(Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994, Davenport 1995;
Poe et al. 1997) and subsistence rights (Moon and Dixon 1985; Spalding 1986; Moon
1991; Milner 1998)  These studies indicate that wealth is a strong predictor in the
improvement of the human condition.  Thus, it is expected that citizens in wealthier
nations experience less abuse from the regime and better living conditions.  On the other
hand, human rights violations and substandard living conditions are expected in relatively
poorer countries.  “The poorest countries, with substantial social and political tensions
created by economic scarcity, would be most unstable and thus most apt to use repression
in order to maintain control” (Mitchell and McCormack 1988, 478).  Following previous
research, economic standing is measured by GNP per capita.
                                                          
14 A third economic variable is economic inequality.  According to Gurr (1986), income inequality drives a
wedge between the rich and poor resulting in conflict and political instability.  As the gulf between the rich
and the poor increases, the elite must resort to various forms of repression in order to maintain stability.
Unfortunately, the restrictions on data availability reduce the number of observations severely.  Thus,
economic inequality is not included in the model.  A regression was performed with the inclusion of this
variable and it is significant in determining human rights conditions, however the limitation of
observations renders other control variables, which have been shown to be significant, insignificant.
Economic inequality is measured by the GINI index formulated by Deininger and Squire (1996).
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The possible effect of economic growth, the second economic control variable, is
less clear.  On the one hand, economic growth implies greater resources and the state’s
increased ability to provide for at least the basic human needs.  This might bode well for
subsistence rights, but tells us very little about the effect of economic growth on security
rights.   Olson (1963) suggests that domestic political unrest is a by-product of rapid
economic growth.  Gurr (1968) also argues that domestic unrest may be due to the fact
that expectations regarding the benefits of economic growth are not met, particularly the
expectations of the non-elite.
Previous research yields conflicting results.  Poe and Tate (1994) find that there is
no link between economic growth and security rights in their 153-country study for the
years 1980-1987.  However, this result changes in their subsequent study (Poe, Tate, and
Keith 1999, 307) when additional years are added.  In this study, they find that
“economic growth exercises a negative impact on repression.”  In regards to subsistence
rights, Milner (1998) finds no relationship between economic growth and a country’s
respect for basic human needs.  However, when differentiating between OECD and non-
OECD states, the results change.  For OECD states, economic growth is influential and
statistically significant, that is, increases in economic growth lead to a decrease in respect
for subsistence rights.  He finds no relationship when considering non-OECD states,
although the coefficient is in the anticipated direction.
The conflicting theories and results lead to competing hypotheses regarding the
link between economic growth and human rights.  Thus, the variable is analyzed utilizing




The level of democracy in a regime is found in previous research to be positively
associated with respect for security rights and with subsistence rights (Spalding 1986,
Moon and Dixon 1985, 1986; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994, 1996;
Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Milner 1999).  That is, regimes that are more democratic are
less abusive to citizens and are better able to provide for basic human needs.  The
influence of democracy is twofold: first, the representative nature of democratic regimes
tends to inhibit a regime from committing widespread human rights abuses, and second,
it causes the state to seek alternative means of conflict (Henderson 1991).
Poe and Tate (1994) argue that certain measures of democracy, specifically
Freedom House, include a measure of personal integrity that would conflict with the
dependent variable. The authors suggest that a tautological problem exists, as many
measures of democracy contain elements that are necessarily captured in the measure of
human rights.  “If democracy is to function as an independent explanation for state
terrorism and abuse of personal integrity, it must be defined in terms of procedures and
rights that do not themselves preclude repression” (Poe and Tate 1994, 856).  Thus, the
Polity III (Jaggers and Gurr 1996) measure of democracy, which focuses on the
institutional attributes of democracy rather than actions of the state, is employed in this
study.  Polity III measures democracy on a scale of “0,” representing the least
democratic, to “10,” representing the most democratic.  Thus, as the level of democracy
increases, respect for both security rights and subsistence rights should increase.15
                                                          
15 A second measure for level of democracy is the political rights scale from Freedom House.  The Freedom
House scale and the Polity III measure are correlated at .92 suggesting that the two variables measure, in
essence, the same phenomena.
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The level of democracy is but one variable that captures the political
characteristics of a regime.  A second political variable is regime ideology, specifically
the presence of a leftist regime.  Regimes are considered leftist if they are “governed by a
socialist party or coalition that does not allow effective electoral competition with
nonsocialist opposition” (Poe and Tate 1994, 858).  Poe and Tate (1994, 1999) include a
measure for the presence of a leftist government based on the arguments of Jeane
Kirkpatrick (1979) and the empirical findings of Mitchell and McCormick (1988).
Kirkpatrick (1979, 44) argues that while right-wing autocracies sometimes evolve into
democracies, this likelihood is practically nonexistent when considering revolutionary
sociality or communist states.  She suggests that leftist governments are more repressive
and they “create refugees by the millions because they claim jurisdiction over the whole
life of the society,” leading to a negative relationship with respect for security rights.  In
contrast, Kirkpatrick (1979, 44) suggests that traditional autocratic (right-wing) regimes
have systemic differences when compared to socialists states, specifically that
“traditional autocrats tolerate social inequalities, brutality, and poverty while
revolutionary autocracies create them.”  One can infer from this last statement that
subsistence rights under a communist revolutionary regime would suffer right along with
security rights.
However, Moon (1991) argues that socialism provides for a social environment
where inequalities are thought to be smaller.  “With a much lower percentage of income
deriving from ownership of capital and land, inequality levels are likely to be much
lower.…It is also evident that socialist states possess a much greater command over
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social resources, with a considerably greater ability to extract, mobilize, and target the
surplus on the problems of basic needs” (Moon 1991, 72).
What does the empirical analyses suggest?  In regards to security rights, Mitchell
and McCormick (1988) find limited support for the Kirkpatrick thesis that totalitarian
(Marxist states) are more repressive.  The caveat is that they are only more repressive on
their imprisonment scale.  On the torture dimension, the authors find no significant
difference between a totalitarian regime and an authoritarian (right-wing) regime.  Poe
and Tate (1994) find conflicting results depending on which dependent variable is used.
In the model based primarily on State Department reports, the leftist government variable
yields a strong, statistically significant coefficient in the anticipated direction.  This is in
contrast to the model based on Amnesty International Reports, which revealed an
extremely weak coefficient with a negative sign.  “These results are precisely what one
would expect if indeed the State Department’s profiles are biased against leftist
governments (or, alternatively if Amnesty International ratings are biased in favor of
leftist regimes and movements)” (Poe and Tate 1994, 864).  In their follow-up article,
Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) find that leftist countries are less repressive regardless of the
source of the dependent variable.   The authors suggest that perhaps a longer time span
and a larger number of countries might be the cause for the change.
 In his analysis of subsistence rights, Moon (1991, 74) finds that socialist states
“possess a PQLI level more than 17 points higher than would be expected on the bases of
GNP alone.”  This finding is a qualified one, however, due to the small sample size (11
socialist countries) and the fact that most of these are characterized by relatively high
income levels (Moon 1991, 75).  In addition, Cuba proves to be an outlier, primarily due
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to their relatively high rate of literacy.  There are conflicting theories regarding the
potential effect of leftist regimes, as well as results, thus leading to a competing
hypothesis.  A variable for the presence of a leftist government is included in the model
and posited with a two-tailed test.  The variable is coded with a "1," representing a leftist
government and a "0," otherwise.
Just as there is an expectation that leftist governments will have an impact on
human rights conditions, it is hypothesized that regimes under military rule will abuse
both security and subsistence rights (McKinlay and Cohan 1975; Poe and Tate 1994;
Moon 1991).  Their method of obtaining power suggests that violence is their primary
modus operandi.  In addition, they “will face fewer barriers than other leaders if they
choose to act repressively” (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).  Thus, it is hypothesized that the
presence of a military regime will result in less respect for security and subsistence rights.  
Two additional military variables, military burden and military personnel, will be
included in the model of basic human needs based on Moon’s (1991) results as well as
conflicting research (Moon and Dixon 1985; Rosh 1986).  Military burden is simply the
percentage of military expenditures by the government.  Previous studies present the
argument that a heavy military burden contributes to a state’s ability to provide for basic
human needs.  Benoit (1973) argues that military expenditures actually facilitate
economic growth and contribute to economic benefits, particularly to countries in the
Third World.  For example, Benoit (1973) points to the benefits to society of manpower
training, the fact that defense programs provide improvements in infrastructure (military-
built roads are used by civilians as well), and defense expenditures may actually stimulate
demand.
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More recent research takes the opposite position, specifically that money
allocated to the military represents lost opportunities to spend on the improvement of
living conditions (Rosh 1986; Moon 1991; Felice 1998; Chan 1985).  “Arms cannot be
used to plow fields, immunize children, or prolong life. Large allocations of a country’s
resources to military expenditures, therefore, might provide for economic growth, but not
for development from a basic needs perspective” (Rosh 1986, 133).   Felice (1998)
concurs with this argument and adds that military regimes forfeit economic rights in
exchange for the right to self-determination, the latter requiring increases in military
preparedness and spending.  “[M]ilitarism represents a structural choice that accords
military priorities and arms spending a higher priority than meeting basic human needs”
(Felice 1998, 26).   Felice points out that this trade-off between military spending and
subsistence rights is not just detrimental to less developed countries, by citing that since
the 1970s the United States has experienced a decline in the standard of living.16
The results from the research are mixed.  Moon and Dixon (1985) find a negative
relationship between military spending and basic human needs, but a positive relationship
between military personnel and PQLI.  Rosh’s (1986) study conflicts with the findings of
Moon and Dixon (1985), that is, the size of a country’s military burden does not affect a
country’s provision of basic needs.  Given the conflicting results, a two-tailed hypothesis
is posited for both military personnel and military expenditures.
                                                          
16 Felice (1998) points to Census Bureau statistics which indicate that the percentage of workers with low
earnings (defined as less than $12,195 per year in 1990 adjusted dollars) rose from 12.1 per cent by the end
of the 1970’s to 18 per cent by the end of the 1990s.  In addition, Felice (1998) cites that the number of
children living in poverty in the United States grew by more than one million in the 1980s.  Felice (1998)
attributes this to increases in military spending.
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The remaining political variables focus on the occurrence of national and
international war, as well as the effect of the Cold War.   Previous research suggests that
involvement in international conflict (Stohl 1975, 1976; Rasler 1986; Poe and Tate 1994;
Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999) and civil wars (Nieburg 1969, Tilly 1978; Skocpol 1979, Poe
and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Milner 1998) negatively affects the realization
of both security and subsistence rights.  In times of war, a regime is more apt to abuse
citizens in order to maintain power.  International wars are apt to create a domestic
environment of repression as the regime focuses on events beyond its borders.
Maintaining civilian peace and obedience becomes paramount to the war effort.
“Moreover, preparations for war earmark resources that could alleviate hunger and create
jobs, and they make coercion and conscription a way of life much more often that not”
(Claude and Weston 1992, 145).   Thus, international wars appear to have a dampening
effect on both security and subsistence rights.
Civil wars are just as likely to produce opportunities for a regime to commit
human rights violations.  Recent events in Cambodia, Nigeria and Zaire (now the
Democratic Republic of Congo) are a testament to the atrocities a regime is capable of
committing. Human rights, in general, suffer in time of conflict.  Thus, both international
and civil wars are included in the model. An international or civil war is defined as at
least 1,000 battle deaths per year.  Both variables are coded 0 if there is no current war,
and 1 if there is.  It is hypothesized that involvement in either case decreases the respect
for security and subsistence rights in that particular regime.
Although it seems counterintuitive, it is hypothesized that regimes during the
post-Cold War period are more likely to engage in security rights violations (Milner
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1998). During the Cold War era, the threats and incentives from the United States and the
USSR kept the behavior of satellite states in check. The demise of the bipolar global
system characteristic of the Cold War has decreased the involvement and influence of the
superpowers in many repressive regimes.  The abandonment of this "stabilizing"
influence, as well as the "revival of nationalism"  may work to unleash the repressive
nature of many regimes (Milner 1998). As for subsistence rights, the fall of the Iron
Curtain has exposed the former communist states to larger and more diversified markets.
As a result, increases in the level of trade and investment within these previously closed
markets suggest that the quality of life will improve.   On the other hand, the economic
woes in Russia also indicate that the transition from a command to a market economy is
not necessarily a smooth one and that at least in the short run, subsistence rights might
suffer.  The variable for the Cold War is coded as 1 for the years of the Cold War and 0
for subsequent years.  It is hypothesized that the Cold War served to inhibit repressive
regimes in terms of security rights, however the post-Cold War’s influence on
subsistence rights in unclear.  As a result, it is posited as a two-tailed test in the
subsistence rights models.
Cultural Factors
Previous research has found that the level of population and change in population
influence human rights conditions (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and
Keith 1999).  It is theorized that large populations increase the pressure on resource
allocation.  This in turn can lead to increases in opportunities for regimes to repress their
citizens due to the increasing scarcity of resources.  The population strain on resources
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suggests that the regime will have a harder time in providing for basic human needs.  In
addition, rapid population growth adds to the problem of resource allocation.
Two population measures are utilized in this study.  The first is a measure of the
country’s current population.  It is logged to account for the disparity in the range of the
variable in the present sample.  The second variable for population measures the percent
change in national population from year to year.   It is hypothesized that both variables
for population are negatively related to personal integrity rights and subsistence rights.
The colonial experience of a regime has been identified as an important
determinant in the development of the political culture of a nation (Mitchell and
McCormick 1988; Moon 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).
Countries that had been territories of Great Britain, it is hypothesized, will have greater
respect for the security rights of the individual.  This argument is based upon the idea that
British influence led to the development of democracy and democratic ideals. “In this
sense, the British role was one of protecting and guiding indigenous development”
(Moon 1991, 240).  In addition, the British model of colonialism, one of indirect rule,
afforded the native population a greater role in governmental participation, ranging from
self-government to the establishment of local institutions. As a result, the former colonies
were better prepared for independence (Moon 1991).
Does this political training translate into an ability of the former British colonies
to provide subsistence rights as well?  Moon (1991) investigates the effects of British
colonialism on subsistence rights.  He argues that, along with British political influence,
missionaries played a crucial role in the provision of basic human needs, concentrating on
education, medical care, medical training, and training the natives in the area of
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agricultural development.  “The bulk of the arguments seem to suggest that the British
approach would yield a postcolonial political atmosphere more conducive to the spread of
citizen welfare” (Moon 1991, 244).  The results indicate that the influence of British
colonialism results in improvements in subsistence rights compared to other colonial
experience.  However, the results presented by Moon (1991) are a bit confusing.   He
reports a negative correlation between British colonial history with a simple r  of -.13.
However, when the variable is included as part of the model, it becomes a positive
influence.  It appears that it is a positive influence only if compared to other colonial
experiences (French, Belgian and Portuguese), but there is no posited explanation of the
switch of the sign in the two separate analyses.    A dummy variable for the history of
British colonialism is included in the model.  It is hypothesized that this influence will
have a positive effect on security rights.  Given the ambiguous results regarding the
relationship between British colonialism and subsistence rights, it is posited with a two-
tailed test.
Previous studies have indicated that strong religious beliefs, particularly of the
elite, influence the provision of basic human needs (Park 1987; Moon 1991).  The most
significant results are found in the negative influence of Islam and the positive influence
of Buddhism on subsistence rights.  Park (1987) finds that the greater the percentage of
Christian population, as opposed to Islam, the better the PQLI.  Unfortunately, Park
offers no theoretical justification for either including the variable or a rationale for the
result.  Moon (1991) also includes an analysis of the effects of Buddhism and Islam in his
model of basic human needs.  He points to the fact that Buddhists place a high priority on
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literacy and education as one possible factor for the relationship between Buddhism and
higher PQLI figures.
Regarding Islam, Moon (1991, 249) suggests that “Islamic culture maintains an
extraordinarily rigid division in the treatment of the sexes, which may impede basic needs
fulfillment.…Any inequality – whether class, sectoral, geographic, or sexual – will lower
basic needs relative to a society in which resources and therefore life chances are more
evenly distributed.”  In addition, given the central role women play in development
issues, such as infant mortality, health care, and nutrition, their treatment will have a
definitive effect on the provision of basic human needs (Moon 1991).  Thus, Islamic and
Buddhist dummy variables will be included in the model for subsistence rights.   It is
hypothesized that the presence of Islam is detrimental to subsistence rights, whereas the
presence of Buddhism as a predominant religion promotes the realization of basic human
needs.  The variable for each is simply a dummy variable with 1 denoting Islamic or
Buddhist countries and zero denoting all other countries in the data set.  All of the control
variables for the two models are summarized in Table 6.
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TABLE 6.  VARIABLES USED TO EXPLAIN SECURITY AND SUBSISTENCE RIGHTS
VARIABLE           Security Rights Subsistence Rights
Main Variables of Interest
U.S. Foreign Assistance              Two-Tailed Test Two-Tailed Test
 (U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and
    Aid from International Organizations)
Economic Control Variables
Economic Standing          Positive       Positive
 (Per Capita GNP)
Economic Growth        Two-Tailed Test Two-Tailed Test
 (Percent Increase in Per Capita GNP)
Political Control Variables
Democracy    Positive          Positive
 (Gurr’s Polity III;
  0 = least & 10 = most)
Leftist Government        Two-Tailed Test Two-Tailed Test
 (1=leftist & 0 = non-leftist)
Military Government                           Negative       Negative
(1=military & 0 = non-military)
Civil War                 Negative       Negative
 (Singer and Small 1994; 1=yes & 0 = no)
International War   Negative       Negative
(Singer and Small 1994; 1=yes & 0 = no)
Post-Cold War   Negative Two-Tailed Test
(0 = Cold War & 1 = Post-Cold War)
Military Burden Two-Tailed Test
 (Military Expenditures as a % of GNP)
Military Personnel                    Positive
 (Number of Military Personnel)
Social/Cultural Control Variables
Population  Negative        Negative
 (Logged Population)
Population Change  Negative        Negative
 (Percent Yearly Population Change)
British Influence  Positive Two-Tailed Test
 (1 = Former British Colonies)
Buddhist               Positive
 ( 0 = no & 1 = yes)
Muslim                            Negative
 (0 = no & 1 = yes)
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The empirical equations for the security rights and subsistence rights model are provided
below:
Security Rights = α + β1 U.S. Aidt-3 +  β2 U.S. Investmentt-1 + β3 U.S. Trade t-1 + β4
Economic Standing  +  β5 Economic Growth  +   β6 Democracy +   β7 Military
Control  +  β8 Leftist Government  + β9 Civil War  +  β10 International War  +
β11 Cold War + β10 Population Level  +  β11 Population Change  +  β12 British
Cultural Influence  +  ε
Subsistence Rights = α + β1 U.S. Aidt-3 +  β2 U.S. Investment t-1 + β3 U.S. Trade t-1 + β4
Economic Standing  +  β5 Economic Growth  +   β6 Democracy +   β7 Military
Control  +  β8 Military Expenditures + β9 Military Personnel +   β10 Leftist
Government  + β11 Civil War  +  β12 International War  +  β13 Cold War + β14
Population Level  +  β15 Population Change  +  β16 British Cultural Influence  +
β17 Buddhism +  β18 Muslim +  ε
Research Design and Methodology
In this study, I examine the influence of aid, trade, and investment on the level of
human rights and whether there is a linear or curvilinear relationship between aid, trade,
investment and human rights conditions.  In addition, I examine whether aid, trade, and
investment actually serve as moderating effects on the relationship between democracy
and/or wealth and human rights. In all three cases, I am interested in the relationships
over time and across many nations.  There are approximately 140 countries in the sample
covering a twenty year time period, 1976 to 1996.
Linear and Non-Linear Analyses
In order to accomplish the first task, a pooled cross-sectional time series analysis
is required for the analysis of the effects of aid, trade, and investment on both security
and subsistence rights.  Pooled cross-sectional time series, however, are susceptible to
heteroskedastic error terms due to the cross-national nature of the data, and
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autocorrelation due to the time series nature of the data (Hicks 1994, Beck and Katz
1995, 1996; Stimson 1985).   Since the bias is associated with the error terms, or
residuals, and not the coefficients, ordinary OLS is performed to estimate the variable
coefficients.   The problem of autocorrelation is addressed with the inclusion of an AR(1)
panel specific correction term (Achen 2000), while the heteroskedasticity inherent in the
data is corrected with panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995, 1996).
An additional analysis will consider whether there is a non-linear relationship
between aid, trade, investment and human rights.   The process to determine whether
there is such a relationship consists of several steps.  First, a regression equation is
formulated based on the linear model.  In this case, the model assumes that aid (trade and
investment) and human rights has a linear relationship:
Y = a + b1X1 + e
Where Y represents security (subsistence) rights and X1 represents values for aid (trade
and investment).  A second regression equation is formulated based on a non-linear
model. This equation takes the form of a quadratic equation.
Y = a + b1X1 + b2 X1
2+  e
A hierarchical F test is then conducted to “determine if the incremental explained
variance due to adding a quadratic term is statistically significant” (Jaccard et al. 1990,
52).  The strength of the effect is also calculated by simply taking the difference between




In order to empirically ascertain whether an interaction effect exists, an interactive
model must be investigated.    The original additive model suggests the following form:
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3-bk(Remaining Control Variables)  + e
where Y is human rights conditions, X1 is foreign aid (trade or investment), and X2 is
either democracy or wealth.  The interaction model, on the other hand, assumes the
following form:
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X1X2  + b4-bk(Remaining Control Variables)  + e
where X1X2  is the interactive, or multiplicative term.  The derived slope, b3, measures
the interaction effect of aid (trade or investment) times democracy or aid (trade or
investment) times wealth.   While it is hypothesized that both aid (trade and investment)
and democracy have an effect on the realization of human rights, here it is hypothesized
that the effect of aid (trade or investment) on human rights is dependent on the level of
democracy or the level of wealth.  The analysis of an interaction model consists of
explaining three issues: first, is it possible to infer from the sample that an interaction
effect actually occurs in the population? Second, if so, what is the strength of that effect?
And, third, what is the nature of the effect?
The first issue, ascertaining whether the interaction effect actually occurs, is
addressed by conducting an F test on the interaction term.  The appropriate formula for
this test is:
F =   R22 - R21)/(k2- k1) 
(1
 
- R22)/ (N -  k2 – 1)
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If significant, one can provisionally conclude that the interaction effect does occur in the
population.  If the F test is insignificant, one must conclude that an interaction effect does
not occur in the population.
The second step is to ascertain the strength of the effect.  This is determined by
implementing a test for effect size, such as eta squared or r2.  The formula for eta
squared is as follows:
Eta2 =  SS(AxB)
SS(T)
A similar result can be obtained from simply taking the difference between the squared
multiple correlation for the original additive equation and the squared multiple
correlation from the interaction equation.  This reflects the strength of the interaction
effect in the sample data (Jaccard et al. 1990, 24).
The third challenge is the interpretation of the coefficient or determining the
nature of the effect.  Basically, this is achieved by examining b3, the coefficient of the
multiplicative term.  This coefficient indicates the number of units that the slope of Y on
X1 changes, given a one-unit change in X2.  The formal equation for calculating the slope
of the predicted effect of X3 on Y at any particular value of X2 is
b1 at X2 = b1 + b3X2
“[M]ost investigators will want to gain an intuitive feel for the interaction by calculating
the slope of Y on X1 at a few different values of X2” (Jaccard et al. 1990:27).  Choosing
the values of X2 should be driven by theory or at least represent a plausible scenario.  As
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such, the analyses will provide a variety of scenarios examining the effect of  aid (trade
or investment), or X1, at different values of democracy and wealth, or X2.
Conclusion
This chapter has served to explain the measurement and choice of the dependent
variables, security and subsistence rights.   Likewise, the measurement and explanation of
the primary independent variables, U.S. aid, trade, and investment was provided.  In
addition, the economic, political, and sociocultural variables were introduced, along with
their measurement and expected relationship to human rights.  Lastly, a discussion of the
methodology that will be utilized was offered.  The next chapter, Chapter Five analyzes
the relationship between United State economic and military aid and both measures for
human rights.  Chapter Six focuses on the effect of trade and investment on human rights.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE LEGACY OF THE U.S.’ FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM:
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Introduction
This chapter examines the empirical relationship between U.S. foreign assistance
and human rights.1  The first section examines the bivariate relationship between
economic and military aid and both measures for human rights.  The second section of
this chapter discusses the results from the multivariate analysis.  First, the analysis
focuses on the effect of economic and military aid on the level of security rights.  Then,
attention is turned to the relationship between foreign assistance and the level of
subsistence rights.  The third section examines the nature of the relationship between
foreign assistance and human rights, that is, whether the relationship is linear or
curvilinear.  Lastly, this chapter examines whether foreign assistance affects human
rights differently at different levels of democracy and/or wealth.
Before proceeding to the results of the bivariate analysis, a repeat of the
competing hypothesis is warranted.  Recall from Chapter Four that the neo-liberal
perspective suggests that foreign assistance will serve to positively affect human rights
conditions by contributing to peace negotiations, providing health and nutrition and
agricultural assistance, and contributing to the development of infrastructure within the
state which is necessary for domestic economic development.
                                                          
1 This research has not tested for the effects of foreign assistance from other countries.
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H1: The higher the level of economic aid  and military aid, ceteris paribus, the more
likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence
rights.
The dependency perspective posits the opposite hypothesis, specifically that foreign aid is
a tool that elites within the recipient regime use to further their own political and
economic agendas.  The result is twofold; first, oppression to fend off a political
contender occurs and second, officials pocket or utilize foreign assistance to perpetuate
their elite lifestyle while the masses continue to suffer in poverty.
H2:  The higher the level of economic aid  and military aid, ceteris paribus, the less
likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence
rights.
Bivariate Statistics
The bivariate relationships between economic and military aid and human rights
are presented in Table 7.   The table displays the relationship between both types of aid
and human rights for the entire sample, OECD states, and non-OECD states.2   These
three different samples illustrate the vast differences in the amount of foreign assistance
granted to the less developed countries in comparison to industrialized states.3  When
attention is turned to the multivariate analyses, only two samples are included: the total
country sample and the sample of non-OECD states.  An analysis of OECD states is not
included because the United States does not attempt to address human rights concerns in
those states and the number of OECD countries receiving aid is limited.
                                                          
2 The bivariate statistics in this chapter, as well as in Chapter Six, were conducted using contemporaneous
variables for foreign aid and human rights.  The purpose of the bivariate analysis is not to establish
causality, rather to determine the nature of the relationship between the variables of interest.
3 Four industrialized countries, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and Spain, received economic aid during the years
in the sample and Austria, Finland, and Spain received military aid.  The amounts for each year are
presented in Appendix A.
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Table 7.  Bivariate Relationships: U.S. Foreign Assistance and Human Rights
(Aid as a percentage of GDP)
                     Security Rights     Subsistence Rights
               (AI)             (PQLI)
Economic Aid
  All Countries -.11* -.31*
  OECD  .02 -.08
  Non-OECD -.03** -.25*
Military Aid
  All Countries -.08* -.03
  OECD -.27* -.18*
  Non-OECD -.05*  .01
Number of Observations
  All Countries 3032 2646
  OECD   414   384
  Non-OECD                                             2618                                             2262                                
  * p < .05
** p < .10
AI = Amnesty International
PQLI = Physical Quality of Life
The first column in Table 7 represents the bivariate relationship between both
types of aid, the three different country samples, and security rights variable based on
Amnesty International Reports.  The second column reveals the relationship between
foreign aid and subsistence rights, based on the Physical Quality of Life Index.  In
general, the results indicate that there is an inverse, or negative, relationship between
foreign assistance and human rights.  In other words, higher levels of aid, relative to
GDP, are associated with lower levels of security and subsistence rights.  In the first
column of correlations between foreign aid and security rights, this phenomenon holds
except for the relationship between OECD states and economic aid, which indicates a
positive relationship.  However, this result is not statistically significant.  In addition,
there is little expectation that either the United States is granting significant amounts of
120
aid to OECD states or that the U.S.’ intention with any such aid is to address human
rights records in OECD states.   A graphical representation sheds light on the negative
relationship between foreign assistance and human rights.  Figure 1 depicts the average
amount of economic and military aid, in millions of dollars, allocated to non-OECD





















Economic Aid 47.46 85.22 70.07 31.64 14.07
Military Aid 13.34 59.42 50.04 33.35 4.8
1 2 3 4 5
countries at each level of personal integrity abuse.  A country rated a “1” is considered to
have the worst human rights record, while a country rated a “5” is considered to have the
best human rights record.  Countries with the worst human rights records receive, on
average, more aid from the United States.  In spite of congressional legislation aimed at
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prohibiting such action,  the United States continuously allocates and appropriates
economic and military aid to countries with poor human rights records.
The distribution of economic and military aid, as a percentage of GDP, for
security rights is presented in Figure 2.  The gap between economic and military aid is









Aid as % of GDP
Economic Aid 1.14 0.86 1.06 1.07 0.7
Military Aid 0.17 0.19 0.27 0.17 0.04
1 2 3 4 5
more pronounced when both are measured as a percentage of GDP.   Economic aid
comprises approximately five times as much GDP than military aid.  Except for the dip in
the ratio for the countries with the best human rights records, there is a consistent
economic aid to GDP percentage across the countries in the sample.  The distribution of
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military aid as a percentage of GDP falls off for those countries with the best human
rights records (Level 5 countries).
The bivariate relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and subsistence rights
indicates a similar relationship (Table 7).  Both economic and military aid are associated
with lower levels of subsistence rights.  It is unclear from these results whether countries
with low levels of subsistence rights attract greater amounts of U.S. foreign assistance, or
whether greater amounts of foreign assistance contribute to lower levels of subsistence
rights.  One exception is the positive relationship between military aid and non-OECD
states, however this relationship is not statistically significant.
Examining the relationship between subsistence rights and economic aid
graphically, in millions of dollars, suggests that countries in the range of 40 to 70 on the
Physical Quality of Life Index receive more economic aid from the United States (Figure
3).  However, those suffering the most and presumably those that need economic
assistance the most, those experiencing under 30 on the Physical Quality of Life Index,
do not receive as much economic aid as the rest of the sample.    The average amount of
economic aid allocated for countries below 30, such as Gambia, Niger, Sierra Leone,
Chad, Ethiopia, and Cambodia, is $22 million compared to the $42.66 million average for
the entire sample.   Military aid, as measured in millions of dollars, follows a similar
pattern to economic aid, albeit at lower averages across the sample.  Countries with less
than 50 on the PQLI receive very little military aid.  It is the countries in the middle range
of subsistence that receive the most military aid.
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Economic Aid 0 13.23 24.02 33.04 72.6 73.71 64.42 37.48 41.89 42.16
Military Aid 0 0.09 1.6 2.24 20.1 52.24 49.77 26.21 45.96 43.76
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
When economic aid is compared to the GDP (Figure 4), it is evident that
economic aid comprises a large percentage of GDP in the countries that have the worst
living conditions.   So, while in raw dollars it appeared that countries with the worst
living conditions were not receiving comparable levels of aid, when compared to GDP
these countries appear to have a heavy dependence on U.S. aid.  Military aid, however,
appears to be a greater percentage of GDP in countries in the middle range of
subsistence; such countries include Turkey, Algeria, Kenya, and most of the Latin
American states.
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Aid as % of GDP
Economic Aid 0 1.16 1.88 1.9 1.26 1.04 1.25 0.57 0.49 0.61
Military Aid 0 0.006 0.12 0.2 0.12 0.24 0.36 0.1 0.15 0.09
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
At this preliminary stage, the results indicate support for the second hypothesis,
that is, support for the dependency perspective regarding the negative relationship
between foreign assistance and domestic conditions, in this case, human rights
conditions.  While bivariate statistics are useful to establish relationships between
variables, in most cases there are additional influences on the dependent variable that a
study seeks to explain.  As such, multivariate analysis is required in order to account for a
relationship between foreign assistance and human rights, holding other important factors
constant.
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Level of Security and Subsistence Rights
Security Rights
The results from the multivariate analysis on the relationship between foreign aid
and security rights are presented in Table 8.  Models A and B represent the economic aid
and military aid models respectively for all countries in the sample.   The analysis is
replicated using only non-OECD states in Models C and D. 4  In addition, the independent
variables are separated into economic, political, and social/cultural factors.  The variables
of interest, economic and military aid, are reported as the first economic factors in the
models.  The chi-square statistic is used for the determination of the overall significance,
or goodness of fit, of the regression.  In other words, it indicates the chance that the
model is any different than a random model.  According to the results, the probability that
these particular models occurred by chance is less than one in one hundred.  Thus, the
chi-squared results allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the model as a whole is not
significantly different than zero.  In addition, the R2 indicates how much of the dependent
variable is explained by the variation in the independent variables.  The R2 statistics of
79% to 82% indicate that all the models perform well.5
                                                          
4 The statistical analyses for this study are conducted with Stata 6.0 (StataCorp) statistical software
package. The use of a pooled cross-sectional timed series research design carries with it inherent problems
of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  A Cook-Weisberg (1983) test was conducted for each model in
the study and the results indicate that there is indeed the presence of heteroskedasticity.  These two threats
to inference are corrected by the inclusion of an AR(1) specification to address autocorrelation (Achen
2000) while panel corrected standard errors were utilized to address the heteroskedasticity in the models
(Beck and Katz 1995, 1996). It should be noted that all of the multivariate analyses in this study suffer from
similar inherent threats to inference and are thus corrected in the manner just discussed.
5 All subsequent models have similar chi-square and R2 results.  As a result, no additional comments will
be made on these statistics, unless they are drastically different.
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Table 8. Multivariate Analyses: Security Rights Model
U.S. Economic and Military Aid
(Aid as a Percentage of GDP)
    All Countries     Non-OECD
Independent Variable        Model A            Model B            Model C            Model D
Constant    6.73*   6.52*   7.65*   7.40
    (.25)   (.25)    (.31)    (.31)
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Economic Aid t-3 -.03*    -.04*
  (.01)    (.01)
Military Aid t-3   -.07*  -.07
   (02)                 (.02)
Economic Standing    .04*   .05*   .01**   .02*
  (.005)    (.004)    (.01)    (.01)
Economic Growth#  -.04  -.04   .02   .01
   (.08)    (.08)    (.09)    (.09)
POLITICAL FACTORS
Democracy  .08*   .08*   .07*   .06*
   (.01)    (.01)    (.01)    (.01)
Leftist Government#  .20*   .20*   .18**   .19**
   (.10)    (.10)    (.10)    (.10)
Military Government -.08 -.09  -.10**  -.11**
   (.06)    (.06)    (.06)    (.06)
Civil War -.94* -.97*  -.94*  -.96*
   (.11)    (.11)    (.11)   (.11)
International War -.23* -.22*  -.30*  -.29*
   (.08)    (.08)    (.09)    (.09)
Post-Cold War  -.28* -.27*  -.26*   -.26*
   (.05)    (.05)    (.05)    (.05)    j
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS
Population -.23*  -.21*  -.28*  -.27*
   (.02)    (.02)    (.02)    (.02)
Population Change  .002   .002   .001   .001
   (.002)    (.002)    (.002)    (.002)
British Influence  .25*   .26*   .25*   .25*
                                                       (.04)                   (.04)                   (.04)                   (.04)                 
Number of Cases 2252    2252   1894   1894
R2 .82    .82    .79    .79
Wald X2 810.54   795.20  603.59 577.77
Probability > x2                            0.00                      0.00                   0.00                   0.00                 
#  two-tailed test
* p < .05; ** p < .10
127
The variables of interest, economic and military aid, are statistically significant
and the results are supportive of the critics’ view regarding the effect of foreign
assistance.6  The aid variables were lagged, as indicated in Chapter Four, for several
reasons.  One was to compare the results to previous research, mainly that of Meyer
(1996, 1998) and Regan (1995).  Second, the process of appropriation and allocation of
U.S. aid is such that a contemporaneous effect is not expected.  Lastly, lagging the aid
variables speaks to the issue of causality, specifically that a dependent variable cannot be
influenced by the occurrence of an independent variable years in advance.  Therefore,
there is no reasonable expectation that the level of human rights will influence allocation
and distribution of aid three years prior. 7
According to the results, at a lag of three years, higher levels of aid relative to
GDP are associated with lower levels of security rights in all countries as well as in non-
OECD countries.  The results conflict with the findings of Meyer (1996, 1998) not only
in the expected direction but also in the number of lags.   These results are also in conflict
                                                          
6 Tests for outliers and influential data were conducted utilizing DFBETA and Cook’s Distance tests.
Unlike many other studies in U.S. foreign aid, Egypt and Israel did not present themselves as outliers, due
to aid being calculated as a percentage of GDP rather than in raw dollars.  Rather, India, Somalia, El
Salvador, and Central African Republic presented themselves as possible outliers. The analysis was
replicated with those countries removed and the substantive and statistically significant results were not
altered. The countries were kept in the sample in the results presented in the text since there is no
theoretical reason for their removal.
7 To empirically examine the issue of causality, several tests are possible.  Granger causality tests are one
option, however, this type of analysis is problematic in panel data.  Granger causality can be conducted
country by country, however this does not tell us about the relationship between trade or investment and
human rights overall.  A test for weak exogeneity is a second option (Hausman 1978; Engle 1984;
Charemza and Deadman 1992).  Such a test includes estimating the original aid model, computing the
residuals, and including the residuals in a model for foreign assistance.  A model for aid allocation has not
been developed for the purposes of this study; therefore, the residuals were regressed on aid in a bivariate
regression.  The residuals are not statistically significant; therefore, the null hypothesis of weak exogeneity
cannot be rejected.  Pinpointing the nature of the causal relationship is an important subject for future
research.  A similar test for weak exogeneity is also conducted in Chapter Six; therefore, a repeat of this
explanation is not presented.
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with the study by Regan (1995).  This study found that greater levels of economic aid is
statistically related to less repression.  The substantive results, however, were not
meaningful.  Regan’s analysis leads to his conclusion that foreign aid was simply an
additional foreign policy tool available to diplomats rather than an effective tool in
improving human rights.  The results in the present analysis lend support to the
conclusions by Smith et al. (1998, 1998) that reliance on economic aid is misplaced and
the United States as well as the international community should focus on alternative
means of addressing human rights.  The analysis was replicated with a contemporaneous
effect and at lags of  one, two, four, and five years as well.  The substantive results were
not altered.  Thus, aid from the United States has not only a contemporaneous effect but
prior aid, over a five-year period, continues to influence human rights conditions.    
The appropriation and allocation of economic and military aid to countries with
poor human rights records is done through an exception, or loophole, to congressional
legislation prohibiting such practice.  Administrations often invoke national security
concerns or override foreign assistance legislation in the name of humanitarianism.  This
act is done, then, with an acknowledgment that aid is allocated in spite of poor human
rights records.  What is the effect of overlooking the human rights record of a potential
recipient state?  In other words, assuming that human rights is a priority, is the trade-off
worth it? The results indicate that it is not.  That is, countries receiving aid, in spite of
congressional stipulations, seem to suffer in the area of human rights.8  Contrary to the
political rhetoric of the potential human rights benefit of aid, these results suggest that
                                                          
8 It should be noted that these results cannot speak to situations where national security concerns are a
priority.
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higher levels of U.S. government assistance are not effective in improving human rights
conditions, in fact, it appears to exacerbate an already poor condition.  Countries with
poor security rights records receive U.S. economic and military aid which the elites in
power simply use to maintain the status quo by silencing and even eliminating any
potential political opposition.
The coefficients for economic (Model A) and military (Model B) aid indicate that
a 1 percent increase of aid relative to GDP decreases .03 and .07 respectively the index of
respect for security rights.  In the models for non-OECD states (Model C and Model D),
the results are comparable with military aid having the same effect and economic aid
decreasing respect for security rights by .04.  While the coefficients are statistically
significant, of more importance are the substantive results.  Even when the empirical
analysis yields statistically significant results, substantively the results may not equate to
any plausible scenario in reality.  For example, Regan’s (1995) analysis found that
economic aid is statistically significant and positively related to improved levels of
human rights.  The substantive results, however, indicated that the amount of aid in
theory necessary to make a difference did not actually exist in practice.
The conversion of the coefficients from Models C and D to meaningful results is
displayed in Table 9.  A sample of different example countries with mean values of
economic and military aid, relative to GDP, is provided.  The effect on security rights is
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Table 9.  Substantive Results of Aid on Security Rights 
 
       Mean Values of Aid/GDP           Effect on Security Rights    
Country           Economic      Military     Economic (-.04)      Military (-.07)   
 
Worst Records (1 & 2)         .94        .18           -.04    -.01  
 
Country A          5.25      1.71           -.21    -.12   
  (Client-State) 
 
Country B          3.77      5.18           -.15     -.36 
  (Allied State) 
 
Country C          7.37      2.01           -.29    -.14 
  (African State)      
          Maximum Values            Effect    
   
Non-OECD States       19.84    15.20           -.79  -1.06 
 
OECD States            .33        .31           -.01    -.02 
 
then calculated and displayed in the last two columns.  The coefficient for economic aid
(-.04) and military aid (-.07) are multiplied by the mean values in order to examine the
effect of foreign aid on security rights.
The countries with the worst security rights records, those with a ranking of “1”
or “2,” average .94 and .18 in economic aid to GDP and military aid to GDP respectively
over the years in the study.  This converts to an effect of -.04 from economic aid and -.01
from military aid on security rights over the period of the study.   Turning to countries
considered as client-states, Country A received a hypothetical annual economic aid to
GDP average of 5.25 percent and a military aid to GDP ratio of 1.71 percent.  The
combined effect of this distribution of aid (-.21 and -.12) is detrimental to security rights
on a level that exceeds the effect of the presence of an international war (-22) and the end
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of the Cold War (-.28).   Several countries in Latin America, such as El Salvador,
received comparable amounts of foreign assistance from the United States.
Country B is representative of Third World states that are considered U.S. allies.
In this hypothetical example,  aid to GDP ratio averaged 3.77 for economic aid and 5.18
for military aid.  The combined effect of U.S. aid for averages of this amount is a
decrease in one half a level on the security rights scale.  Thus, aid to U.S. allies in the
Third World appears to contribute to poor human rights records.  Country C represents a
Third World African states.  Many African states received a great deal of U.S. economic
aid tied to humanitarian relief efforts.  The mean values for this hypothetical equate to
7.37% and 2.01% for economic and military aid as a percentage of GDP respectively,
resulting in the combined effect of a decrease of approximately .43 in the level of security
rights.  Somalia is an example of a Third World African state that received large amounts
of economic aid from the United States.  In 1980, economic aid to Somalia, relative to
GDP, was approximately 18%.  In the 1990s, the highest ratio of economic aid to GDP in
Somalia reached over 10%.   Over the years in the study, the average level of security
rights in Somalia is 2.19.  In spite of humanitarian aims, the results suggest that this level
of economic aid only contributed to the suffering of many Somalians.   In addition, the
maximum values of both types of aid are provided for OECD and non-OECD states.  At
these maximum values, security rights are negatively affected by three quarters of one
point in the economic aid model and over one point in the military aid model for non-
OECD states.
According to the results, the allocation of military aid has a much greater negative
influence on security rights than economic aid, in fact almost twice the effect of
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economic aid.   Fortunately, the mean values of military aid do not reach the levels of
economic aid in relation to overall GDP for most countries in the sample.  Given the
empirical and substantive results, at this juncture we can conclude provisionally that there
is support for the second hypothesis posited, specifically that foreign assistance from the
United States has a deleterious effect on security rights.
Turning to the control variables in the models, the results from the economic
variables are mixed.  Wealth remains a statistically significant predictor of a regime’s
respect for security rights.  This result is consistent with previous findings regarding the
relationship between economic standing and security rights (Mitchell and McCormick
1988; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Davenport 1995; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).
Economic growth, however, is not statistically significant in any of the models.  In the
sample for all countries, the relationship is in the direction that would support the theories
posited by Gurr (1968) and Olson (1963), however there is no statistically significant
evidence that rapid growth contributes to increases in a regime’s propensity to violate
security rights.   This finding contradicts that of Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999) where they
find that economic growth is negatively related to repression in the sample using State
Department records.  Their empirical results, using a two-tailed test, indicate that
economic growth actually improves human rights conditions, as their variable is abuse
and not the realization of human rights.   However, the empirical results do not translate
into significantly important substantive results considering that it requires a 10% rate of
economic growth to decrease abuse by .04 units on the security rights scale.
The political variables all perform well in the model, save the presence of a
military government, which is only statistically significant in the models of non-OECD
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states.  Similar to previous research, democracy remains a constant and positive effect on
the realization of security rights (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe,
Tate, and Keith 1999).  Citizens in states that are more democratic experience higher
respect of security rights.  The coefficient for leftist government is in the positive
direction and is statistically significant, lending support to the findings by Moon (1991).
Contrary to arguments presented by Jeanne Kirkpatrick (1979), these results indicate that
leftist governments are not more apt to abuse the security rights of its citizens but are in
fact less apt to abuse them. These findings are consistent with those of Poe, Tate, and
Keith (1999).  In fact, leftist governments have a comparable influence to that of British
colonization on the level of security rights.
The strongest predictor within the political factors category of the violation of
security rights is the presence of civil wars.  Countries experiencing such a violent
conflict, according to the model, should expect a decrease in respect for security rights by
almost one full level.  Involvement in an international conflict is also detrimental to the
realization of security rights.  The addition of the end of the Cold War as a control
variable also performs well and supports the finding by Milner (1998).  Ironically, the
Cold War served as a pacifying influence, that is, during the Cold War, regimes were less
likely to engage in human rights violations.   After the Cold War, nationalism and ethnic
conflict have been on the rise and have contributed to human rights atrocities.9
The remaining control variables are designed to capture the social and cultural
factors that are theorized to have an influence on the realization of security rights.  The
variable measuring the level of population is statistically significant and in the
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hypothesized direction, indicating that countries with larger populations experience lower
levels of respect for security rights.  However, an increase in population does not appear
to be influential in the level of respect for human rights.  This variable is neither
statistically significant, nor in the hypothesized direction.  A history of British influence
has a positive effect on the provision of security rights, suggesting that British
colonialism provided for the establishment of democratic norms.  This supports the
finding of Poe, Tate, and Keith (1999).
Regardless of political rhetoric or the original intent or purpose of foreign
assistance, the above results indicate that both U.S. economic and military aid has
detrimental effects on security rights of the citizens in recipient states.  Does aid have the
same effect on factors contributing to the overall standard of living in recipient states?  Is
it possible that a regime’s target of human rights violations makes a difference?  For
example, economic and military aid appear to support the status quo regime and harm the
political opposition, i.e., the target of security rights violations.  Does foreign assistance
have a comparable effect on the target of subsistence rights abuses, that is, the average
citizen?  The next section of this chapter addresses what effect aid has on the realization
of basic human needs.
Subsistence Rights
The relationship between foreign assistance and subsistence rights is displayed in
Table 10.   Similar to Table 8, the results include models for economic and military aid
for all countries and non-OECD countries.  Model A and Model B are models for
economic and military aid, incorporating all of the countries in the sample.  Non-OECD
                                                                                                                                                                            
9 Examples include the ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia and the genocide in Rwanda.
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Table 10.   Multivariate Analyses: Subsistence Rights and U.S.
Economic and Military Aid (Aid as a Percentage of GDP)
All Countries Non-OECD
Independent Variable        Model A            Model B            Model C            Model D            
Constant  57.10  51.16*   54.32*   50.45*
    (5.68)    (6.18)    (8.40)    (7.70)
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Economic Aid t-3  -.48*    -.39*
    (.14)    (.13)
Military Aid t-3   1.28*   .62*
   (.19)    (.28)
Economic Standing  1.13*   1.19*   1.96*  1.96*
   (.10)    (.10)    (.13)    (.13)
Economic Growth#  -.25   -.53   -.56   -.84
   (1.37)    (1.38)    (1.41)    (1.40)
POLITICAL FACTORS
Democracy  .86*   .82*   .78*   .79*
   (.13)    (.12)    (.13)    (.13)
Leftist Government#  -2.40*   -1.70**   -1.17   -.32
   (1.17)    (1.01)    (1.11)    (1.02)
Military Government -.4.26*   -4.77*   -4.12*  -4.61*
   (.96)    (.98)    (.86)    (.89)
Military Burden   .001    .03   .01   .01
   (.04)    (.04)     (.04)     (.04)
Military Personnel  .01*   .01*  .01*   .01*
   (.001)    (.001)     (.001)    (.001)
Civil War -2.28* -2.59* -1.81* -1.85*
   (.74)    (.76)    (.71)   (.69)
International War -.56 -.09 -.48 -.18
   (.70)    (.68)    (.93)    (.91)
Post-Cold War#  .85   1.00  1.44   1.53**
   (.74)    (.78)    (.93)    (.94)    j
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS
Population .16  .55   .21   .49
   (.34)    (.39)    (.49)    (.45)
Population Change -.02  -.02  -.03  -.03
   (.02)    (.02)    (.03)    (.03)
British Influence# -2.39*  -4.16*   -3.42*   -4.63*
   (1.17)     (1.07)    (1.26)    (1.11)
Buddhist -1.80   3.66   -.12   4.53**
   (3.65)    (2.40)    (3.22)    (2.18)
Muslim -10.13*  -9.99*  -9.80*   -9.49*
                                                       (1.30)                 (1.37)                 (1.15)                 (1.24)               
Number of Cases 1880   1880    1536    1536
R2 .91    .92     .91     .92
Wald X2 1200.68* 849.99*  959.83* 727.79*
Probability > x2                           0.00                     0.00                    0.00                   0.00                 
#  two-tailed test
* p < .05; ** p < .10
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states are used in Model C and Model D.   Economic aid remains a negative influence on
human rights, in this case, subsistence rights.  However, contrary to the relationship
between military aid and security rights, military aid has a positive effect on subsistence
rights.10
Given the prior empirical results with regard to security rights, there appear to be
two separate effects of U.S. foreign assistance on human rights conditions.  First, the
results for economic aid suggest that this type of assistance lands in the hands of the
leaders of these repressive regimes and the elites continue to abuse a certain segment of
the population, primarily the political opposition.  Second, it appears that military aid is
detrimental to security rights as elites in charge use the weapons and materials against the
political opposition.  How can military aid benefit subsistence rights while at the same
time be detrimental to security rights?  One plausible explanation is that money originally
earmarked for military expenses can be diverted by the recipient regime to welfare and
infrastructure expenditures.  In this sense, the repressive regime is providing, at least
minimally, in terms of basic subsistence, for the vast majority of the population.  The
regime seems to keep them just happy enough as not to encourage wide-spread revolt and
subsequent support for the political opposition.
The multivariate analysis yields statistically significant results, however, the
substantive results will shed light on whether the statistical results are meaningful in the
                                                          
10  Diagnostics indicated that Egypt and Israel did not present themselves as outliers, due to aid being
calculated as a percentage of GDP rather than in raw dollars.  Rather, Mozambique, Haiti, El Salvador, and
Somalia presented themselves as possible outliers. The analysis was replicated with those countries
removed and the substantive and statistical results were not altered.  Thus, the countries were kept in the
sample because there is no theoretical reason for their removal.
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realization of security and subsistence rights.  The substantive results of the analysis are
presented in Table 11.  The results from Table 9 are replicated so that a comparison can
be made to the results from the subsistence rights models.  The first four columns of data
Table 11.  Substantive Results of Aid on Security and Subsistence Rights 
 
                   Effect on:  
           Mean Values of Aid     Security Rights                 Subsistence Rights 
Country         Economic      Military       Economic      Military       Economic      Military 
      (-.04)         (-.07)       (-.39)            (.62)  
 
Worst Records (1 & 2)    .94        .18               -.04           -.01     -.37              .11 
 
Country A              5.25      1.71               -.21           -.12   -2.05            1.06 
  (Client-State) 
 
Country B              3.77      5.18               -.15             -.36   -1.47            3.21 
  (Allied State) 
 
Country C  7.37      2.01               -.29           -.14   -2.87            1.25  
  (African State) 
          Maximum Values            Effect   Effect     
 
Non-OECD States        19.84    15.20               -.79         -1.06   -7.74            9.42 
 
OECD States                   .33        .31    -.01            -.02     -.13              .19 
 
 
are the same as in Table 9.  The last two columns represent the results from multiplying
the mean values of economic and military aid for non-OECD states, relative to GDP, with
the coefficients for economic aid (-.39) and military aid (.62) from Table 10.  Economic
aid has a negative effect on subsistence rights, similar to that of the effect of economic
aid on security rights.  Thus, economic aid not only serves as a negative influence on that
segment of the population that poses a threat to the political status quo, but the average
citizen suffers as well.  It is important to recall that the scale of subsistence rights is from
0 to 100.  Thus, while the results are statistically significant, it requires a relatively large
amount of economic aid, relative to GDP, to substantively influence subsistence rights.
138
Nonetheless, the negative influence of economic aid cannot be discounted for two
reasons.  First, this same economic aid has a deleterious effect on security rights and
second, it cannot be discounted in light of the political rhetoric that the U.S.’ goal is the
improvement of human rights.  These results again provide support for the dependency
hypothesis (H2) presented, at least in the case of economic aid.
The effect of military aid on subsistence rights is quite different than the effect of
economic aid on the level of basic human needs.  According to the results, military aid is
positively related to the realization of subsistence rights.  The empirical results from the
relationship between military aid and subsistence rights, therefore, provides support for
the first hypothesis presented.  That is, there is support for the neo-liberal perspective that
foreign assistance contributed to improvements in living conditions.  This support,
however, is a qualified one given the fact that military aid, as a percentage of GDP, is on
average far less than economic aid and the amount of military aid necessary to affect any
significant substantively important change simply doesn’t exist.  The amount of military
aid has to be extremely large in order for states to receive any benefit in terms of
subsistence rights.  In addition, the trade-off between military aid being detrimental to
security rights and beneficial to subsistence rights does not appear to be worth the cost, as
an increase in military aid designed to help subsistence rights actually decreases the
respect for security rights.
Turning to the other economic variables in the model, economic standing (i.e., the
wealth of the citizenry) has a positive effect on subsistence rights.  In fact, this is the
strongest economic variable in the model, indicating that wealth remains a key indicator
in providing for the basic needs of citizens as well as improving the level of security
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rights.  This result is consistent with previous research examining the relationship
between wealth and basic human needs (Moon and Dixon 1985; Spalding 1986; Moon
1991; Milner 1998).  Economic growth has a negative effect, although it is not
statistically significant.  At this juncture, we can conclude that there is no statistical
evidence that economic growth negatively affects human rights conditions.
The political variables exhibit some interesting and unexpected results.  As
expected, democracy has a positive effect on the realization of basic human rights.  This
remains fairly consistent across the models as well as in previous research (Dixon and
Moon 1985; Spalding 1986; Moon 1991; Milner1998).  In addition, the presence of war
has a deleterious influence on subsistence rights; however, only the presence of a civil
war is statistically significant.  Involvement in an international war has no statistically
significant bearing on the state’s ability to provide for the basic needs of its citizenry.
These results conflict with Milner (1998) whose study found both international and civil
wars are substantively important for security rights, but have no effect on subsistence
rights.  The Cold War variable does not perform as well in the model for subsistence
rights, except for Model D.  The end of the East-West ideological struggle has not had a
significant influence on the provision of subsistence rights.   However, the coefficients
are in the opposite direction than in the security rights model suggesting that subsistence
rights have improved since the end of the Cold War.
Contrary to the results in the model of security rights, the presence of a leftist
government appears to have a deleterious effect on subsistence rights, although it is only
statistically significant in Model A and Model B.  This result suggests that socialist
governments are not as competent at providing for the subsistence needs of their citizens
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as their ideology would have us believe.  Thus, while socialist states may not be more apt
to abuse the security rights of their citizens, they are not as able to provide for basic
human needs.
The strongest political variable is the presence of a military government.  The
results indicate that those nations with a military regime experience a decrease of over 4
points on the physical quality of life index.  This finding is consistent with the effect of
military regimes on security rights as well as previous research (McKinlay and Cohen
1975; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).  This result suggests that a military regime not only
abuses the security rights of its citizens, but it also fails to provide them basic human
needs.  Of the two other military variables, only the number of military personnel is
statistically significant and in the expected direction, supporting the findings of Moon
and Dixon (1985).  However, the substantive results are minimal.   For every one
thousand increase in the number of military personnel, subsistence rights improve by
only .01.  The result from the military expenditures variable is not statistically significant
and fails to support either hypothesis.  There is no empirical evidence to support the
hypothesis that increases in military expenditures will benefit subsistence rights (Benoit
1973) or that increases will be detrimental to subsistence rights, as such expenditures take
away from spending on welfare needs (Rosh 1986; Felice 1998).
The social and cultural variables also yielded some unexpected results.  Size of
the population and population growth do not appear to have a significant influence on the
state’s ability to provide for basic human needs.   The strongest cultural predictors are the
presence of a state religion.  States characterized as Muslim have a strong negative effect
on the provision of basic human needs.  The presence of a Muslim government
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consistently decreases the realization of subsistence rights by approximately 10 points.  It
is by far the most influential social/cultural factor in the model.  The results support the
findings of Park (1987) and Moon (1991).  The results from the presence of a Buddhist
dominated government are mixed.  The variable measuring Buddhist influence is only
statistically significant and in the predicted direction in the model for military aid and
non-OECD states (Model D).
The variable capturing the legacy of the British is in the negative direction and is
statistically significant.  According to the results, states that were colonized by the British
have less respect for basic human needs.  This finding contradicts the results from the
security rights model where a history of British rule led to improved human rights
conditions where the personal integrity of the individual was concerned.  One plausible
explanation rests with the idea that the British were able to instill political norms, at least
at the elite level, but did little to provide guidance in how to accommodate or ensure the
realization of basic human needs for the masses.  This result supports dependency
theorists arguments that the core country benefits economically from imperialism at the
expense of the periphery state.
These results indicate that, in general, foreign assistance is detrimental to both
security and subsistence rights.  Any benefit gained or realized in subsistence rights by
the presence of military aid is far outweighed by the deleterious effect the military aid has
on security rights.  The decision by the United States to override or invoke the loopholes
in legislation restricting aid due to poor human rights records appears to be a poor
decision.  In cases where aid has been granted for self-serving reasons (i.e., Cold War
ideology, oil resources from the Middle East), it is important for the United States to
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realize the consequences of such action.  From a normative position, the United States
still has a moral responsibility to ensure that its national interests are not realized at the
expense of humanity.  Even in the instances where the aid is ostensibly granted for
humanitarian reasons, the results are the same.  This suggests that the present form of aid
needs to be reassessed.  Unilateral aid from the United States, as dependency theorists
suggest, is associated with poor human rights conditions.
Linear or Curvilinear Relationship
Neo-liberalism and dependency theory suggest two competing perspectives for
the hypothesis that a curvilinear relationship exists between foreign aid and human rights.
Recall from the discussion in Chapter Four that foreign aid is allocated and distributed to
recipient regimes, specifically government officials or elites within that regime.  At the
lowest levels of foreign assistance, scenarios indicative of minor U.S.-client relationships,
human rights conditions may not be significantly affected.  As foreign aid begins to
increase, elites and government officials in the recipient states, according to the
dependency perspective, will use this assistance to further their own interests and
agendas.
At higher levels of aid, the two theories project very different scenarios.  The neo-
liberal perspective suggests that elites within recipient states will compromise and make
political and economic concessions in order to satisfy American pressure for reform,
stability, and development.  Dependency theory posits that in order to satisfy these
American concerns, elites will simply resort to greater levels of human rights abuse to
silence the political opposition and provide a perception of stability.  In addition, the
greater levels of aid will be used for elite consumption and the majority of the population
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will not realize any improvements in basic human needs.  This research puts forth the
hypothesis that there is a non-linear relationship between foreign aid and human rights.
The process to determine whether there is a curvilinear relationship between foreign aid
and human rights necessitates the use of a quadratic equation.
The security rights and subsistence rights models for non-OECD states from
Table 8 and Table 10 were replicated with the inclusion of a quadratic term for economic
and military aid respectively. The results are presented in Table 12 with only the
Table 12.   Curvilinear Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models
U.S. Economic and Military Aid
(Aid as a Percentage of GDP)
         Security Rights      Subsistence Rights
Independent Variable        Model A            Model B            Model C            Model D
Economic Aid t-3 -.07*    -1.12*
  (.02)     (.30)
Economic Aid Squared t-3  .003*    .06*    
                (.02)      (.02)
Military Aid t-3    -.07*     1.28*
      (.02)       (.47)
Military Aid Squared t-3   .02*     -.09*
     (.01)     (.04)
Joint F Test (X2)                           20.49#                9.71#                 14.44#                7.37#                
Number of Cases 1894   1894   1536   1536
R2 .79    .78    .92    .92
Wald X2 604.66  573.44  1196.71 742.88
Probability > x2                           0.00                      0.00                   0.00                   0.00                 
* p < .05
# X2 < .05
Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 8 and Table 10
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variables of interest displayed.11   While the coefficients are statistically significant in the
model, what is of more importance is their joint significance.  A joint F test for each
model is also reported in the table.  The combination of each foreign aid variable and its
associated quadratic term is jointly significant.  In other words, the null hypothesis can be
rejected that taken together, foreign assistance and the square of foreign assistance have
no effect on security and subsistence rights.  For both types of aid and security rights and
for economic aid and subsistence rights, the initial effect is negative as indicated by the
coefficients for foreign aid.  The quadratic term, on the other hand, is positive in Model
A, Model B, and Model C, indicating a curvilinear relationship.
Figure 5 offers an illustration of the curvilinear relationship between economic
aid and security rights.12   The graph indicates a U-shaped relationship with increasing
amounts of aid, relative to GDP, associated with lower levels of security rights.
However, if a country’s economic aid to GDP ratio reaches over 10%, human rights
conditions appear to improve.13
The results from the curvilinear analysis indicate qualified support for the
dependency perspective that low and moderate levels of foreign aid have deleterious
effects on human rights.  The neo-liberal perspective is supported, however, at higher
levels of foreign assistance.  In reality, however, this level of aid, relative to GDP, is
                                                          
11 The complete results are available in Appendix B.
12 The pattern for economic aid and subsistence rights as well as the pattern for military aid and security
rights mirrors the pattern exhibited in Figure 5, thus they are not shown.  Rather, Figure 5 represents all
three cases.
13 In the case of military aid, the threshold is 15% of GDP.
145




seldom reached.  Recall that the average level of economic aid to Somalia was 7.37%, far
less that the 10% of GDP necessary for any benefits to be realized.  Thus, in order to
effectively improve human rights and find substantial support for the neo-liberal
perspective, the ratio of foreign aid to GDP must be an extreme amount.  Not only does
this type of ratio of aid to GDP signal an extreme dependence on the United States for
foreign assistance, it is an unlikely scenario for the future due to the fact that the levels of
aid have decreased since the end of the Cold War.  The average annual aid to GDP ratio
for non-OECD states during the Cold War was 1.15 and .24 for economic and military
aid respectively.  These amounts dropped to .77 for economic aid and .07 for military aid
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in the post-Cold War era.  Thus, the results provide more support for the dependency
perspective.
The case of military aid and subsistence rights indicates a different relationship
(Figure 6).  In the original analysis (Table 10) and in the interaction analysis (Table 12),
military aid has a positive effect on subsistence rights, however the results from the
quadratic term are negative, indicating a curvilinear relationship.  Should military aid
exceed 6% of GDP, the effect of military aid becomes negative.   In other words, there is
a threshold to the benefit of military aid on subsistence rights.  Thus, while military aid is
detrimental to security rights (unless the military to GDP ratio reaches over 15%), the
benefits to subsistence rights are lost if a regime becomes too dependent on the United
States for military assistance.   Again, the overall conclusion points to support for the





dependency arguments regarding the negative effects associated with foreign assistance.
While we will have to wait to see the actual effects of the present Colombian aid
package, these results suggest that nothing but additional harm is going to come to not
only the security rights of the citizens of Colombia but to their subsistence rights as well.
Interaction Effects
The relationship between aid and human rights may actually be more complicated
than an additive, or main-effects, model allows.  Previous studies have indicated that both
democracy and wealth are statistically significant in predicting the realization of human
rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Mitchell and McCormick 1988,
McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Moon 1991).  This analysis examines whether the stage
of this economic and political development makes a difference or serves as a moderating
effect on the relationship between human rights and aid, trade, and investment.
In addressing the level of democracy, the arguments for an interaction effect were
outlined in Chapter Four.  A brief review is warranted.  In countries experiencing lower
levels of democracy, citizen participation is limited to the extent they are able to
effectively engage in elections and policymaking.  In such countries, dependency
theorists would argue that foreign assistance dollars and benefits from trade and
investment are economic tools for elites to suppress the political opposition and maintain
their authority and position with society.  The neo-liberal position, on the other hand,
suggests that the introduction of foreign aid will help alleviate poor living conditions and
pave the way for future investments.
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At higher levels of democracy, the neo-liberal position suggests that more and
more citizens are engaged in the political process and thus have more voice in choosing
the political leadership and the allocation of government funds, as well as more say in the
overall direction of economic policy.  Dependency theorists might argue that the
democratization process is a fragile one and that increases in the level of democracy
coincide with a higher likelihood of social and political unrest due to more and more
diverse segments of the population making political and economic demands upon the
government.  Elites in such transitional states will utilize the economic windfalls from
aid, trade, and investment to further suppress the rising political opposition and to
continue reaping the economic benefits at the expense of the masses.
It is also hypothesized that aid, trade, and investment will have different effects
on human rights conditions depending on the level of economic development.  At the
lowest levels of wealth, the vast majority of the citizenry is concerned with subsistence
and pose little political threat to the elites.  The introduction of aid, trade, and investment
may improve levels of subsistence, but have little effect on security rights.  As wealth
increases, the emerging middle class begins to clamor for more political and economic
rights.  In response, government may resort to human rights abuses in order to suppress
the growing political unrest.  Subsistence rights may continue to improve, however, as
the overall level of wealth increases due to the influx of American dollars into the
recipient state’s economy.
In order to empirically ascertain whether this type of relationship exists, an
interactive model must be investigated.   An interaction term, created by multiplying
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economic aid/GDP times democracy, was added to the original main-effects model.
Thus, the original equation for human rights has been changed from:
 Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3-bk(Remaining Control Variables)  + e
to
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X1X2  + b4-bk(Remaining Control Variables)  + e
Where X1 represent aid and b1 is its coefficient, X2 represents democracy and b2 is its
coefficient, and X1X2 represents the interaction term with b3 as its coefficient.
Foreign Aid, Democracy and Human Rights
Table 13 displays the results of the interaction between foreign assistance and
democracy and their combined effect on human rights.  Only the variables of interest are
presented, however the complete results can be found in Appendix C.  In several cases,
the original aid variable is no longer statistically significant (Models A, B, and D) due to
the high level of collinearity between the aid variables and the interaction terms.14  In
Model C, the original aid variable is still statistically significant, however the interaction
term is not.  Due to this effect of multicollinearity, the results of the joint F test are of
more importance.15  In all four models, the joint F test is statistically significant, thereby
allowing the rejection of the null hypothesis.  The statistical significance of the F test
indicates the presence of an interaction effect in all four models.
                                                          
14 The correlation between economic aid and the interaction between economic aid and democracy is .66,
while the equivalent correlation for military aid is .64.
15 The lack of statistical significance of the individual coefficients is irrelevant when interaction effects are
included in a model.  The joint F test provides for the test of statistical significance of the variables of
interest
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Table 13.  Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models
U.S. Aid and Democracy
(Aid as a Percentage of GDP)
         Security Rights      Subsistence Rights
Independent Variable        Model A            Model B            Model C            Model D
Economic Aid t-3 -.02    -.53*
  (.01)     (.17)
Democracy  .07*    .72*    
                (.02)      (.14)
Economic Aid x Democracy -.004**      .03
   (.002)       (.03)
Military Aid t-3    .    -.04      .15
      (.02)     (.26)
Democracy     .07*    .76*
      (.01)     (.13)
Military Aid x Democracy   -.02*    .17*
      (.01)     (.07)
Joint F Test (X2)                           82.41#                  66.49#             37.94#                46.28#              
Number of Cases 1894     1894   1536    1536
R2 .79      .79    .91     .92
Wald X2            628.30   678.87  1046.97   705.56
Probability > x2                           0.00                       0.00                  0.00                    0.00                
* p < .05; ** p < .10
# X2 < .05
Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 8 and Table 10
The strength of this interaction effect is computed by the difference in the R2 of
the main effects model and the interaction model.  Using Model A as an example, the
main effects model R2 is .7921 while the interaction model’s R2 is .7942.  The difference
(.7942-.7921) equates to a .21% additional difference in the variance explained in
security rights, a relatively small effect size.   The remaining models exhibit a similar
effect.  However, given how well the independent variables explained the variance in the
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dependent variable in the original models, adding an additional variable was unlikely to
drastically change the amount of explained variance.16  In addition, the relatively small
effect does not diminish the fact that the addition of the interaction term is statistically
significant, suggesting an appropriate functional form.
Of more interest are the substantive results of the interaction terms.  The nature of
the interaction term is determined with democracy (X2) as the moderating variable.  The
value of the coefficient for the interaction term (b3) indicates how the relationship
between security rights and foreign aid (X1) varies across different values of democracy.
Various levels of democracy are offered to ascertain the varying effect on security rights.
A value of two was chosen to represent countries with low levels of democracy.  The
mean value of democracy among the countries with the worst security rights in the
sample is 2.40.  A value of four was chosen as it is the mean value of democracy for the
entire sample.  Lastly, countries with high levels of democracy are represented with a
value of ten.  In the sample, the mean value of OECD countries is 9.87.
The respective coefficients (b3), standard errors (SE), and t statistics for these
different scenarios are presented in Table 14.  In non-OECD states, the results support the
dependency argument, specifically that as countries increase in the level of democracy,
they are more negatively affected  by the presence of economic aid.  In other words, at
higher levels of democracy, increases in the aid to GDP ratio are more detrimental than
aid to countries at lower levels of democracy.  All of the t scores are statistically
                                                          




Table 14.  Interaction Analyses:  
Economic Aid, Democracy and Security Rights 
(Non-OECD States) 
 
    Level of Democracy    b3   SE     t   
 
 Low (2)   -.028  .012  -2.33 
 
 Medium (4)   -.036  .012  -3.09 
 




 significant, indicating that all of the slopes differ from zero.  At low levels of democracy
(a 2 on the Polity III scale), a one percent increase in aid relative to GDP translates into
an additional negative effect of .028 on security rights.  From a dependency perspective,
it is not surprising to find that aid allocated to regimes with little or no indication of
democratic values would use foreign aid to perpetuate the current regime.  At high levels
of democracy, each one percent increase in aid/GDP translates into an additional negative
effect of .06.  From the lowest to the highest levels of democracy, the effect doubles.
This effect is above and beyond the effect of aid and democracy alone.  Figure 7 offers a
graphical representation of this relationship.  There is support for the notion that foreign
intervention in the form of economic aid during the democratization process is
detrimental to human rights as elites utilize aid to suppress the emerging political
opposition.17
                                                          
17 The results from the interaction between economic aid and subsistence rights as well as military aid and
security rights were comparable and thus only one explanation was provided.
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The relationship between military aid and subsistence rights for non-OECD states,
as originally reported in Table 10, is positive (a coefficient of .62).  The interaction
between military aid and democracy was reported in Table 13 and remains positive (a
coefficient of .17).  These results indicate that not only does military aid contribute to
improved subsistence rights directly, but countries at higher levels of  democracy receive
an additional boost, in terms of basic human needs, from the allocation of military aid.
The substantive results from the interaction model are reported in Table 15 for varying
levels of democracy.  Again, each t score is statistically significant, indicating that all of




Table 15.  Interaction Analyses:  
Military Aid, Democracy and Subsistence Rights 
(Non-OECD States) 
 
    Level of Democracy    b3   SE     t   
 
 Low (2)   .493  .244  2.01 
 
 Medium (4)   .83  .318  2.61 
 




more beneficial in the realization of subsistence rights.  A graphical representation of this
relationship is offered in Figure 8.
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There is a twofold explanation for these results.  First, in states that are more
democratic, as previously discussed, citizens may have more say in redistributive policies
through the power of the vote and other opportunities to participate in the electoral
process.  Thus, citizens will demand redistributive policies favoring improvements in
basic human needs such as health care, sanitation, and education.  Second, in this
particular scenario, it is military aid that is being considered and such aid may not have
an economic distributive characteristic as much military aid comes in the form of
equipment.  Receiving such military equipment from an external source, however
allows a regime to redirect money originally earmarked for defense into domestic welfare
concerns, concerns which citizens in states that are more democratic are able to voice
their position.
Overall, the results indicate that the relationship between foreign aid and human
rights differ depending on the level of democracy, and the results are generally supportive
of the dependency perspective.  Only military aid and levels of democracy are in the
positive direction in support of the neo-liberal position concerning the realization of basic
human needs.  Again, this support is a qualified one, given the previous finding that there
is a threshold effect to the positive influence of military aid on subsistence rights.  At the
lowest levels of democracy, all types of foreign aid are detrimental to security rights and
economic aid is negatively associated with the level of basic human needs.  This effect,
however, is relatively small compared to the results as the level of democracy increases.
These results indicate that as states become more democratic, the effects of foreign aid
only serve to disrupt the process, particularly the aspect of democracy that pertains to the
realization of security rights.
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The Interaction of Foreign Aid and Wealth
A second possible interaction exists between foreign assistance and wealth.  Table
16 presents the four models for the interaction between economic and military aid and
wealth and their effect on security rights (Model A and Model B) and subsistence rights
(Model C and Model D).  Again, only the variables of interest are presented, the complete
Table 16.  Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models
U.S. Aid and Wealth
(Aid as a Percentage of GDP)
         Security Rights      Subsistence Rights
Independent Variable        Model A            Model B            Model C            Model D
Economic Aid t-3 -.02*    -.58*
  (.01)     (.16)
Wealth  .02*    1.93*    
                (.02)      (.13)
Economic Aid x Wealth -.01**      .18*
   (.01)       (.03)
Military Aid t-3    .    -.04      .85*
      (.03)     (.33)
Wealth     .02*   1.98*
      (.01)     (.13)
Military Aid x Wealth    -.01   -.14
      (.01)     (.10)
Joint F Test (X2)                           24.13#                   15.56#              239.20#               222.52#            
Number of Cases 1894     1894   1536    1536
R2 .79      .78    .92     .92
Wald X2            614.13   725.96  1031.45   719.36
Probability > x2                           0.00                       0.00                  0.00                    0.00                
# X2 < .05
* p < .05; ** p < .10
Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 8 and Table 10
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table is available in Appendix D.   All the aid variables remain statistically significant in
the interaction models, except for military aid in Model B.   The joint F test indicates the
presence of an interaction effect in each model.
The strength of the interaction effect is calculated by taking the difference in the
squared multiple correlations in the main-effects model and the subsequent interaction
models.  Using Model A as an example, the interaction R2 is .7946, while the R2 for the
main-effects model is .7921.  The difference (.7946-.7921) equals .0025, indicating that
an additional .25% in the variance is explained by the addition of the interaction term.
Similar to the effect size of the interaction between aid and democracy, the size of this
effect is relatively small.  However, this fails to negate the proper specification of the
model or the statistical significance that aid’s effect on human rights is moderated by a
country’s level of wealth.
The substantive results of the interaction of economic aid, wealth, and security
rights are presented in Table 17 using Model A.  The nature of the interaction term is
determined with wealth, as measured by per capita GDP, as the moderating variable.  The
value of the coefficient of the interaction term, b3, indicates how the relationship between
foreign assistance and security rights varies across different values of wealth.  Three
different values of wealth were selected and are listed in the first column of Table 17.
The low value of 2.14 represents the mean value of countries with the worst human rights
records.  The medium value of 3.85 represents the mean value of wealth for the entire




Table 17.  Interaction Analyses:  
Economic Aid, Wealth and Security Rights 
(Non-OECD States) 
 
          Level of Wealth    b3   SE     t   
 
Low (2.14)   -.054  .016  -3.44 
 
Medium (3.85)   -.078  .028  -2.76 
 




value of OECD states.18   The respective coefficients, standard errors, and t statistics for
these different scenarios are also presented in Table 17 in columns two, three and four
respectively.19
In non-OECD states, the results suggest that the wealthier a state becomes, the
more detrimental the effect economic aid has on security rights.  All of the t scores are
statistically significant, although the high value is only significant at the .10 level.  These
results, once again, provide more support for the dependency perspective.  The poorest
countries, contrary to the arguments presented, are ill affected by economic aid in terms
of security rights.  Elites do appear to perceive a potential threat from the poverty stricken
masses and are more likely to suppress political opposition, even in the poorest countries.
As wealth increases, the extent of political suppression grows, possibly in response to
growing unrest among the emerging middle class.  Figure 9 provides a graphical
representation of this negative relationship. Ultimately, the level of wealth does not have
                                                          
18 These values are stated in the thousands, thus the lowest value, 2.14, equals $2,140 per person while
15.25 equals $15,250 per person.
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the same relevance as the level of democracy, as the only scenario that is of substantive
importance is that of economic aid, economic development and security rights.  The
results indicate that the level of wealth is not significant in the relationship between
foreign aid and subsistence rights.
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The analysis of the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and human rights
revealed that the former is negatively associated with the latter.  The bivariate and
                                                                                                                                                                            
19 While all four models indicated the presence of an interaction effect, the different slopes in the remaining
models were not statistically significant.
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multivariate analyses consistently point to this negative relationship.  The one exception
is the positive effect of military aid on subsistence rights.  However, subsequent analysis
indicated that there is a threshold to this positive influence and the amount of aid
necessary to be effective in improving subsistence rights is at the same time extremely
detrimental to security rights.   Foreign assistance is not the pacifying foreign policy tool
that political rhetoric suggests.  The U.S.’ efforts at improving human rights records
across the globe have been harmed by their foreign assistance program.  The next chapter
investigates whether the private sector, in the forms of trade and investment, influences
human rights conditions.  The results will inform U.S. policy makers as to the wisdom of
either restricting or encouraging trade and investment in the name of human rights.
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CHAPTER SIX
U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT
IS THERE HOPE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS?
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between U.S. trade and
investment and both security and subsistence rights.1  The bivariate relationships between
the two economic variables and human rights are examined in the first section.  Second,
the empirical results from the multivariate analysis are discussed.  An investigation of the
multivariate relationship between trade, investment, and security rights is examined.
Then, attention is turned to the effect of trade and investment on subsistence rights.  The
third section examines whether there is a linear or curvilinear relationship among the
variables of interest.  Similar to the analysis regarding the relationship between foreign
aid and human rights, the fourth section will address whether the trade and investment
variables' effect on human rights is conditioned by the level of democracy and/or wealth.
The hypothesis for the relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and
investment bears repeating before proceeding to the bivariate statistics.2  The neo-liberal
position argues that both trade and investment will be positively related to the realization
of human rights.  Trade and investment contributes to economic wealth providing for a
better standard of living.  Neo-liberals contend that the deficiencies in less developed
economies, specifically the lack of capital, an oversupply of unskilled laborers, and
                                                          
1 This research does not test the effects of international trade and investment on human rights, only trade
and investment from the United States.
2 For a complete explication of the theorized relationships between human rights and U.S. trade and
investment, see Chapter Four.
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protectionist trade policies, all contribute to substandard living conditions and can be
relieved through international trade and investment.  As for security rights, neo-liberals
suggest that with improvements in economic standing comes political reforms and the
decline of repressive regimes.
H3: The higher the level of trade and investment, ceteris paribus, the more likely the
government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence rights.
Dependency theory, on the other hand, posits that trade and investment
relationships with the United States will have negative effects as elites within recipient
states benefit at the expense of the vast majority of citizens.  Trade and investment from
the U.S. serve to suppress domestic economic growth as the less developed state tends to
loss control over resources and policies governing land use and wage labor.  The result is
a substandard quality and standard of living.  In addition, elites in the periphery, it is
argued, are captured or coopted by the greater economic power and fail to develop
policies favoring the recipient state.  Repression may also increase in order to maintain a
stable investment and trade environment and ensure continued elite economic dominance.
H4: The higher the level of trade and direct foreign investment, ceteris paribus, the
less likely the government will respect security rights and provide for subsistence
rights.
Bivariate Statistics
Bivariate statistics are useful to establish the correlation between two variables.
The results of the correlations between human rights and U.S. trade and investment are
displayed in Table 18.  The bivariate relationships are broken down into country
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Table 18.  Bivariate Relationships: U.S. Trade, Investment and Human Rights
(As a percentage of GDP)
                     Security Rights     Subsistence Rights
               (AI)             (PQLI)
Trade
  All Countries .09* .15*
  OECD .22* .12*
  Non-OECD .13* .22*
Investment
  All Countries .12* .13*
  OECD .10*             -.17*
  Non-OECD .14* .16*
Number of Observations  Trade       Investment              Trade           Investment
  All Countries    3130            2371  2698              2091
  OECD     397             414   368  383
  Non-OECD                                  2712             1936                     2312                  1690                   
* p < .05
AI = Amnesty International
PQLI = Physical Quality of Life
categories (all countries, OECD countries, and non-OECD countries) and security and
subsistence rights.  Again, the three different samples are offered to illustrate the
disparity in the levels of trade and investment by the U.S. to various types of countries.
The first column reports the correlation between trade and investment, as a percentage of
GDP, from the U.S. and the security rights variable based on Amnesty International
Reports. The second column represents the bivariate relationship between subsistence
rights, based on the Physical Quality of Life Index, and U.S. trade and investment. 3   
The results suggest that trade is positively related to both measures of human
rights.  In addition, all of these relationships are statistically significant.  In other words,
                                                          
3 See footnote 1 in Chapter Five for the explanation of using contemporaneous variables in the tests for
bivariate correlations.
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higher levels of trade, as a percentage of GDP, are associated with higher levels of
respect for security and subsistence rights.  The bivariate relationship between U.S.
investment and human rights reveals a similar relationship to that of human rights and
trade.  That is, higher levels of investment, relative to GDP, are associated with countries
with better human rights records, except for the relationship between subsistence rights
and OECD countries.   At this point, however, it cannot be assumed that higher levels of
either trade and investment from the U.S. actually contribute to higher levels of human
rights conditions. One could just as easily conclude that higher levels of human rights
conditions attract higher levels of trade and investment, particularly since many
multinational and transnational corporations consider domestic conditions and global
public opinion when making decisions about trade and investment.4
A graph provides a better appreciation of the relationships between trade,
investment, and human rights.  Figure 10 provides a view of the relationship between
U.S. exports, imports, and investment (in millions of dollars) and security rights.  A
country rated “1” is considered to have the worst human rights record.  Countries with the
best human rights records are represented in the graph with a “5.”  When all countries are
included, the disproportionate amount of trade with countries with the best human
                                                          
4 Human Rights Watch has an article at www.hrw.org/about/initiatives/corp.html outlining the connection
between corporations and human rights violations.  They cite that companies such as Royal Dutch/Shell,
British Petroleum Company, Nike, Heineken and several others “were placed on the defensive by
damaging exposures of corporate complicity in human rights violations.”  The issue continued by stating
that MNCs and TNCs were “stung again and again by charges that their companies had abused workers and
propped up repressive governments.  Accounts of child labor and sweatshop working conditions stunned
public opinion to become human rights issues of broad popular concern.”
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US Exports 647.48 1398.02 1163.22 1285.33 4178.43
US Imports 922.23 2062.95 1448.42 1896.23 5320.65
US DFI 943.14 1370.55 1041.99 3020.44 7678.42
1 2 3 4 5
rights records is evident.  The U.S. trades and invests overwhelmingly with and in
countries with the best human rights records.  It should be noted, however, that the
majority of these countries with the best human rights records are OECD states.  This
might possibly explain the positive relationship between security rights and trade and
investment reported in Table 18.
When only non-OECD countries are considered (Figure 11), the countries with
the poorest security rights records received greater amounts of trade and investment
dollars.   This belies the correlation between trade, investment, and security rights in non-
OECD countries reported in Table 18, where there is a positive relationship.  When trade
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and investment are measured in millions of dollars, rather than as a percentage of GDP,
the correlation to security rights is negative.   The correlation between U.S. exports, as
measured in millions of dollars, and security rights is -.088, while the correlation between
U.S. imports, measured in millions, and security rights is -.086.  Both are statistically
significant at the .05 level.










US Exports 647.48 1398.08 1153.21 688.54 331.47
US Imports 922.24 2062.95 1436.49 1087.56 415.7
US DFI 943.14 1370.55 1013.31 682.31 335.13
1 2 3 4 5
When trade and investment are taken as a percentage of GDP, the discrepancy
between the non-OECD countries with the worst and best records presents a different
trend (Figure 12).  As previously mentioned, in raw dollar figures, non-OECD countries
with the worst security rights records receive a disproportionate amount of trade and
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investment from the U.S..  When calculated as a percentage of GDP, however, trade and
investment comprises a larger percentage of wealth in non-OECD countries with better
human rights records.  This is, in part, a function of the fact that non-OECD countries
with the best human rights records tend to be smaller countries with relatively small
GDPs.  This also accounts for the positive correlation between trade, investment, and
non-OECD states in Table 18.











Trade 6.43 8.29 7.92 9.25 10.79
Investment 2.54 3.00 3.11 2.66 5.27
1 2 3 4 5
Whether calculated as raw dollar figures or as a percentage of GDP, the trends in
trade and investment in regard to subsistence rights tend to mirror each other.   The U.S.
consistently trades and invests in countries with higher levels of subsistence rights.  In
other words, the U.S. simply does not trade with and invest in countries with the poorest
living conditions.  Figures 13 and 14 graphically illustrate the
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relationship between trade, investment and subsistence rights.  Figure 13 provides trade
and investment in millions of dollars, while Figure 14 presents the values of trade and
investment as a percentage of GDP.  The countries with the worst living conditions in










US Exports 1 17.27 31.65 43.06 187.51 427.8 608.58 1428.96 1678.17 570.65
US Imports 0 31.54 61.31 182.91 353.09 850.89 777.63 2214.77 1958.14 854.23
US DFI 0 18.14 27.04 44.95 147.28 245.72 842.39 1576.48 1504.66 558.39
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
the sample have a subsistence rating, or Physical Quality of Life Index, closer to 0.5
                                                          
5 For example, the lowest PQLI rating in the sample is Cambodia in 1977 with a 7.27.  In 1980, 1982, and
1992, Sierra Leone had a PQLI rating of 16.21, 16.03, and 16.67 respectively.  The mean PQLI rating for
Afghanistan for the entire sample is 26.11.  The following countries had a PQLI rating below 30 at some
point during the years in the sample: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad,
Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Upper Volta, and North
Yemen.
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Countries experiencing the best living conditions have a subsistence level closer to 100.6
In raw dollars, countries in the range of 70 to 90 on the Physical Quality of Life Index
receive the greatest amount of trade and investment dollars from the U.S..
When converted to a percentage of GDP, there is a gradual increase in the level of
trade and investment as the standard of living increases (Figure 14).  This positive












Trade 0.18 4.46 4.2 4.65 6.71 7.94 7.09 11.56 12.35 8.78
Investment 0 0.86 1.23 1.98 3.66 2.39 2.96 4.49 10.01 6.14
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
relationship is reflected in the bivariate statistics reported in Table 18. 7   Thus far, we can
provisionally conclude that there is support for the neo-liberal position regarding the
                                                          
6 Non-OECD countries with a PQLI rating above 90 include Barbados, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Greece,
and Israel.
7 Recall that the variable for trade is converted to a percentage of GDP by using the Heston and Summer
variable for trade openness as a model.  In this study, U.S. exports plus U.S. imports are divided by GDP
for the variable for trade.
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relationship between human rights and trade and investment.  Neo-liberals contend that
globalization, in this case international trade and investment, is positively related to
improvements in the human condition.  Bivariate statistics are limited, however, in that
they can only suggest that a relationship exists between two variables. Multivariate
analysis allows for a more sophisticated examination of the relationship between two
variables as additional factors, or variables, are taken into consideration.  Thus, the
following section of Chapter Six investigates the multivariate relationship between trade
and investment and security rights, followed by an analysis between these same two
economic factors and subsistence rights.
Level of Security and Subsistence Rights -  Multivariate Analysis
Security Rights
The results from the multivariate analyses on the relationship between security
rights and U.S. trade and investment are displayed in Table 19.  The first two models
include the variable measuring the level of trade openness or trade measured as a
percentage of GDP.  Model A includes all states in the sample, while Model B restricts
the analysis to non-OECD states.  The analysis is replicated with U.S. investment in place
of trade in Model C and Model D.  Similar to the presentation of the aid models, the
independent variables are separated into economic, political, and social/cultural variables.
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      Table 19 Multivariate Analyses: Security Rights Model
Trade Investment
        All Countries     Non-OECD    All Countries     Non-OECD
Independent Variable        Model A            Model B            Model C            Model D            
Constant    6.69*   7.48*   6.05*   7.17*
    (.26)   (.38)    (.22)    (.30)
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Trade Openness t-1  -.003  -.002 
     (.002)    (.002)
Investment  t-1  .005*   .005**
      (.002)    (.001)
Economic Standing  .05*   .02*   .05*  .03*
   (.003)    (.01)    (.001)    (.001)
Economic Growth# -.05  -.01   -.14  -.11
   (.08)    (.08)    (.09)    (.10)
POLITICAL FACTORS
Democracy  .08*   .07*   .08*   .05*
   (.01)    (.01)    (.01)    (.01)
Leftist Government#  .09   .09   .32*   .31*
   (.08)    (.06)    (.09)    (.10)
Military Government -.11* -.12*  -.14*  -.14*
   (.04)    (.05)    (.06)    (.06)
Civil War -.84* -.83*  -.89* -.88*
   (.11)    (.11)    (.12)   (.12)
International War -.28* -.34* -.26* -.35*
   (.07)    (.08)    (.08)    (.10)
Post-Cold War  -.23*  -.20* -.27*  -.24*
   (.04)    (.04)    (.05)    (.05)
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS
Population -.22*  -.27*  -.19*  -.26*
   (.02)    (.02)    (.01)    (.02)
Population Change  .002   .0004  -.001  -.005
   (.002)    (.002)    (.003)    (.003)
British Influence  .18*   .18*   .32*   .32*
                                                       (.04)                   (.04)                   (.05)                   (.05)                 
Number of Cases 2552  2174  1999   1604
R2 .79   .77   .82    .78
Wald 2 713.63  606.90 1025.93  913.08
Probability > x2                            0.00                     0.00                   0.00                   0.00                  
#  Two-tailed test
* p < .05; ** p < .10
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The chi-square statistic is used for the determination of the overall significance, or
goodness of fit, of the regression.  In other words, it indicates the chance that the model is
any different than a random model.  According to the results in Table 19, the probability
that these particular models occurred by chance is very slightly above zero in one
hundred.  Thus, the chi-squared results allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the
model as a whole is not significantly different than zero.  The chi-square indicates that
the models are statistically significant and the R2 indicates that between 77% and 82% of
the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the variations in the independent
variables.8
Recall that the trade and investment variables in the models for security and
subsistence rates are lagged at one year.  This is done for two reasons.  First, there is no
expectation that trade and investment will have a contemporaneous effect on human
rights and second, lagging the variables of interest addresses the issue of causality.  One
might expect that better human rights records actually attract trade and investment.
However, with the inclusion of a lagged trade and investment variable, the direction of
causation is more clear.  There can be no expectation that human rights records at time t
influence trade or investment at t-1. In addition, an empirical test was conducted and
found that trade was weakly exogenous.9
                                                          
8 Just as in the foreign assistance models, the two inherent and common problems with this particular type
of analysis were corrected with the use of an AR(1) parameter (Achen 2000) to accommodate the
autocorrelation in the model and panel-corrected standard errors to address the heteroskedasticity (Beck
and Katz 1995, 1996).  All of the models in this chapter suffer from these two threats to inference and no
additional remarks are made addressing this issue.  In addition, the remaining models have comparable chi-
square and R2 statistics and thus the explanation of these results is not repeated for each.
9 See footnote 6 in Chapter Five for a complete explication of the issue of causality.
173
Although the direction of the trade variable would suggest support of the critics’
view on the relationship between factors of globalization and human rights conditions, it
is not statistically significant in either the model of all countries or the non-OECD
country model.10  However, given the positive bivariate relationship between trade
openness and security rights reported in Table 18, the multivariate results are puzzling.
Upon further analysis, it was determined that trade openness does have a positive
relationship with security rights in a multivariate model until the variable for population
is introduced to the model.  A bivariate analysis between trade openness and population
revealed a negative relationship (correlation of -.21, p < .05), suggesting that higher
levels of trade openness are associated with countries characterized by smaller
populations.  Conversely, countries with larger populations are associated with lower
levels of trade openness with the United States.
Further examination of the relationship between trade openness, population, and
security rights revealed that there is, in fact, an interaction effect occurring between trade
and population which influences security rights.   Table 20 reveals the pertinent results
from this analysis, while the entire results can be found in Appendix E.   The joint F test
is statistically significant, suggesting the presence of an interaction effect.  However,
                                                          
10 Additional diagnostics on the trade models indicated that the Bahamas was an extreme outlier as the U.S.
comprises over 400% of the Bahamas trade when compared to GDP.  As a result, this country was removed
from the sample.  Additional countries were identified as outliers by using the dfbeta test.  These included
Angola, Singapore and several Latin American countries.  The analysis was replicated with these countries
excluded; however, the variable for trade in the security rights model is never statistically significant.
Given the lack of any theoretical grounds for their removal, all the countries remained in the sample except
for the Bahamas.
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Table 20.  Interaction Analyses: Security Rights Model
U.S. Trade and Population in Non-OECD
(Aid as a Percentage of GDP)
             Security Rights
A           Independent Variable                        Model A                                           
Trade Openness t-1 .02  
  (.02)
     Population -.28*
                    (.02)
Trade x Population -.001   
    (.01)   
A           Joint F Test (X2)                                                                  191.31#                            
Number of Cases  2174
R2   .77
Wald X2            694.64
A           Probability > x2                                                                   0.00                                            
#  X2 < .05
* p < .05;
Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 19
examining the individual slopes as population size changes reveals that no slopes are
different from zero. Additionally, the t statistics for each slope are not statistically
significant.  Thus, while the functional form of the model is well-specified, the
substantive results indicate that different levels of population are not statistically
significant in affecting the relationship between trade and security rights.   At this
juncture, we can only conclude that population appears to have a dampening effect on the
relationship between trade and security rights.11
Turning to the other U.S. economic variable of interest, investment as a
                                                          
11 The precise relationship between trade and population is not known and is beyond the scope of this
research.
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percentage of GDP is statistically significant and supportive of the neo-liberal view at a
lag of one year (Table 19).12  According to the results in Model C and Model D, higher
levels of investment lead to higher levels of respect for security rights. The findings here
support those of Meyer (1998) and Rothgeb (1989) regarding the relationship between
investment and human rights.  Meyer (1998), using the presence of MNCs as a variable
for investment, finds their presence is positively associated with civil and political rights
as well as improvements in the quality of life.  Rothgeb (1989) finds that foreign
investment, as measured by the level of multinational manufacturing and mining, is
positively related to improved human rights conditions.  In addition, these results
contradict previous studies that find a negative relationship between higher levels of trade
dependency and repression (Ziegenhagen 1986; Pion-Berlin 1989; Carleton 1989).
The present results indicate that a one percent increase in the level of investment
relative to GDP leads to a .005 increase in the level of security rights.  At first glance, this
.005 increase appears to be quite weak given that the scale of security rights ranges from
1 to 5.  Thus, a substantive investigation of the results is necessary.  Table 21 displays
the conversion of the coefficient for investment (.005) and trade (.02) from Table 19 and
Table 20 respectively.13  A sample of different countries, with mean values of trade and
                                                          
12 In the investment model, the Bahamas is again an extreme outlier as it receives over 200% of its GDP
investment from the United States.  As a result, it is removed from the analysis.  In addition, Panama
received comparable amounts of investment from the United States and was also eliminated from the
sample.  Additional diagnostics indicated that Liberia was also an outlier.  However after observing the
data, the year 1976 indicated an investment to GDP ratio of over 90% in Liberia while the remaining years
were in the low teens.  This suggested a data entry error and that one year of data was removed from the
sample.  Bahrain, Singapore, and several Latin American countries also revealed themselves as potential
outliers.  However, excluding them from the sample failed to change the substantive results.
13 The coefficient for trade was used from Table 20 because the joint F test indicated that it is statistically
significant in conjunction with population and the interaction of population and trade.  The positive
relationship between trade and security is also supported by the bivariate statistics and in a regression
analysis with the variable for population removed.
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investment, is also provided in the second and third columns.  The effect on security
rights is then calculated by multiplying the mean values by the coefficients and reported
in the last two columns.  The first conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that
trade potentially has a far greater effect on security rights than investment.  This is due to
Table 21.    Substantive Results of Trade and Investment Effect on Security Rights 
 
                 Mean Values of           Effect on Security Rights    
Country                      Trade       Investment      Trade# (.02)      Investment## (.005)   
 
Worst Records a                   7.65       2.78         .15    .01  
 
Worst Living Conditions b   4.52       1.75         .09    .01 
 
Country A          22.08            20.55         .44    .10  
  (Client-State) 
 
Country B             38.89       2.17         .78    .01   
  (Trade Dominant) 
 
Country C          16.35            29.53         .33    .15 
  (Investment Dominant) 
 
            Maximum Values            Effect    
   
Non-OECD States         96.26           98.58       1.93    .48 
 
OECD States            6.1      7.14         .12        .04   
a      Countries with a security ranking of 1 or 2  
b      Countries with lower than a 40 on the PQLI 
#     coefficient from the trade/population interaction model in Table 19 
##   coefficient from the investment variable in Table 18 
the fact that trade comprises a larger percentage of GDP than investment, as well as the
stronger trade coefficient from the multivariate analysis.
The countries with the worst security rights records, those with a ranking of a “1”
or a “2” received an average trade to GDP ratio of 7.65 and an investment to GDP ratio
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of 2.78.  These countries realize an improvement in security rights from trade (.15) and
investment (.01), albeit a fairly mild improvement.  However, this combined effect is
comparable to the influence of British colonialism.  Similarly, countries with the poorest
living conditions (those with less than 40 on the PQLI) have mean values of trade and
investment to GDP of 4.52 and 1.75 respectively.  This translates into a combined
improvement of .10 in the level of security rights (again, a fairly mild improvement).
What may be more important is the fact that trade and investment do not appear to inflict
any harm where security rights are concerned.
While the foreign assistance program has been detrimental to U.S. allies and
client-states, the benefits to security rights from trade and investment can be seen in the
Country A example.  In this scenario, trade and investment comprises over 40% GDP.
This translates into an improvement of over half a point on the security rights scale.
Countries in Latin America receive, on average, comparable levels of trade and
investment from the United States.
When trade volumes become a substantial portion of GDP, like in Country B
which hypothetically received approximately 39% of their GDP from trade and 2% of
their GDP from investment, more drastic improvements in security rights are possible,
almost .80 of one point on the security rights scale.  Country C illustrates that it takes
almost twice as much investment to realize half of the benefit of trade.   At this point,
relying on investment alone to improve security rights is insufficient.  However, these
results suggest that there are real benefits of trade in the area of human rights.  This is
particularly true when observing the differences in the amount of trade from U.S. trade to
non-OECD countries versus OECD states.  An increase in the level of trade to non-
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OECD states, according to the results, would have positive effects on human rights. The
effect of trade and investment on the maximum values of non-OECD and OECD is also
provided in Table 20.
The remaining economic variables in the models perform in a similar fashion to
the foreign aid models.  Wealth continues to be an important factor in the realization of
security rights as previous studies have found (McCormick and Mitchell 1988, 1989; Poe
and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).  For every one thousand dollar increase in
wealth per capita, security rights are improved by .05 (Model A and Model C).  The
effect is not as strong in the non-OECD country models.  Again, contrary to the theories
posited by Olson (1963) and Gurr (1968), there is no statistical evidence that economic
growth leads to increases in the abuse of security rights.
The political factors perform in a similar manner as they did in the models for
foreign aid.  The strongest predictor remains the presence of a civil war, which leads to a
decrease of almost a full point on the five-point security rights scale.  The presence of an
international war reveals a similar pattern, but with less severity.  A country’s
involvement in an international war equates to a decrease of between .26 and .35,
depending on the model.  This result supports previous research that wars in general are
detrimental to human rights (McKinlay and Cohen 1975; Poe and Tate 1994; Milner
1998; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).  The end of the Cold War has had a negative effect on
security rights, similar to the models of foreign assistance and supportive of the results by
Milner (1998).
Regime type, in all of the models, proves to be an important factor in the
realization of security rights.  Democracy is in the anticipated direction and is statistically
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significant, while military regimes continue to be a detriment to security rights.  The
remaining political variable, leftist governments, continues to be in the positive direction,
albeit statistically significant only in the models for investment.  The results from the
leftist regime variable suggest that democratization is not the only path to improved
security rights.  What is evident, however, is the fact that military regimes are disastrous
where human rights are concerned.
The cultural variables in the model measure the effects of population, population
growth, and the legacy of British colonialism on human rights conditions.  While all the
variables are in the anticipated direction, the variable measuring population growth is not
statistically significant.   Thus, there is no statistical evidence that rapid population
growth is detrimental to human rights.  The results from the other population variable
indicate that countries with larger populations are less likely to respect security rights
within their society, consistent with previous research (Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and
Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999).  A history of British colonialism remains an
important factor in the development and realization of security rights.
These results indicate that the variables of interest, trade and investment, do
influence security rights conditions, with trade potentially having a much larger effect in
non-OECD states.  However, the level of trade and investment must comprise a
significant portion of the recipient state’s GDP to be effective, particularly in the case of
investment.  The effects from the maximum values of trade and investment indicate the
potential benefit to security rights from factors of globalization.  While it is unrealistic to
believe that states will maintain such a large reliance on the United States for trade and
investment as the maximum values indicate, the results from the Latin American states
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indicate that security rights can be realized through increased globalization in the form of
trade and investment.  These results suggest that political opposition within the regime is
less likely to be a target of human rights violations with increases in trade and investment
with the United States.  The next section of this chapter investigates whether society at
large also benefits from trade and investment.
Subsistence Rights
The relationship between trade, investment and subsistence rights is presented in
Table 22.  Similar to models of security rights, the results include models for trade and
investment for all countries and non-OECD states.  The first two columns are models for
trade, while the last two columns include the variable for U.S. investment.  In contrast to
the model for security rights, the level of trade openness in the subsistence rights model is
statistically significant and in the positive direction, lending support to the neo-liberal
perspective.  The analyses indicate that a one percent increase in trade openness results in
an increase of .29 and .20 in subsistence rights in all countries and non-OECD countries
respectively.14  Investment remains in the positive direction and statistically significant,
similar to the results from the security rights model.  In this instance, a one percent
increase in investment, relative to GDP, equates to a .07 increase in subsistence rights in
                                                          
14 As in the security rights model, the Bahamas were eliminated from the sample in the trade model for
subsistence rights due to their overwhelming dependence on the U.S. for trade.  However, additional
countries also revealed themselves as possible outliers, specifically Angola, Singapore, Haiti, Honduras,
and Mozambique.  The analysis was repeated with these countries excluded.  Since the results, both
statistically and substantively, were not altered and given the lack of theoretical grounds for their
elimination, these countries were kept in the sample presented in the text.
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Table 22.   Multivariate Analyses: Subsistence Rights Models 
 
             All Countries Non-OECD All Countries Non-OECD 
Independent Variable  Model A Model B Model C Model D  
Constant    41.72*   42.21*    53.14*   43.56* 
        (7.65)    (7.19)     (8.43)     (9.82) 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Trade Openness t-1    .29*    .20*    
        (4.42)    (4.41)  
Investment t-1             .07*    .07* 
               (.03)     (.03) 
Economic Standing   1.14*    2.06*    1.04*   1.99* 
       (.13)      (.14)     (.16)     (.17) 
Economic Growth#  -1.49   -1.74   -1.10   -1.27 
       (1.17)     (1.15)     (.95)     (.96) 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
Democracy    .71*    .73*    .83*    .70* 
       (.16)      (.15)     (.10)     (.13) 
Leftist Government#   -1.13    .38    -6.08*    -6.39* 
       (1.17)     (.89)     (1.85)     (1.65) 
Military Government  -6.20*    -6.13*    -4.62*   -3.99* 
       (1.51)     (1.40)     (.91)     (.85) 
Military Burden    .04     .05    .06    .03 
       (.04)     (.04)      (.06)      (.05) 
Military Personnel   .004*    .004*   .001    -.001* 
       (.001)     (.001)      (.001)    (.001) 
Civil War   -.92  -.62  -1.08  -1.26 
       (.77)     (.73)     (1.11)    (.99) 
International War  -.68  -.70  -.28  -.03 
       (.55)     (.74)     (.54)     (.79) 
Cold War#    1.10    1.78   2.18*    2.85* 
       (.93)     (1.10)     (.89)     (1.15)    j 
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS 
Population    1.08*   .99*    .58    1.06** 
       (.36)     (.35)     (.54)     (.63) 
Population Change  -.03   -.04   -.05   -.09** 
       (.02)     (.03)     (.03)     (.05) 
British Influence#  -3.28*   -3.95*    -6.03*    -7.25* 
       (1.32)      (1.21)     (1.04)     (1.19) 
Buddhist    5.59*    6.83*    13.81*   18.11** 
       (2.50)     (2.28)     (2.45)     (2.92) 
Muslim    -11.54*   -12.34*  -12.12*  -10.24* 
       (1.38)     (1.43)     (2.79)     (2.27)   
Number of Cases   2093    1733     1697     1322 
R2      .91     .92      .92      .92 
Wald X2   670.20* 2587.60*   238.57* 251.35* 
Probability > X2    0.00    0.00     0.00     0.00   
#  two-tailed test 
* p < .05; ** p < .10 
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both Model C and Model D.15  These results, combined with the positive statistically
significant results from the relationship between investment and security rights, suggest
that economic factors of globalization benefit the human condition.
Having statistically significant results only indicates an empirical relationship
between variables.  Converting the coefficients from Table 22 into substantive results
provides a more concrete appreciation of the benefits of trade and investment, as well as
indicates whether the statistical results have any tangible meaning.  Table 23 replicates
the substantive results from the security rights models and adds two additional columns
for the effect of trade and investment on subsistence rights.  The first four columns are
the same as in Table 21.  The last two columns represent the effect of trade and
investment on subsistence rights by multiplying the mean values of trade and investment
with the coefficients for trade (.20) and investment (.07).
The patterns established in the security rights models continue here; that is, there
is much more significant influence on subsistence rights from trade than from investment.
In the client-state example (Country A), where countries have approximately 40% of
their GDP tied to U.S. trade and investment, subsistence rights can see an improvement
of almost 6 points.  In Country B, a 38.89 trade to GDP ratio translates to an
improvement of 7.78 points on the subsistence rights scale.  Diffusion of the economic
benefits to trade are evident as the level of subsistence rights increases.
                                                          
15 The Bahamas and Panama were removed from the sample in the investment models.  Both receive over
200% of their GDP from investments from the U.S..  Diagnostics on the investment models also indicated
that Liberia, Guyana, Singapore, and Bahrain were potential outliers.  Their removal from the analysis did
not alter the results, thus they were left in the sample that is presented in the text.
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Table 23.    Substantive Results of Trade and Investment on 
Security and Subsistence Rights 
 
                   Effect on:  
            Mean Values of   Security Rights   Subsistence Rights 
Country        Trade     Investment       Trade    Investment        Trade    Investment 
                (.02)    (.005)      (.20)        (.07)  
 
Worst Records #       7.65   2.78             .15     .01   1.53         .19 
 
Worst Living  
Conditions ##           4.52   1.75             .09     .01     .90         .12 
 
Country A         22.08       20.55             .44     .10    4.41       1.44 
  (Client-State) 
 
Country B         38.89   2.17             .78     .01   7.78         .15 
  (Trade Dominant) 
 
Country C         16.35       29.53             .33     .15   3.27       2.07 
  (Investment Dominant) 
 
        Maximum Values       Effect               Effect   
 
Non-OECD States   96.26 98.58           1.93     .48            19.25        6.90 
 
OECD States           6.1   7.14             .12     .04   1.22         .49  
 
#   Countries with a security ranking of a 1 or 2 





Thus, one can conclude that trade and investment do serve to improve human
rights conditions.  The plight of countries with poor security rights and the worst living
conditions, it would appear, can benefit from increases in trade and investment.  These
results suggest that preventing or restricting trade and investment would not be in the best
interests of either security or subsistence rights.  These results support, ironically, the
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arguments presented by conservatives on Capitol Hill regarding the potential benefits that
trade to China will bring in the area of human rights.  The recent passage of PNTR should
serve to increase the level of trade between the U.S. and China.  Thus, given the results,
one might expect to see an improvement in China, particularly in the area of subsistence
rights, in the coming years.
Turning to the remaining independent variables in the subsistence rights models,
the two other domestic economic variables perform in a similar fashion to all the previous
models.  The level of economic wealth in a country is positively related to the subsistence
rights experienced within the state.  These results are statistically significant across all the
models and consistent with previous research (Moon and Dixon 1985; Spalding 1986;
Moon 1991; Milner 1998).  The variable measuring economic growth is not statistically
significant.  So, while there seems to be a suggestion that rapid growth is detrimental to
domestic conditions, there is no empirical evidence supporting the theories posited by
Gurr (1968) and Olson (1963).
Overall, the political variables fail to perform as well in the models for trade and
investment, contrary to the findings of previous results and contrary to the theoretical
arguments presented.  Only the level of democracy, the presence of a military regime, the
size of the military, the presence of leftist governments, and the end of the Cold War in
the investment models are statistically significant and in the direction hypothesized.
Surprisingly, involvement in either a civil or international war has no statistically
significant affect on the realization or provision of basic human needs.  In addition,
expenditures on the military seem to have no bearing on the regime's ability to provide
for subsistence rights.  A finding of no statistical significance, in either direction,
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conflicts with Benoit (1973), whose study finds a positive relationship and Rosh (1986),
Moon (1991) and Felice (1998) who find a negative relationship between military
expenditures and the realization of basic human needs.
The social and cultural variables, for the most part, do perform well in the model
of subsistence rights when trade and investment are included.   Contrary to the influence
of population on security rights, larger populations appear to have a positive influence on
the provision of subsistence rights.  This in part can be explained by a greater number of
people providing for the country’s basic needs.  Since the hypothesis was posited in the
negative direction, we must conclude that this result is not statistically significant.  The
direction of the variable measuring population growth is in the direction hypothesized for
all the models, but is only statistically significant in the investment models for non-
OECD countries (Model D).  According to the results, an increase of one unit in
population in non-OECD countries relates to a decrease in .09 in the level of subsistence
rights.
A legacy of British colonialism, once again, proves to have a deleterious effect on
a regime’s ability to provide for basic human needs, particularly in the investment
models.  Just as in the models for foreign assistance and subsistence rights, this variable
indicates that the British failed to disseminate the ability for the state to provide an
adequate level of subsistence although democratic norms appeared to have transferred to
the elites.  The findings here contradict those of Moon (1991) whose study found that the
British influence resulted in improvements in subsistence rights.  His study, however,
compared the influence of the British to that of French and Portuguese colonial heritage.
The remaining two social/cultural variables measure the presence of a state-dominated
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religion.  These two variables are both statistically significant and in the direction
hypothesized.  In addition, they are extremely influential in the provision or inability of a
state to provide basic human needs.  The presence of a Muslim-dominated government
decreases the level of subsistence rights by at least 10%.  The findings for the variables
measuring the influence of religion are consistent with that of Park (1987) and Moon
(1991).
The results from the multivariate analysis of both security and subsistence rights
suggest that higher levels of trade and investment, relative to GDP, translate into
improved human rights conditions, thus providing support for the neo-liberal hypothesis
posited.  The effect is more pronounced, or realized, in the area of subsistence rights.
This suggests that larger trade and investment relationships with the United States
benefits society at large.  The quality of life of individuals in states with higher levels of
trade and investment with the United States improves as a result of this relationship.  The
analysis also suggests that this benefit is only just beginning to be realized, as the United
States tends to trade and invest in countries with better human rights records.  Increasing
the portion of GDP from trade and investment in states with poor security and subsistence
rights records appears to be a policy worth pursuing.
Curvilinear Relationships
Just as in the case of foreign assistance, this research hypothesizes that there is not
just a simple linear relationship between trade and human rights or investment and human
rights, rather a curvilinear relationship exists between trade/investment and human rights.
While a full explication of this relationship is found in Chapter Four, a brief review is
offered here.  Dependency and neo-liberal theory provide divergent arguments regarding
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the consequences of such trade and investment.   In countries where there is little U.S.
economic penetration in terms of trade and investment, there is subsequently little
additional capital flowing into the country.  At such low levels, human rights conditions
may not be affected.  Dependency theory, however, suggests that elites within these types
of countries will actually suppress political opposition in order to provide a stable
environment designed to attract investment and international capital.
As U.S. firms become more entrenched in foreign markets, a dependent
relationship develops which prevents Third World countries from developing domestic
industries and markets, thus quality and standard of life suffers.  Accordingly, both
security and subsistence rights suffer from trade and investment relationships with the
U.S..  Neo-liberals, on the other hand, would argue that the diffusion of capital will
benefit all in society.  As foreign capital and goods penetrate society, both the standard
and quality of life improves.  In other words, with economic prosperity comes improved
political and civil rights.  Ultimately, neo-liberals view globalization, including trade and
investment, as a positive sum game where all citizens in the world can improve their
economic standing.
The security rights and subsistence rights models for non-OECD states from
Table 19 and Table 22 were replicated with the inclusion of a quadratic term for trade and
investment respectively.  The results are reported in Table 24.16    While all the
coefficients are statistically significant, save the investment variable in Model B, their
                                                          
16 The complete results of this analysis, including the control variables, is available in Appendix F.
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Table 24.  Curvilinear Analyses: U.S. Trade and Investment in Non-OECD States
(As a Percentage of GDP)
         Security Rights      Subsistence Rights
Independent Variable        Model A            Model B            Model C            Model D
Trade Openness t-1 -.008*    .337*
  (.004)     (.08)
Trade Openness Squared  .001*   -.003*    
                (.0001)      (.001)
Investment t-1      -.002     .11*
      (.004)       (.04)
Investment Squared    .0001*     -.002*
   (.0001)     (.001)
Joint F Test (X2)                           5.79##                   9.12#                24.33#                  8.16#               
Number of Cases   2174    1606    1733     1322
R2    .77     .78     .93       .92
Wald X2   619.05  976.09   1495.33    257.26
Probability > x2                             0.00                   0.00                    0.00                    0.00               
#  X2 < .05; ##  X2 < .10
* p < .05; ** p < .10
Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 19 and Table 22
joint significance is more important.  The results indicate that the joint F test also is
statistically significant in all four models. The null hypotheses that taken together, trade,
investment and the square of each, have no affect on security and subsistence rights can
be rejected.
In the original model, investment had a positive effect on security rights, however
the inclusion of the square of investment inverted the direction of the coefficient (Model
B).  The square of investment is in the positive direction, thus indicating a curvilinear
relationship.  The curvilinear relationship is better appreciated in Figure 15.  What is
most glaring is the effect of debt on human rights.  There are numerous examples in the
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Figure 15. Curvilinear Relationship Between U.S.
Investment and Security Rights
(Non-OECD States)
sample where the United States has either withdrawn its previous investment or where
the host state has incurred investment debt.17  This failed investment relationship has a
detrimental effect on security rights, specifically the process of getting out of that debt.
Perhaps in efforts to attract or maintain investment, host states engage in repressive
behavior in order to present a stable investment environment.  This, of course, supports
dependency theorists' accusations that multinational investment serves as a detriment to
human rights conditions.  As countries resume a positive investment relationship with the
U.S., however, an improvement in security rights is realized.  The greater the ratio of
                                                          
17 For example, in 1977, investment in the amount of $8540 million was withdrawn for Saudi Arabia, $834
million in Iran in 1976, $454 million from Bahrain in 1977, and $242 million from Angola in 1977.  In the
sample, the average amount of investment lost equates to $265 million.  This loss is the mean for 111
incidences of withdrawal of U.S. investment.
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U.S. investment to GDP, the more rapid improvement in security rights.  This supports
the neo-liberal view regarding the relationship between globalization and human rights,
specifically that increased levels of trade and investment leads to improvements in
economic and social conditions, including improvements in human rights conditions.
The case of trade and subsistence rights indicates a different relationship (Figure
16).   In this scenario, the coefficient for trade openness is positive while the squared term
possesses a negative coefficient.  Again, the presence of two different directions on the
coefficient suggests a curvilinear relationship.  The statistically significant joint F test
indicates that the null hypothesis can be rejected that taken together, trade openness and
the square of trade openness have no effect on subsistence rights.  The results indicate
that a shift from zero to approximately 60 in the level of trade openness can improve
subsistence rights by approximately 10 points.  However, there is a threshold to the
benefit of trade openness.  Once past approximately 60 on the trade to GDP ratio, a
country no longer realizes improvements in subsistence rights, in fact, subsistence rights
begin to suffer as a country becomes extremely dependent on the United States for trade.
Countries in the sample that have greater than 60% of GDP in U.S. trade include Belize,
Dominican Republic, Guyana, Honduras, Trinidad, Suriname, and North Yemen.
These results indicate that the relationship between human rights and U.S. trade
and investment is more complex than a linear model allows.  Contrary to the arguments
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Figure 16. Curvilinear Relationship Between U.S.
Trade and Subsistence Rights
(Non-OECD States)
presented by the dependency camp, in general, greater levels of investment are related to
an improved level of security rights.  This is offered with one caveat, the ill-effects of
recovering from investment debt.  Neo-liberal theories of globalization are further
supported by the results indicating that greater levels of trade are related to greater levels
of subsistence rights.  Yet, there is a point of diminishing returns as too heavy a reliance
on trade from the U.S. starts to inhibit the realization of basic human needs.  One
explanation is that the less developed countries' reliance on primary products for trade
prevents the development of industries that allow for human development in terms of
skilled labor and higher wages.  The next section of this chapter investigates whether
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trade and investment interacts with the level of democracy and the level of wealth in their
relationship with human rights.
Interaction Effects
The hypothesis that the effect of trade and investment on human rights is
moderated by either the level of democracy or wealth is addressed in this section of
Chapter Six.  Studies have indicated that democracy and wealth are significant factors in
the realization of human rights (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Mitchell
and McCormick 1988; McCormick and Mitchell 1997; Moon 1991).  Thus, we are
interested in determining whether there is a conditional relationship whereby trade and
investment have different impacts depending on the level of democracy and wealth.
While a complete discussion of the hypothesized relationships is offered in Chapter Four,
a brief recap is warranted.  Again, the level of democracy indicates the extent that
citizens can effectively participate in electing their officials and voicing their position on
policies.  At lower levels of democracy, local officials and the established elite have little
incentive to divert the economic benefits from trade and investment to those most in
need.  In addition, dependency theory suggests that these same elites will suppress
opposition to reforms and policies that threaten their position.  At higher levels of
democracy, dependency critics suggest that this mode of behavior is only increased as
elites perceive their position slipping and act to preserve their status.  Neo-liberals on the
other hand, suggest that with an increase in the level of democracy comes greater citizen
participation in policy decisions, in this case economic policy.
The level of wealth is also hypothesized to make a difference in the relationship
between human rights and U.S. trade and investment.  Subsistence needs preoccupy the
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daily lives of those living in the poorest of poor countries.  The introduction of trade and
investment dollars may slightly improve the level of subsistence, but may not affect
security rights as the elites fail to perceive those in poverty as viable political adversaries.
As the level of wealth increases, however, dependency theory indicates that the emerging
middle class serves as a threat to the leadership of the state and increased repression will
ensue.  The influx of trade and investment may actually improve subsistence rights due to
the benefits associated with increases in capital within the state.  Neo-liberals maintain
their positive sum arguments regarding the realization of political and economic rights
from the influx of foreign capital.  Thus, countries with increasing levels of wealth will
only benefit from trade and investment relationships with the U.S..
In order to determine whether this type of relationship is significant, an
interaction model is offered with democracy as the moderating variable.  Two different
interaction terms are created for this analysis.  The first interaction term considers the
relationship between trade (and investment) and democracy.  The second interaction term
investigates the relationship between trade (and investment) and wealth.  Thus, the
original equation for human rights has been changed from:
 Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3-bk(Remaining Control Variables)  + e
to
Y = a + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X1X2  + b4-bk(Remaining Control Variables)  + e
where X1 represents trade/investment and b1 is its coefficient, X2 represents
democracy/wealth and b2 is its coefficient, and X1X2 represents the interaction term with
b3 as its coefficient.
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Trade, Investment, and the Level of Democracy
Table 25 displays the results of the interaction between the two factors of
globalization and democracy and their combined effect on human rights.  Once again,
only the variables of interest are displayed, however the full results are available in
Appendix F.   In every case, except Model C, the original trade or investment coefficient
is no longer statistically significant.  The democracy variable remains statistically
significant in each model, while the interaction term is only statistically significant in
Model D, investment and subsistence rights.  The lack of statistical significance on these
coefficients is due, in part, to the high degree of multicollinearity between the variables.18
This high degree of multicollinearity makes the results of the joint F test all that more
important.19  In all four models, the joint F test is statistically significant, suggesting the
presence of an interaction effect in all four models.
The strength of the interaction effect is calculated by taking the difference of the
square multiple correlations.  Using the investment and security rights model (Model B)
as an example, the R2 for the main-effects model is .7710, while the R2 for the interaction
model is .7897.  The difference (.7897-.7710) equates to a 1.87% increase in the variance
explained in security rights.  The remaining models exhibit a comparable size effect.   Of
                                                          
18 The correlation between trade and the interaction between trade and democracy is .70, while the
equivalent correlation for investment is .62.
19 A reminder here that in the analyses of interaction effects, the statistical significance of the variables of
interest is no longer the primary concern considering the effects of multicollinearity.  The statistically
significant joint F test indicates that the variables, taken together, are statistically significant in explaining
the variation in the dependent variable.  Thus, the coefficients are used in the explanation of the substantive
results since the joint F test signals their statistical significance, not the p-value traditionally used.
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Table 25.  Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models
U.S. Trade, Investment and Level of Democracy
         Security Rights      Subsistence Rights
Independent Variable        Model A            Model B            Model C            Model D
Trade Openness t-1 .000001    .12*
  (.003)     (.06)
Democracy  .07*    .67*    
                (.01)      (.16)
Trade x Democracy -.0003      .02
   (.002)       (.01)
Investment t-1    .    .005      -.05
      (.003)     (.04)
Democracy     .05*    .67*
      (.01)     (.15)
Investment x Democracy   -.00005    .04*
      (.001)     (.01)
Joint F Test (X2)                           61.73#                   50.96#              43.29#                 57.57#               
Number of Cases 2174     1604   1733    1322
R2 .77      .79    .93     .92
Wald X2            693.01   951.19  1955.99   260.31
Probability > x2                           0.00                       0.00                  0.00                    0.00                
# X2   < .05
* p < .05; ** p < .10
Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 19 and Table 22
more interest, however, is the actual substantive results of the interaction terms.  The
nature of the interaction term is determined with democracy serving as the moderating
variable.
Initially, we could conclude from Table 25 that while trade and democracy benefit
security rights, their combined effect dampens or inhibits any gains for countries on the
path to greater levels of democracy.  However, the substantive impact is negligible in the
investment example, as the change in security rights is measured at the thousandth
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decimal point.   In addition, the t scores for the individual slopes are not statistically
significant at any level of democracy.   Thus, while at first glance, the interaction of trade
and democracy appeared to have a negative effect on security rights, the substantive
evidence does not support any claim that human rights are being negatively affected by
trade and investment, even at lower levels of democracy. Once again, this provides
support for the neo-liberal perspective.
The interaction effect on subsistence rights, however, suggests a very different
relationship.  The interaction of both trade and investment with democracy has a positive
effect on subsistence rights (Table 25, Model C and Model D).  Various levels of
democracy are used in order to determine the varying effect of trade and investment on
security rights and subsistence rights.  A value of two was chosen as it is representative
of countries experiencing low levels of democracy.  The mean level of democracy for
countries experiencing the worst living conditions (less than 30 on the PQLI) is 2.48.  A
value of four was chosen as it is the mean value of democracy for the entire sample.
Lastly, the value of ten was chosen to represent the countries with the highest level of
democracy.  The mean value of OECD states in the sample is 9.87.
The coefficients (b3), standard errors (SE), and t statistics for the relationship
between trade, democracy, and subsistence rights for the three different scenarios are
displayed in Table 26.  In non-OECD states, the results suggests that the more democratic




Table 26.  Interaction Analyses:  
Trade, Democracy and Subsistence Rights 
(Non-OECD States) 
 
    Level of Democracy    b3   SE     t   
 
 Low (2)   .16  .059  2.71 
 
 Medium (4)   .20  .049  4.08 
 




of democracy, increases in the trade to GDP ratio are more beneficial than trade is to
countries at lower levels of democracy.  All of the t statistics are statistically significant,
indicating that all of the slopes differ from zero.  At the lowest level of democracy (2),
each one percent increase in trade openness translates into an increase of an additional
.16 on the subsistence rights scale.  This benefit is in addition to the benefit from trade
alone and the benefit from democracy.  At high levels of democracy (10), each one
percent increase in trade openness equates to an increase of an additional .32.  The effect
doubles as one moves from the lowest to the highest levels of democracy.
Figure 17 provides a graphical illustration of this positive relationship.20  The
statistical and substantive evidence is supportive of the neo-liberal position.  In other
words, the results suggest that as the level of democracy increases (those characteristics
of democracy such as greater citizen participation and the realization on the part of
democratically elected leaders that their power is in jeopardy if the majority of the
population are not satisfied with the economic and political conditions within the state)
                                                          
20 The pattern for investment mirrors the pattern exhibited in Figure 19 and thus is not replicated.
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this leads to an increased tendency for states to provide higher levels of basic human
needs.
Trade, Investment and the Level of Domestic Wealth
The second interaction effect that is hypothesized in this study is the relationship
between trade/investment and wealth and their combined effect on security and
subsistence rights.  Table 27 presents the four models with Model A and Model B
reflecting the interaction relationship between security rights and either trade or
investment and Model C and Model D representing the interaction between these two
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Table 27.  Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models
U.S. Trade, Investment, and Level of Wealth
         Security Rights      Subsistence Rights
Independent Variable        Model A            Model B            Model C            Model D
Trade Openness t-1 -.0036**     .35*
  (.002)     (.05)
Wealth  .008    2.53*    
                (.01)      (.17)
Trade x Wealth  .001*      -.05*
   (.002)       (.01)
Investment t-1    .    .007**       .09*
      (.004)     (.04)
Wealth     .03*    1.99*
      (.01)     (.17)
Investment x Wealth   -.001     -.004
      (.001)     (.01)
Joint F Test (X2)                           11.12#                   16.39#              235.77#               200.93#            
Number of Cases 2174     1604   1733    1322
R2 .77      .78    .92     .92
Wald X2            648.91   877.55  3203.90   256.10
Probability > x2                           0.00                       0.00                  0.00                    0.00                
#  X2 < .05
* p < .05; ** p < .10
Note: Control variables are the same as in Table 19 and Table 22
economic variables and wealth and their effect on subsistence rights.  Only the variables
of interest are presented, however the complete results are available in Appendix G.   All
of the original trade and investment variables are statistically significant in the direction
from the original main-effects models.  The joint F test is statistically significant,
indicating that there is indeed the presence of an interaction effect between trade and
wealth as well as between investment and wealth.
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 Table 28 provides the substantive results of the analysis.  The nature of the
interaction term is determined by wealth as the moderating variable.  Three different
values of wealth, as measured by per capita GDP, were selected and are listed in the first
column of Table 28.  The three levels represent the mean value of wealth for countries
with the worst human rights records, the mean value of wealth in the sample,
 
 
Table 28.  Interaction Analyses:  
Trade, Wealth and Subsistence Rights 
(Non-OECD States) 
 
          Level of Wealth    b3   SE     t   
 
Low (2.14)   .237  .044  5.39 
 
Medium (3.85)   .145  .045  3.22 
 




and the average level of wealth in the industrialized states.  The coefficients, standard
errors and t statistics are presented for each scenario in columns two, three and four.
These results indicate that at higher rates of per capita GDP, increases in trade
have a deleterious effect on subsistence rights in non-OECD countries. All of the t scores
are statistically significant which indicates that all of the slopes are different from zero.
This relationship becomes more evident from a graphical representation which is offered
in Figure 18.  These results are very different than the previous analysis where the
relationship between trade and subsistence rights was enhanced at higher levels of
democracy.  In this case, it appears that the negative effect of the interaction term
dampens the combined positive effect that trade and wealth have independently.
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At first glance, these results are puzzling and seem to defy the neo-liberal position.  The
results are also puzzling in that overall trade, as well as investment, has demonstrated a
positive relationship.  How then, can the combination of trade and higher levels of wealth
negatively affect subsistence rights?  One plausible explanation is that countries with
higher levels of wealth also have higher levels of economic inequality.  One measure of
such economic inequality is the GINI index (Deninger and Squire 1996).  A correlation
test reveals that there is a negative correlation between wealth and equality (-23. p < .05
for 448 observations).  The GINI index was not included in the model, given the limited
number of observations.   Economic inequality, or gap between the rich and poor within a
state, speaks directly to subsistence rights.  Economic inequality implies a gap between
health and nutrition, as well as education.   Lastly, the wealthiest of the non-OECD
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countries tend to be the oil producing states of the Middle East where the gap between the
wealthy and poor is staggering.  In addition, the differences in treatment of women in
these states also directly affects subsistence rights.
Conclusion
The analysis in this chapter indicates that economic factors of globalization, on
the whole, benefit the human condition.  This is particularly the case in the area of
subsistence rights.  The results further suggest that trade is far more effective in
accomplishing this goal than investment.  However, investment is a far more consistent
influence in that it is statistically significant in every model.   In addition, there is a
curvilinear relationship between factors of globalization and human rights.  Lastly, this
analysis demonstrates that both democracy and wealth serve as moderating factors
influencing the relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and investment.  The
following chapter offers an integrated model that incorporates all four types of U.S.
economic influence: economic aid, military aid, trade, and investment.   In tandem, do
these variables exhibit the same influence on security and subsistence rights?  Lastly, the
policy implications are addressed in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
INTEGRATED MODELS AND CONCLUSION
Introduction
This final chapter provides an examination of the combined effect of U.S. foreign
aid, trade, and investment on security and subsistence rights.  All of the variables of
interest, along with the control variables, are integrated into one model for each
dependent variable.   This analysis will shed light on how various types of economic
relationships with the United States simultaneously affect human rights.  Specifically,
this analysis offers a comparison between the effect of government funds, that is foreign
assistance, and private funds or trade and investment.  In other words, is government
intervention or the power of the free market better suited for addressing human rights
conditions?  Furthermore, this chapter offers a summation of  all the previous analyses
and places it within the context of American foreign policy.  In other words, given the
results, an examination of how U.S. foreign policy might proceed in the area of human
rights is offered.  The chapter closes with suggestions and directions for further research.
Multivariate Analysis
Security Rights
The results from the multivariate analysis on the relationship between security
rights and aid, trade, and investment relationships with the United States are reported in
Table 29.  The first model, Model A, represents the analysis for all countries in the
sample and Model B is the analysis for non-OECD countries.  The chi-square statistic
signifies that the probability that these particular models occurred by chance is zero in
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Table 29 Multivariate Analyses: Security Rights Integrated Model
Aid, Trade, and Investment
                      All Countries                    Non-OECD
Independent Variable                Model A                                         Model B                  
Constant   6.32   (.22)*    7.42      (.27)*
U.S. FACTORS
Economic Aid t-3   -.03    (.01)*      -.04      (.01)*
Military Aid t-3   -.05    (.02)*     -.03      (.03)
Trade Openness t-1   -.003  (.002)     -.0003  (.002)
Investment  t-1    .006  (.003)**      .002    (.004)
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS
Economic Standing    .05    (.005)*      .02      (.008)*
Economic Growth#   -.08    (.11)     -.06      (11)
POLITICAL FACTORS
Democracy    .08     (.007)*      .06      (.007)*
Leftist Government#    .34     (.10)*      .34      (.11)*
Military Government   -.11     (.07)**     -.12      (.07)**
Civil War   -.98     (.12)*     -.96      (.12)*
International War   -.25     (.10)*     -.35      (.12)*
Post-Cold War   -.29     (.05)*     -.27      (.05)*
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS
Population   -.20     (.014)*     -.27      (.02)*
Population Change    -.0002 (.003)     -.005    (.003)
British Influence                                         .35     (.05)*                                   .35      (.05)*
Number of Cases                                   1734            1396
R2            .83                .80
Wald X2    1057.79         886.33
Probability > X2                                                0.00                                               0.00                      
#  two-tailed test
* p < .05; ** p < .10
one hundred.  The R2 indicates that 83% (Model A) and 80% (Model B) of the variation
in the dependent variable is explained by the variations in the independent variables.1
                                                          
1 The countries of Panama and the Bahamas were removed due to their extreme reliance on the United
States for trade and investment.  Familiar countries presented themselves as outliers (Somalia,
Mozambique, El Salvador, Bahrain, and Costa Rica), however removing them from the sample did not alter
the statistical or substantive results.
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The empirical results of the variables of interest are generally reflective of the
earlier analyses in Chapter Five and Chapter Six.   Economic and military aid are
statistically significant and in the negative direction as previously reported, however
military aid is not statistically significant in the model for non-OECD states.   According
to the findings in Table 29, higher percentages of aid relative to GDP are related to lower
levels of security rights.  In Model A, the analysis for the entire sample, a one percent
increase in economic aid relative to GDP translates into a decrease of .03 index points in
security rights, while the same increase in military aid equates to a decrease in .05 index
points in security rights.  These results support the critics and dependency perspective
regarding the negative effects of governmental intervention in the form of foreign
assistance.  The negative arguments presented regarding the relationship between the
allocation and distribution of foreign aid and the recipient state’s domestic conditions are
confirmed in this study.
Turning to the economic globalization variables, trade openness remains in the
negative direction and is still not statistically significant, just as in previous models of
security rights.  Investment as a percentage of GDP is in the positive direction and is
statistically significant, albeit at the .10 level.  According to the empirical results, a 1
percent increase in investment, relative to GDP, translates into an increase of .01 in the
level of security rights when all countries are considered.  The correlation between trade
openness and investment as a percentage of GDP in the sample is .5974.  Considering
this high level of correlation and the fact that in previous models investment was
statistically significant, trade and investment were removed in succession from the
analysis to determine if the multicollinearity between the two was affecting the results.
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When trade openness was included rather than investment, both foreign aid variables
remained statistically significant and maintained their same coefficients.  Trade openness
was not statistically significant, but remained in the negative direction.  When only non-
OECD countries were included in the analysis, military aid becomes statistically
significant at the .10 level, however trade openness is still not statistically significant.
The analysis was replicated with the inclusion of investment rather than trade.  Again, the
military aid variable becomes statistically significant, but the investment variable does
not.  This holds for both samples.2   In Model B, the analysis for non-OECD states, the
only variable of interest that is statistically significant is economic aid.  Unlike the
models in the previous chapter, when combined with foreign assistance, trade and
investment do not significantly affect security rights.
All of the remaining control variables in both models are statistically significant
except for economic growth and change in population.  This, too, is consistent with the
previous models where neither of these two variables is found to be an important factor in
contributing to the realization of security rights.  The wealth of the citizenry remains an
important factor in the determination of security rights.  All of the political variables
perform well in the integrated model for security rights, with the presence of conflict,
both civil and international, having a very strong effect.  The variables measuring the end
of the Cold War confirms the analysis by Milner (1998).  The post-Cold War era has
witnessed a decrease in the level of security rights.  It appears that the wave of
                                                          
2 An additional analysis was conducted including an interaction term for the combined effect of trade and
population given the results in Chapter 6.  The trade variable becomes positive, but still statistically
insignificant.   However, the joint F test indicates the presence of an interaction term.  These findings are
consistent with the findings in the previous chapter.
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democratization unleashed at the end of the Cold War led to increased political and
ethnical tension which led elites, in turn, to use repressive measures to maintain power.
Regime type remains a significant factor as well.  Higher levels of democracy and leftist
states are both positively related to higher levels of security rights.  Military regimes, on
the other hand, have a detrimental effect on the realization of security rights.
In summarizing the relationship between security rights and U.S. aid, trade, and
investment, the combined results in Model B suggest that, overall, foreign assistance and
economic policy may not be the best approaches to altering poor human rights practices
in recipient states in the area of security rights.  For example, if the objective is truly
improving security rights conditions in non-OECD states, then appropriating and
allocating foreign assistance is not a recommended policy as there is a negative
correlation between the two.  Likewise, aid due to donor or national security interests
should be allocated with the knowledge of its deleterious effects.  While the United
States, as well as most states, must juggle national security interests with other types of
“low politics,” in the absence of the ideological battle characteristic of the Cold War era,
there seems to be little justification for the former abusing the latter. Thus, we can
confidently suggest that the road to hell, human rights hell, is paved with good intentions
regarding foreign assistance.  That is, in spite of political rhetoric and perhaps even
sincere intentions on the part of policymakers, the use of foreign aid has been
demonstrated to have deleterious effects on security rights.  Suggestions that aid is being
allocated for the improvement of human rights simply is not supported by any evidence
in this study.
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On the other hand, while the results from trade and investment are generally in the
positive direction, the lack of consistent statistical evidence suggests that security rights
are not dramatically improved by increased trade and investment relationships.  We can
conclude, however, that trade and investment fail to have the negative effect on security
rights in less developed countries that critics of globalization suggest.3  Thus, it appears
that national economic policies can be pursued without bringing harm, in terms of
security rights, to the citizens in the states that have significant trade and investment
relationships with the United States.
Subsistence Rights
The relationship between subsistence rights and U.S. aid, trade, and investment is
investigated and the results are displayed in Table 30.  Similar to the previous table, the
independent variables are separated into U.S. factors, domestic economic factors,
political factors, and finally, social and/or cultural factors.  Model A is the analysis for
the entire sample, while Model B is the analysis when only non-OECD states are
considered.  The variation of the independent variables explain 94% and 95% of the
variance in the dependent variable for each respective model.  The chi-square statistic
indicates that the probability that these models occurred by chance is slightly above zero
in one hundred.4
                                                          
3 Although there is a negative coefficient regarding trade and security rights, the results were not
statistically significant.  In addition, the inclusion of the variable for level of population influences the
direction of the trade variable.  This relationship deserves additional research.
4 Just as in the security rights model, Panama and the Bahamas were removed due to their high trade and
investment to GDP ratio with the United States.   The countries of Guyana, Mozambique, and Liberia were
revealed as possible outliers utilizing a Dfbeta  test.  However, removing these countries did not alter the
results and due to the lack of any theoretical grounds, these countries were kept in the sample.
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Table 30.  Multivariate Analysis: Subsistence Rights Integrated Models
Aid, Trade, and Investment
        
          All Countries                   Non-OECD
Independent Variable                  Model A                                      Model B                 
Constant   56.60       (6.60)*  48.47        (6.60)*
U.S. FACTORS
Economic Aid t-3      -.65       (.15)*    -.45         (.13)*
Military Aid t-3                   1.15      (.24)*      .62        (.24)*
Trade Openness t-1        .21      (.04)*                   .21        (.04)*
Investment  t-1        .11      (.04)*                   .11        (.05)*
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS
Economic Standing      1.01      (.06)*     1.55        (.14)*
Economic Growth#     -1.47      (.79)**   -1.49        (.91)**
POLITICAL FACTORS
Democracy      1.12      (.17)*      .97        (.16)*
Leftist Government#     -7.57      (1.51)*   -6.30        (1.18)*
Military Government     -5.60      (.98)*   -6.00        (.99)*
Military Expenditures         .02     (.05)                   .01        (.04)
Military Personnel         .002   (.001)*      .00003  (.0001)
Civil War      -1.81     (.94)**   -1.62        (.96)**
International War        -.42     (.63)     -.50        (.92)
Post-Cold War#       1.24     (.65)**    2.197      (.92)*
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS
Population         .13     (.40)      .65        (.40)**
Population Change         -.04     (.03)     -.08        (.04)**
British Influence#       -1.44     (.67)*   -3.54        (.76)*
Muslim      -7.20     (1.88)*   -6.89        (1.59)*
Buddhist                                                        16.89    (2.27)*                         20.01       (2.09)*          
Number of Cases             1491           1166
R2                .94   95
Wald X2        2306.19    16218.70
Probability > X2                                                    0.00                                          0.00                       
#  two-tailed test
* p < .05; ** p < .10
Turning to the variables of interest, foreign aid, trade, and investment are all
statistically significant regardless of the country sample.  The directions of the
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coefficients are consistent with the results of the previous analyses on aid in Chapter Five
and trade and investment in Chapter Six.  Again, there is a dual affect of aid on
subsistence rights.  Economic aid, as previously found, is negatively associated with
subsistence rights.  Concentrating on the model of non-OECD states (Model B), a one
percent increase in economic aid as a percentage of GDP translates into a decrease of .45
in the level of subsistence rights.  The consistent negative performance of the economic
aid variable suggests that there are seemingly no long-term human rights benefits to the
allocation of economic aid.5
The results from the economic aid variable seem to be offset by the benefit of
military aid, which indicates that the level of subsistence rights improves by .62 with
each one percent higher level of military aid to GDP.  However, one should keep in mind
that, on average, the level of economic aid is much higher than the level of military aid,
as percentages of GDP, and more importantly that any positive benefit realized in the
area of subsistence rights from military aid is accompanied by extreme negative effects
on security rights.  Lastly, the analysis on military aid and subsistence rights in Chapter
Six indicated that there was a threshold effect to the benefits of military aid.   This
curvilinear effect remains consistent in the integrated model.
The results from the trade and investment variables in Table 29 are consistent
across the two models, indicating that a one percent increase in trade and investment,
relative to GDP, translates into an increase in subsistence rights by .21 and .11
respectively.  As demonstrated in the previous chapter, trade continues to maintain a
                                                          
5 This research cannot make a conclusion regarding emergency humanitarian aid for such natural disasters
as earthquakes or flooding.
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stronger influence on the realization of subsistence rights than investment, in this case
almost twice the influence.  Contrary to the prospect of U.S. government funding
improving human rights conditions, the potential for improvements in basic human needs
from trade and investment appear boundless, save any government intervention to
obstruct such relationships.  American businesses, as well as politicians interested in
continuing the pattern of American prosperity, can forge ahead with these seemingly self-
interested motivations as their economic gain also serves to benefit citizens in other
states.  The assertion by Pritchard (1989, 1) that there is a “tenet of faith among
politicians, financiers, and academicians” that “economic development enhances human
rights conditions” isn’t simply a prayer or a leap of faith, but rather a substantiated
reality.
The interaction analysis unveiled, however, an interesting caveat regarding the
relationship between trade and subsistence rights depending on the level of wealth in the
recipient state.  The consequence of high levels of wealth, many argue, is not all good.
Societies experiencing high levels of wealth, particularly non-OECD states, also
experience a great deal of economic inequality.  In such countries, higher levels of trade
do not alleviate poor living conditions among the majority of the citizens.  Overall,
however, these results indicate that the relationship between external economic factors
such as trade and investment is associated with enhanced human rights conditions.  Thus,
not only is domestic wealth or economic development important, but the international
community, in its pursuit of economic prosperity, can generate a human rights by-product
– improved standards of living or subsistence rights among non-OECD states.
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In the integrated model for subsistence rights, the control variables also perform
better than in the separate models of subsistence rights reported in Chapter Five and
Chapter Six.    For example, economic growth is statistically significant at the .10 level
and in the direction posited by Olson (1963) and Gurr (1968).  According to these results,
greater rates of economic growth lead to lower levels of subsistence rights.  Thus, all the
economic variables in both models are important and statistically significant factors in the
realization of subsistence rights.
As for the political factors, all of the variables are statistically significant except
for the level of military expenditures and the presence of an international war.  Regime
type is extremely important in the provision of basic human needs with leftist and
military governments proving to be incapable of providing citizens with adequate levels
of subsistence.   On the other hand, countries that are the most democratic (10 on the
Polity III scale) realize an improvement of approximately 10 points on the physical
quality of life index.  Other political variables perform in the direction predicted.  As
expected, the presence of a civil war is detrimental to the state’s ability to provide basic
human needs.  However, the end of the Cold War has led to an increase in the realization
of subsistence rights.
The remaining variables reflect various social and cultural factors within a
society.  The variables measuring population and population growth are only statistically
significant in Model B, the analysis for non-OECD states.  In that model, countries
characterized by larger populations are more likely to have higher levels of subsistence
rights, contrary to the hypothesis.  Population growth, on the other hand, is in the
hypothesized direction indicating that greater rates of population growth are detrimental
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to a state’s ability to provide for basic human needs.   The legacy of British colonialism
remains a negative influence on the provision of subsistence rights.  As previously
mentioned, this may be due in part to the fact that while the British were able to instill
democratic norms that are important in the realization of security rights, they were unable
to transfer an ability to provide for the subsistence needs of the citizenry. The influence
of a state-dominated religion is remarkable.  Those states characterized as Muslim suffer
approximately 7 points on the subsistence rights scale, while states that are
predominantly Buddhist receive between almost 17 and 20 points on the scale.
In order to appreciate these results in a substantive manner, several examples used
in previous chapters are replicated in Table 31.6    U.S. governmental interference in the
case of economic aid proves, statistically and substantively, to be detrimental to
subsistence rights.  For example, the countries with the worst security rights and those
countries suffering the worst living conditions experience a decrease in the level of
subsistence of .42 and .84 respectively.  For countries with an even greater reliance on
U.S. aid, such as Country C and Country D, the level of subsistence is decreased by 3.32
and 2.13 index points respectively.  While military aid demonstrates a positive
relationship with subsistence rights, one must recall that the effect on security rights is
even more devastating and makes the trade-off between the effect on subsistence rights
and the effect on security rights unacceptable.  This is particularly the case when
alternative means of improving subsistence rights are available – mainly the private
marketplace.
                                                          
6 Given the lack of statistical results for the security rights model, except for the economic aid variable, the
results were not transformed into any substantive examples.
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Table 31.  Substantive Results of Aid, Trade, and Investment on Subsistence Rights 
  
                    Effect on:  
        Mean Values                 Subsistence Rights 
Country   Economic   Military   Trade    DFI          Economic     Military     Trade     DFI 
        Aid           Aid                Aid (-.45)     Aid (.62)  (.21)      (.11)  
    
Worst Records #     .94            .18        7.65      2.78         -.42          .11       1.61    .31 
 
Worst Living  
Conditions ##        1.87           .17         4.52      1.75         -.84          .11         .95     .19 
 
Country A              1.33          .12       22.08    20.55         -.59          .07       4.63      2.26 
 (Client-States) 
 
Country B              3.77         5.18       14.05     2.65       -1.70        3.21       2.96    .29 
 (Allied State) 
 
Country C              7.37         2.01        4.11       .36       -3.32        1.25         .86    .04  
 (African State) 
 
Country D              4.74           .48       15.87   28.92       -2.13            .30       3.33      3.18 
 (Investment Dominant)           
 
#   Countries with a security ranking of 1 and 2 
## Countries with a PQLI less than 40  
 
The substantive effects of trade and investment on subsistence rights are
presented in the last two columns of Table 31.  These substantive results illustrate the
statistical results, specifically that the path to improved subsistence rights is primarily
through the private sector in the form of trade and investment.  In this case, the self-
motivated intentions of American businesses and firms, as well as the U.S. government,
are positively associated with higher levels of subsistence rights.  The example of the
client-states, Country A,  ealize a combined effect of almost 7 points on the physical
quality of life index due to increased levels of globalization.  At the same time, this
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benefit is not undermined by any perceptible ill effects that trade and investment have on
security rights.  Thus, governmental interference in the marketplace would seem to
indirectly inhibit or prevent the positive effects of trade and investment on subsistence
rights, as well as security rights.
Summary of Results and the Effect on American Foreign Policy
This research set out to accomplish several objectives.  The first objective was to
embark on an investigation of a little studied phenomenon – the consequences of
American foreign assistance and economic policy in relation to human rights.  The
empirical analyses in Chapter Five, Chapter Six, and in the present chapter have led to
several basic conclusions regarding the relationship between human rights and varying
levels of U.S. aid, trade, and investment in recipient states. First, the source, or type, of
dollars flowing into non-OECD states seems to matter.  The empirical results indicate
that there are, indeed, dire as well as beneficial consequences of such policies.  The dire
consequences stem from the U.S. foreign assistance program.  Over and over, the
empirical results indicate that human rights conditions are negatively affected by
economic and military aid from the United States.  Although military aid is positively
associated with the realization of basic human needs, the ill-effect on security rights
negates military aid has a preferable means of improving the standard of living of citizens
around the world.
The recent $1.6 billion foreign assistance program to Colombia, which most
human rights activists oppose, would seem to be a bad human rights policy on the part of
the United States.  As a policy of national security, the likelihood for curbing the
trafficking and supply of drugs into the United States is suspect.  Congressman Ramstad
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pointed out previous failures at attacking the domestic drug problem at its source: “over
the last 10 years…the Federal Government has spent $150 million to combat the supply
of illegal drugs. Yet the cocaine market is glutted, as always, and heroin is readily
available at record high purities…Our drug eradication and interdiction efforts have also
been costly failure” (Ramstad 2000).
The relationship between human rights and U.S. trade and investment, however,
is more promising.  Positive consequences, particularly in the case of subsistence rights,
bode well for the future as the trend of economic globalization is not likely to reverse.
While critics of globalization push for “fair trade” rather than free trade, the results
suggest that the quality of life for those currently suffering in substandard living
conditions can be improved by greater levels of trade and investment.  The PNTR debates
where China is concerned will undoubtedly continue as certain lawmakers strive to limit
trade due to poor human rights records.  These results, however, suggest that isolating
human rights violators from participating in the international economy may not be the
best approach to solving their human rights conditions.  These results cannot speak
directly to the effects of economic sanctions or other means of what Donnelly refers to as
“positive non-intervention”; however, obstructing the flow of trade and investment into
less developed countries seems to be a lost opportunity to improve the lot of the majority
of the citizens within a state.
In summary, dollars in the form of U.S. foreign assistance have a very different
relationship with human rights conditions than dollars in the form of U.S. trade and
investment. According to this research, the most effective means of accomplishing
improved human rights is through the private sector in the form of trade and investment.
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Thus, the U.S. government should refrain from manipulating the market in the name of
human rights, as this research has demonstrated that states with a healthy trade and
investment relationship with the United States exhibit higher levels of human rights
conditions, or at least these relationships fail to harm conditions.
Second, it was suggested that focusing on the United States was important and the
evidence bears this out.  Levels of U.S. aid, trade, and investment matter and the role of
the United States in the increasing globalization of the international economy as well as
its perceived political leadership, at least among democratic states, suggests that its power
and influence in the international system will only continue.  Third, the development of
two separate models was fruitful in that the evidence indicates that U.S. influence on
human rights is not one-dimensional.  That is, the United States should broaden its focus
beyond security rights to include on an equal footing economic or subsistence rights.
While security rights violations capture the attention of governments, NGOs, IGOs, and
especially the media, the plight of a larger number of the world’s citizenry is affected by
poor levels of subsistence rights.
Fourth, the inclusion of key independent variables provided a more complete
picture of the various economic, political, and social factors relevant to the realization of
human rights.  Previous studies have not included the post-Cold War era, mainly due to
the lack of data and the timing of the research.  The results indicate that with
democratization comes the potential for political unrest and subsequent repression.  In
terms of subsistence rights, however, the end of the Cold War has allowed for
improvements in the provision of basic human needs.  This may be a function of previous
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socialist states opening up to international markets and the infusion of capital and goods
which serve to improve levels of subsistence.
Additional variables were posited with competing hypotheses.  For example, the
models indicated, leftist (or socialist) regimes were incapable of providing basic human
needs and their inward economic focus may be to blame.  However, they were not as
likely to abuse the security rights of its citizens contrary to the theory supplied by Jeanne
Kirkpatrick (1979).  Economic growth failed to be a factor in the majority of the models
and leads to the conclusion that there is little, if any, empirical evidence that rapid
economic growth has any affect on human rights conditions.  Lastly, the legacy of British
colonialism has led to two opposing outcomes.  First, the results indicate that the former
British colonies experience higher levels of respect for security rights.  Second, the
British failed to transfer the ability or knowledge of how to go about providing the basic
needs for the majority of the citizens.
Lastly, the target of human rights abuse, or the type of human rights, makes a
difference.
U.S. foreign policy probably could not, and almost certainly should
not, concern itself with the performance of other governments in
honoring every one of these internationally recognized human rights.
The policy must in practice assign priority to some rights over others.
It is not entirely clear so far either which rights are receiving priority
or which rights ought to receive primacy in U.S. foreign policy….
the so-called “economic rights,” which I shall call subsistence
rights, ought to be among those that receive priority” (Shue 1980, 5)
The evidence from this research confirms the position posited by Shue (1980).  While the
United States has traditionally focused on security rights in their linkage to foreign
policy, the United States has a far better opportunity to improve the level of subsistence
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rights in other states.  In turn, the improvement of such basic human needs should factor
into the improvement of security rights.  In fact, security rights and subsistence rights are
positively correlated with one another, indicating that higher levels of subsistence rights
are associated with higher levels of security rights (Milner, Poe and Leblang 1999).7
Further analysis will have to be undertaken in order to adequately investigate the nature
of the relationship between the two, however, it seems quite intuitive that these two rights
are interrelated, or what Donnelly (1989) refers to as “interdependent.”  Thus,
improvement in one subset of rights should equate to improvements in the other.
Further Research and Conclusion
This study has addressed the relationship between human rights conditions and
U.S. aid, trade, and investment.  In doing so, paths for further research were uncovered.
First, while focusing on the United States is important and was of primary interest for this
research, future research needs to examine the role of other industrialized states and the
influence of aid, trade, and investment from those states.   In the area of foreign
assistance, additional studies should examine the differences between bilateral and
multilateral trade as the motives for bilateral foreign assistance appear to obfuscate the
original purpose of the assistance.
In terms of globalization, future research should attempt to flush out the role of
population size in the trade and human rights relationship. In addition, the role of finance
capital, as another component of economic globalization, should be investigated to
determine if decisions and/or loans from the IMF or World Bank contribute to human
                                                          
7 The correlation between security rights and subsistence rights in the entire sample is .37 (p < .05) and .21
(p < .05) for non-OECD states.
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rights conditions.  The role of other facets of globalization,  increased communication
and technology for example, are also bound to play a role in the realization of human
rights and should be considered in future research on human rights.
In the area of foreign policy, there is a need for research on the role of strategic
concerns, particularly as they apply to donor interest or donor intent.  This type of
investigation could address the exact nature of the trade-off between national security
needs and human rights.  Lastly, future research should continue to focus on the wide
range of human rights as it relates to foreign policy.  The United States funds many
development programs, such as those through the U.S. Agency for International
Development as well as food and health programs.  The effect of this type of assistance
needs to be investigated.
The question posed by this research sought to discover whether the intentions or
rhetoric of policymakers were valid when it comes to human rights.   Does the allocation
of foreign assistance improve human rights conditions?  Will the lives of citizens in
Colombia improve as a result of the $1.6 billion foreign aid package?  Does trade actually
bring improvements to the quality and standard of life?  Will trade with China bring
democracy and improved levels of subsistence?  The philosophy of Adam Smith, writing
over 200 years ago, seems to be relevant to this study.
The uniform, constant and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his
condition, the principle from which public and national, as well as private
opulence is originally derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the
natural progress of things toward improvement, in spite both of the extravagance
of government, and of the greatest errors of administration. Like the unknown
principle of animal life, it frequently restores health and vigour to the constitution,
in spite, not only of the disease, but of the absurd prescriptions of the doctor
(Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book II Chapter III).
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According to Smith, the market will provide, naturally, for improvement, even in the face
of government forays into the economy.  There is a great deal of irony in that government
intervention for the purpose of human rights appears more harmful than the selfish
motives of free enterprise and its subsequent influence on human rights conditions.  It
seems that it is more appropriate to say to hell with the good intentions of governments,
the path to human rights heaven is paved with free trade and investment.
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Appendix A.   Economic and Military Aid Distributed to OECD States
(in 1992 dollars; in millions)
Country    Year Economic Aid Military Aid
Austria      1978    .237837
Austria      1984   .1321229
Austria      1986  .1245847
Austria      1987   .1205914




Finland      1978    .237837
Finland      1986   .1245847
Finland      1987   .1205914


















Country    Year Economic Aid Military Aid
Spain      1978   14.03238 274.8206
Spain      1979    12.91317 302.334
Spain      1980   11.83204 212.8077
Spain      1981   11.18382 193.3423
Spain      1982   31.77113 183.4061
Spain      1983   16.58672 556.3461
Spain      1984   15.85474 532.4551
Spain      1985   15.31614 514.2394
Spain      1986   14.32724 479.9004
Spain      1987   6.029572 130.2387
Spain      1988    3.71652 2.78739
Spain      1989    2.33623
Spain      1990   2.025855
Spain      1991   1.539871
Spain      1992         .9
Spain      1993    .292062
Spain      1995   .0933633
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Appendix B.  Curvilinear Analyses:  
Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models for U.S. Aid 
(Non-OECD States) 
                   
                    Security Rights                      Subsistence Rights  
Independent Variable    Model A         Model B     Model C            Model D  
Constant     7.73 (.32)*      7.39 (.31)*          58.11 (7.61)*   50.80 (7.64)* 
 
U.S. FACTORS 
Economic Aid t-3    -.07 (.02)*      -1.16 (.31)* 
Economic Aid Squared     .003 (.002)*        .06 (.02)* 
Military Aid t-3               -.09 (.05)*     1.28 (.47)* 
Military Aid Squared                .003 (.004)     -.09 (.04)* 
       
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Economic Standing    .01 (.01)          .02 (.01)*    1.97 (.12)*   1.96 (.13)* 
Economic Growth    .03 (.09)          .01 (.09)     -.51 (1.28)  -.84 (1.40) 
 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
Democracy                 .07 (.01)*        .06 (.01)*      .85 (.13)*   .79 (.13)* 
Leftist Government    .16 (.10)          .19 (.10)**   -1.09 (1.01)  -.29 (1.02) 
Military Government   -.10 (.06)**    -.11 (.06)**   -4.16 (.85)*    -4.64 (.88)* 
Military Expenditures           .01 (.04)   .01 (.04) 
Military Personnel           .01 (.001)*   .005 (.001)* 
Civil War                -.95 (.12)*       -.96 (.11)*   -1.61 (.71)*    -1.88 (.69)* 
International War   -.31 (.09)*       -.29 (.09)*     -.78 (.95)  -.14 (.91) 
Post-Cold War                -.27 (.05)*       -.29 (.09)*     1.44 (.94)  1.57 (.94)** 
 
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS 
Population    -.28 (.02)*        .26 (.05)*      -.02 (.45)    .46 (.44) 
Population Change    .001 (.002) .001 (.002)      -.03 (.03)   -.03 (.03) 
British Influence    .27 (.04)* .25 (.04)*    -2.83 (1.14)*  -4.64 (1.12)* 
Buddhist          -2.77 (3.89)  4.62 (2.19)* 
Muslim         -10.61 (1.16)* -9.49 (1.24)* 
 
Number of Cases        1894   1894          1536                1536 
R2             .79       .79             .92         .92 
Wald X2      604.66  573.44                  1196.71   742.88 
Probability > x2         0.00      0.00           0.00       0.00 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .10 
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Appendix C.  Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models 
U.S. Aid and Democracy 
(Non-OECD States) 
                   
                  Security Rights           Subsistence Rights 
Independent Variable       Model A          Model B          Model C           Model D  
Constant          7.65 (.32)*       7.40 (.32)*    49.06 (8.75)*    50.22 (8.23)* 
 
U.S. FACTORS 
Economic Aid t-3        -.02 (.02)        -.53 (.17)*  
Democracy          .07 (.02)*          .72 (.14)*   
Economic Aid x Democracy             -.004 (.002)**        .03 (.03) 
Military Aid t-3                     -.04 (.02)         .15 (.26) 
Democracy            .07 (.02)*         .75 (.13)* 
Military Aid x Democracy                     -.02 (.01)*         .17 (.08)* 
       
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Economic Standing          .01 (.01)**        .02 (.01)*     1.99 (.13)*         1.96 (.13)* 
Economic Growth                      .01 (.09)            .01 (.09)          -.51 (1.46)         -.86 (1.41) 
 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
Leftist Government          .19 (.10)**        .19 (.10)**      -.67 (1.10)         -.21 (1.05) 
Military Government         -.11 (.06)*        -.11 (.06)**    -4.00 (.87)*       -4.52 (.89)* 
Military Expenditures            .01 (.04)       .01 (.04) 
Military Personnel            .01 (.001)*       .01 (.001)* 
Civil War          -.94 (.11)*        -.95 (.10)*      -1.42 (.71)*       -2.07 (.69)* 
International War         -.30 (.09)*        -.28 (.09)*        -.42 (.92)           -.21 (.90) 
Post-Cold War          -.26 (.05)*        -.27 (.05)*        1.53 (.94)**      1.56 (.94)** 
 
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS 
Population          -.28 (.02)*       -.27 (.02)*          .53 (.51)            .49 (.48) 
Population Change          .001 (.002)        .001 (.002)       -.03 (.03)          -.03 (.03) 
British Influence          .26 (.04)*          .25 (.04)*       -3.15 (1.14)*    -4.40 (1.20)* 
Buddhist             -.70 (3.32)       4.37 (2.16)* 
Muslim            -9.81 (1.08)*    -9.38 (1.22)* 
 
Number of Cases             1894          1894         1536       1536   
R2                  .79             .79            .91                   .92 
Wald X2           603.59       678.87    1046.97    705.56 
Probability > x2              0.00           0.00          0.00        0.00 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .10 
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Appendix D.  Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models 
U.S. Aid and Wealth 
(Non-OECD States) 
                   
     Security Rights           Subsistence Rights 
Independent Variable      Model A            Model B           Model C           Model D  
Constant         7.66 (.32)*       7.41 (.32)*      51.48 (8.06)*    52.05 (8.00)* 
 
U.S. FACTORS 
Economic Aid t-3        -.02 (.01)*                     -.58 (.16)*  
Wealth         .02 (.02)*         1.93 (.13)*  
Economic Aid x Wealth                   -.01 (.01)**                      .18 (.06)* 
Military Aid t-3                     -.05 (.03)          .85 (.33)* 
Wealth           .07 (.02)*        1.98 (.13)* 
Military Aid x Wealth                       -.01 (.01)        -.14 (.10) 
       
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Economic Growth                     .02 (.09)             .01 (.09)          -.58 (1.41)         -.84 (1.39) 
 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
Democracy          .07 (.01)*           .07 (.01)*         .79 (.13)*       .79 (.13)* 
Leftist Government         .18 (.10)**        .19 (.10)**    -1.13 (1.15)          -.26 (1.02) 
Military Government       -.10 (.06)**        -.11 (.06)**    -4.04 (.84)*        -4.60 (.89)* 
Military Expenditures            .01 (.04)              .01 (.04) 
Military Personnel            .01 (.001)*        .01 (.001)* 
Civil War        -.94 (.11)*          -.96 (.11)*      -1.77 (.71)*        -1.80 (.69)* 
International War       -.29 (.09)*       -.29 (.09)*        -.55 (.92)            -.23 (.91) 
Post-Cold War        -.27 (.05)*          -.26 (.05)*        1.53 (.93)**       1.55 (.94)** 
 
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS 
Population        -.28 (.02)*      -.27 (.02)*           .39 (.47)            .39 (.47) 
Population Change         .001 (.002)        .001 (.002)       -.03 (.03)            -.03 (.03) 
British Influence         .26 (.04)*          .25 (.04)*       -3.37 (1.17)*      -4.88 (1.13)* 
Buddhist            -.98 (3.60)         4.51 (2.16)* 
Muslim           -9.29 (1.10)*      -9.56 (1.26)* 
 
Number of Cases    1894           1894          1536         1536   
R2        .79              .79             .91                    .92 
Wald X2             614.13        725.96     1031.45      719.36 
Probability > x2     0.00            0.00           0.00          0.00 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .10 
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Appendix E.  Interaction Analyses: Security Rights Model 
U.S. Trade and Population  
(Non-OECD States) 
                   
       Security Rights 
Independent Variable            Model A              
Constant            7.31 (.33)* 
 
U.S. FACTORS 
Trade Openness t-1        .02 (.02) 
Population       -.26 (.02)* 
Trade x Population       -.002 (.01)                    
       
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Economic Standing             .02 (.01)*       
Economic Growth                      -.01 (.08)      
 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
Democracy           .06 (.01)*       
Leftist Government        .09 (.09)      
Military Government       -.12 (.06)*       
Civil War           -.83 (.11)*      
International War       -.34 (.08)*       
Post-Cold War        -.20 (.05)*      
 
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS 
Population Change        .001 (.002)       
British Influence        .17 (.05)*           
 
Number of Cases              2174              
R2                     .77               
Wald X2                   694.64         
Probability > x2               0.00  
 
* p < .05; ** p < .10 
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Appendix F.  Curvilinear Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models 
U.S. Trade and Investment 
(Non-OECD States) 
                   
                                      Security Rights                       Subsistence Rights     
Independent Variable      Model A         Model B            Model C            Model D  
Constant        7.51 (.31)*       7.11 (.30)*   37.86 (7.06)*    44.11 (9.62)* 
 
U.S. FACTORS 
Trade Openness t-1      -.01 (.004)*                     .34 (.08)*  
Trade Openness Squared      .0001 (.0001)*        -.003 (.001)*   
Investment t-1                   -.002 (.004)                     .11 (.04)* 
Investment Squared                   .0001 (.0001)*       -.002 (.001)* 
       
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Economic Standing       .02 (.01)*         .03 (.01)*     2.13 (.14)*         1.97 (.16)* 
Economic Growth                  -.02 (.08)         -.12 (.10)            -1.76 (1.14)        -1.07 (.98) 
 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
Democracy        .06 (.01)*         .06 (.01)*             .81 (.15)*          .70 (.13)* 
Leftist Government       .08 (.09)    .31 (.10)*             .33 (.98)         -6.63 (1.66)* 
Military Government      -.12 (.05)*   -.14 (.06)*         -6.00 (1.37)*     -4.05 (.85)* 
Military Expenditure           .04 (.04)      .03 (.05) 
Military Personnel           .004 (.001)*     -.001 (.001) 
Civil War       -.84 (.11)*       -.88 (.12)*           -.68 (.73)         -1.24 (.99) 
International War      -.34 (.09)*   -.35 (.10)*           -.76 (.75)           -.01 (.80) 
Post-Cold War       -.21 (.05)*       -.24 (.05)*           1.92 (1.11)**    2.90 (1.16)* 
 
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS 
Population       -.27 (.02)*   -.25 (.02)*           1.23 (.34)*        1.04 (.62)** 
Population Change       .001 (.002)       .01 (.003)            -.05 (.03)          -.09 (.05)** 
British Influence       .18 (.04)*         .33 (.05)*    -4.65 (1.21)*    -7.62 (1.19)* 
Buddhist           7.93 (2.19)*    18.48 (2.86)* 
Muslim         -12.25 (1.39)*  -10.22 (2.23)* 
 
Number of Cases           2174       1606         1733       1322   
R2                .77          .78            .93                   .92 
Wald X2         619.05    976.09    1495.33    257.26 
Probability > x2            0.00        0.00          0.00        0.00 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .10 
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Appendix G.  Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models 
U.S. Trade, Investment and Democracy  
(Non-OECD States) 
                   
                                    Security Rights                      Subsistence Rights     
Independent Variable     Model A          Model B            Model C             Model D  
Constant      7.47 (.31)*    7.19 (.30)*  44.58 (7.65)*   46.67 (10.55)* 
 
U.S. FACTORS 
Trade Openness t-1      .000001 (.003)      .12 (.06)*  
Democracy      .07 (.01)                                .67 (.16)   
Trade x Democracy     -.0003 (.001)                   .02 (.01)* 
Investment t-1                    .005 (.003)                       -.05 (.04) 
Democracy        .05 (.01)         .67 (.15) 
Investment x Democracy     -.0001 (.001)           .04 (.01)* 
       
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Economic Standing     .02 (.01)*           .03 (.01)*   2.12 (.14)*          1.97 (.18)* 
Economic Growth                -.02 (.08)           -.11 (.10)          -1.79 (1.11)         -1.19 (.97) 
 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
Democracy      .07 (.01)*           .05 (.01)*           .67 (.16)*      .67 (.15)* 
Leftist Government     .10 (.09)     .31 (.10)*           .12 (.93)         -6.56 (1.56)* 
Military Government    -.12 (.06)*    -.14 (.06)*       -6.16 (1.39)*      -4.07 (.83)* 
Military Expenditures          .04 (.04)     .02 (.05) 
Military Personnel          .004 (.001)*     -.0004 (.001) 
Civil War     -.84 (.11)*          -.88 (.12)*         -.69 (.73)         -1.35 (1.01) 
International War    -.34 (.08)*          -.35 (.10)*         -.68 (.72)           -.05 (.79) 
Post-Cold War     -.20 (.05)*          -.24 (.05)          1.78 (1.08)**     2.93 (1.16)* 
 
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS 
Population     -.27 (.02)*    -.26 (.02)*          .90 (.37)*           .89 (.68) 
Population Change     .001 (.002)          .01 (.003)         -.04 (.03)           -.09 (.05)** 
British Influence     .19 (.04)*            .32 (.05)*  -4.29 (1.31)*     -7.07 (1.20)* 
Buddhist         6.34 (2.31)*     18.06 (2.88)* 
Muslim                   -12.73 (1.45)*   -10.46 (2.26)* 
 
Number of Cases        2174       1604        1733       1322   
R2             .77          .79           .93                    .93 
Wald X2      693.01    951.19   1955.99    260.31 
Probability > x2         0.00        0.00         0.00        0.00 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .10 
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Appendix H.  Interaction Analyses: Security Rights and Subsistence Rights Models  
U.S. Trade, Investment and Wealth 
(Non-OECD States) 
                   
                           Security Rights          Subsistence Rights     
Independent Variable      Model A            Model B          Model C           Model D  
Constant         7.55 (.31)*        7.15 (.31)*   37.88 (6.73)*     43.79 (9.83)* 
 
U.S. FACTORS 
Trade Openness t-1     -.004 (.002)**          .35 (.05)*  
Wealth      .008 (.01)*                   2.53 (.17)  
Trade x Wealth      .001 (.001)*           -.05 (.01)* 
Investment t-1                    .01 (.004)**                                 .09 (.04)* 
Wealth        .03 (.01)*      1.99 (.17)* 
Investment x Wealth         -.001 (.001)                   -.004 (.01) 
       
DOMESTIC ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Economic Standing      .01 (.01)            .03 (.01)*   2.53 (.17)*          2.00 (.17)* 
Economic Growth                 -.01 (.08)          -.10 (.10)          -1.85 (1.13)**     -1.22 (.94) 
 
POLITICAL FACTORS 
Democracy       .07 (.01)*          .05 (.01)*          .70 (.16)*       .69 (.13)* 
Leftist Government      .10 (.09)    .32 (.10)*           .59 (.83)            -6.37 (1.62)* 
Military Government     -.13 (.06)*   -.14 (.06)*       -6.13 (1.39)*        -3.97 (.85)* 
Military Expenditures         .03 (.04)                .03 (.05) 
Military Personnel         .004 (.001)*      -.001 (.001) 
Civil War      -.84 (.11)*        -.88 (.12)*         -.33 (.72)            -1.24 (.98) 
International War     -.34 (.08)*   -.35 (.10)*         -.68 (.71)               .05 (.79) 
Post-Cold War      -.21 (.05)*        -.24 (.05)*        1.70 (1.05)           2.87 (1.15)* 
 
SOCIAL/CULTURAL FACTORS 
Population      -.27 (.02)*   -.26 (.02)*        1.18 (.34)*           1.05 (.63)** 
Population Change       .001 (.002)       .01 (.003)         -.04 (.03)             -.09 (.05)** 
British Influence       .18 (.04) *        .33 (.05)*       -3.39 (1.15)*       -7.27 (1.17)* 
Buddhist        7.67 (2.28)*       18.04 (2.91)* 
Muslim                  -11.97 (1.40)*     -10.34 (2.28)* 
 
Number of Cases            2174         1604        1733         1322   
R2     .77            .78           .92                      .92 
Wald X2          648.91      877.55   3203.90      256.10 
Probability > x2             0.00          0.00         0.00          0.00 
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